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Introduction
The executive branch of the United States government contains 15 executive depart-
ments, more than 60 independent agencies, and employs over 2.5 million civil servants.1
Using authority delegated to their agencies by law, these civil servants make and imple-
ment policies that influence virtually all aspects of modern life from the quality of the food
we eat to the security of our nation. Importantly, policymaking and implementation are
only the final steps in a sequence of decisions that determines the content and quality of
public policy. Before civil servants begin their work, the structure of an agency must be de-
fined through statute or executive action, including determining the influence that elected
officials will have over agency policymaking (Lewis 2003; Selin 2015). Once created,
agencies tend to persist for decades (Lewis 2004); therefore, agency structure will shape
public policy beyond a presidential administration, Congress, or civil servant’s career.
Presidents and Congresses do not create the expertise needed to formulate effective pub-
lic policy along with the agency. Rather, policy expertise is dependent on agency personnel.
After an agency is created, it must be staffed. The president selects political appointees to
run the agency, and individuals choose to work at the agency as career civil servants. Polit-
ical appointees set agency policy priorities and manage the career civil service, including
making decisions about work assignments and, within statutory constraints, promotions,
hiring, and firing. Presidential appointments are some of the most consequential decisions
for civil servants’ job satisfaction and, in turn, their career decisions. Civil servants’ deci-
1See Lewis and Selin (2012, pg 13-16) for discussion of the various definitions of federal agency and
the number of federal agencies listed by official sources. The Office of Personnel Management’s Central
Personnel Data File (CPDF) lists 2,044,419 federal employees as of March 2017. This data is available
here: https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/employment.asp. However, this number excludes some agencies, like
the United States Postal Service (USPS) and the Federal Reserve Board. The USPS employed 508,908
career employees and 130,881 non-career employees as of September 30, 2016 (http://about.usps.com/who-
we-are/postal-facts/size-scope.htm, accessed July 21, 2017). The CPDF also excludes uniformed military
personnel. Lewis and Selin (2012, page 12, footnote 27) collect data for agencies excluded by the CPDF and
count 2.85 million civilian federal employees as of 2012.
1
sions about whether to remain in public service and, if so, whether to work hard building
and applying policy expertise largely determine the stock of policy expertise in federal
agencies across presidential administrations.
In this dissertation, I examine each step in the sequence of decisions preceding policy-
making and implementation: agency design, presidential appointment strategies, and civil
servants’ career decisions. In the first chapter, I develop a formal model of the politics of
agency design. Scholars have made much progress theorizing about elected officials’ views
about agency creation (e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran 1994; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999;
Gailmard 2002; Lewis 2003; Wiseman 2009), but less progress has been made understand-
ing the preferences of interest groups despite their prominent role in the politics of agency
design (De Figueiredo 2002; Moe 1989). I examine how an interest group’s preferences
over the creation and subsequent insulation of a federal agency from political control vary
as a function of three parameters: first, the group’s expectation that it will be able to in-
fluence agency policymaking; second, the similarity between the group’s policy preference
and that of a representative civil servant who will work in the agency; and, finally, the
similarity between the group’s policy preference and that of an opposing group.
Overall, the model provides testable predictions about when interest groups prefer the
creation of insulated agencies, uninsulated agencies, or no agency at all that can improve
our understanding of agency design. I discuss how groups’ expectations about their fu-
ture policy influence may vary systematically by type of interest group environment, which
yields predictions about which interest group environments are most likely to generate
insulated agencies. I conclude this chapter by sketching a reformulation of the model that
incorporates lawmaking under separation of powers and more dynamic interest group com-
petition to generate predictions about what agencies will be created in equilibrium in addi-
tion to what agency groups prefer in equilibrium.
One aspect of agency insulation is the number of appointed positions in an agency.
In the second chapter, I examine how presidents fill appointed positions. Scholars have
2
generated competing predictions about if and when it is optimal for the president to select
political appointees whose policy views are as similar to the president’s ideology as pos-
sible. A basic principal-agent model would predict that the president should always select
an appointee that shares her ideology exactly (e.g., Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). Schol-
ars have examined how Senate-confirmation may constrain presidents’ ability to put their
ideological clones in office (e.g., Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015) and how the fact that
appointees must manage career civil servants may cause presidents to prefer appointees
who oppose or share the ideology of these civil servants rather than an ideological clone of
themselves (Jo and Rothenberg 2014).
I use two surveys of senior federal employees – one fielded at the end of President
George W. Bush’s second term and one fielded at the end of President Obama’s second
term to generate comparable estimates of the ideology of presidents, political appointees,
and career civil servants. I then use the estimates to evaluate these predictions. I find that
the ideology of the president is more similar to the ideology of appointees who the president
appoints unilaterally than the ideology of appointees who must be confirmed by the Senate.
This suggests that Senate confirmation does constrain the president’s choice of appointee.
I find that, unsurprisingly, President Obama tends to select liberal appointees and Pres-
ident Bush tends to select conservative appointees. However, within administrations pres-
idents tend to select appointees whose ideology is similar to the ideology of civil servants
working in the agency. This finding is consistent with an underlying formal model (Jo and
Rothenberg 2014) that emphasizes that career civil servants possess greater policy expertise
than political appointees, which gives civil servants an informational advantage and causes
presidents to select appointees with preferences similar to careerists to promote informa-
tion sharing. This finding is also consistent with an underlying formal model in which
political appointees vary in both ideological congruence with the president and policy ex-
pertise (e.g., Hollibaugh, Jr 2015). If the president requires appointees to have a minimum
level of expertise and expertise is correlated with ideology, then there should be a posi-
3
tive correlation between the ideology of expert appointees and expert career civil servants.
While additional work is needed to isolate the mechanism responsible for the correlation,
the finding implies that presidents are willing to trade some ideological congruence with
their appointees to increase the level of expertise used to formulate public policy.
In the third and final chapter, I use data from the survey of senior federal employees
during the Obama Administration to analyze the effect of politicization, defined as concen-
trating policy influence among political appointees at an agency, on civil servants’ career
decisions. Presidents select appointees who share their policy views to ensure that their
policy agenda is faithfully implemented across the executive branch (Edwards III 2001;
Golden 2000; Lewis 2008; Moe 1985; Nathan 1975; Waterman 1989; Weko 1995). One
way that appointees do this is by concentrating policy influence among appointees and ex-
cluding civil servants with divergent views from policymaking. I find that civil servants
whose policy preferences diverge from those of political appointees are more likely to per-
ceive that their agency is politicized, and that civil servants who perceived their agency is
politicized are more likely to express intent to exit their agency and less likely to engage in
behaviors that build policy expertise. Many civil servants work for the federal government
because they care about the content of public policy. Politicization reduces their policy in-
fluence, which reduces their job satisfaction leading to increased turnover or, if they remain
in public service, less on-the-job effort. In total, these findings provide some of the first
systematic, micro-level evidence demonstrating how presidential efforts to gain control of
policymaking via political appointments can reduce agency policy expertise.
A common theme throughout my dissertation is the significant heterogeneity within
the executive branch, heterogeneity that can be a function of agency, position, or both.
Examining this heterogeneity lights a path forward for my research agenda. Chapter 1 dis-
cusses the importance of theorizing about the differential effects of the various statutory
mechanisms used to insulate agencies from political control (e.g., party-balancing require-
ments versus exempting agency rulemaking from review by the Office of Information and
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Regulatory Affairs). Understanding how these specific insulating mechanisms affect both
political control and agency performance will help us better understand when groups and
elected officials prefer which mechanisms. Chapter 2 discusses the importance of consid-
ering how the location of an appointed position in the internal agency hierarchy, the type
of expertise needed for the position, and statutory limitations on the president’s appoint-
ment authority affect presidential appointment strategies. A better characterization of how
presidents use their appointment authority will help us better understand the dynamics of
agency politicization and the maintenance of policy expertise across administrations.
In sum, how federal agencies are designed, the appointees whom presidents choose,
and the career decisions of civil servants all have important consequences for the content
and quality of public policy. This dissertation helps us to understand each of these choices,
but there is more work to be done to understand how heterogeneity within the executive
branch affects the relationships between these choices.
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Chapter 1
Interest Groups and the Politics of Agency Design
Federal agencies make policy decisions that affect most aspects of modern life from
highways to health care to banking. It is clear that the quality of these decisions are material
determinants of citizens’ quality of life, yet both citizens and politicians complain that
American federal agencies are often inefficient and ineffective.
Scholars point to the design of administrative agencies as a key factor that determines
performance. One of the primary explanations for why agencies in the United States are
not effective is that the interest groups that are influential in designing the agency confront
political uncertainty and pressure to compromise with opponents (Moe 1989; Moe and
Caldwell 1994). Enacting coalitions worry that today’s policy victory will be undone if
an opposing group becomes influential tomorrow. This uncertainty causes groups to favor
structural features that insulate their policy victories from future political influence. In-
sulation, however, may come at the cost agency performance. For example, groups may
create formal restrictions that limit the discretion of bureaucrats tasked with making policy,
or impose detailed procedures for decisionmaking to ensure that bureaucrats incorporate
considerations important to the group. However, limiting discretion and imposing rigid
procedures create costs in terms of flexibility and efficiency, respectively. Agency design is
also the result of compromise. Groups favoring the creation of new agencies must compro-
mise with opponents to ensure that legislation that creates agencies is signed into law. This
need to compromise provides opposing groups the opportunity to choose agency character-
istics that are intended to impede agency performance.
Given the scope and influence of agency policymaking, coupled with the potential for
design choices to affect the content and quality of policymaking, understanding the de-
terminants of agency creation and design is clearly an important task. Political scientists
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have made much progress explaining politician’s views about agency creation and design
(e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran 1994; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Gailmard 2002; Lewis
2003; Wiseman 2009; also see Gailmard and Patty 2012, for a review of formal models of
delegation), but comparatively less progress regarding what interests groups want. Moe’s
(1989) initial theory did not discuss how political uncertainty might vary across groups
or time or how groups’ preferences over agency design and creation are influenced by
the preferences of bureaucrats that will work in the agency. I argue a key determinant of
uncertainty is a group’s political resources (e.g., public support, money, technical exper-
tise). These resources may be useful in influencing politicians when legislation is being
crafted, bureaucrats when they are specifying policy, or both. Subsequent work clarified
the relationship between electoral uncertainty (which I argue is a particular type of polit-
ical uncertainty, but not the only source) and policy insulation, but this work also did not
consider bureaucrats’ policy preferences. To better understand groups’ preferences over
agency design, I model the effects of the likelihood a group retains influence over public
policy and its preference congruence with bureaucrats working in the agency to identify
conditions that induce interest groups to prefer agencies that are not subject to political
control.
My analytical results reveal that a group’s preferences over agency creation and insu-
lation depend on both the likelihood that it retains influence and the policy preferences of
bureaucrats. My results are consistent with De Figueiredo (2002) who demonstrates that
groups that expect to lose policymaking authority are most likely to prefer insulation. Im-
portantly, I find that if bureaucrats are expected to have policy preferences very similar to
the group, even groups that expect to retain policymaking influence will prefer insulation.
Additionally, if bureaucrats are expected to have policy preferences very dissimilar to the
group, then groups that expect to lose policymaking authority are likely to prefer to re-
tain some political control over the agency, or simply retain the status quo policy. Before
concluding, I discuss how my findings provide insight into what interest group environ-
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ments are most likely to produce more insulated agencies. I also discuss a reformulation
of the model that incorporates lawmaking under separation of powers and includes a richer
treatment of interest group competition.
1.1 Interest Groups and Agency Design
The politics of agency design is fundamentally about interest groups (Moe 1989). In-
terest groups have clear policy goals in their issue areas and they understand how agency
structure affects their abilities to accomplish these goals. They are willing to mobilize po-
litical resources to pressure politicians to get the agency they want; whereas voters, if they
even have policy goals, almost certainly lack understanding of how agency structure affects
policy (Bartels 2003; Converse 1964). Voters’ lack of understanding often leaves interest
groups as the sole purveyor of political pressure regarding agency design.
Groups’ preferred agency structures are not only determined by what structures are
most beneficial to effective policymaking, but also what structures ensure that their policy
victories are durable across time. Political uncertainty, meaning uncertainty about who will
wield policymaking authority in the future, creates fear that today’s policy victory will be
undone if an opposing group becomes influential tomorrow. This uncertainty causes groups
to favor structural features that insulate their policy victories from future political influence.
Groups can choose various mechanisms to insulate their policies from political control
(Lewis 2003; Moe 1989; Selin 2015). They can write detailed legislation that removes bu-
reaucratic discretion (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). They can ensure that administrative
procedures create policymaking processes that ensure their interests are represented (Mc-
Cubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989). They can place restrictions on appointees the
president can select to run the agency, and, finally, they can exempt agency policymaking
from review by politicians (Lewis 2003; Selin 2015). The American separation of powers
system means that legislation, once it becomes law, proves to be difficult to overturn (Kre-
hbiel 1998; Moe and Caldwell 1994). Therefore, groups have confidence that the structure
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they choose can endure even if they do indeed lose political power.
1.1.1 Resources and Political Uncertainty
In the context of agency design, political uncertainty is often associated with electoral
uncertainty (De Figueiredo 2002; Lewis 2003), meaning uncertainty over whether politi-
cians that support a group’s policy goals will be replaced by opponents. As noted above,
however, groups have resources that they are willing to devote to achieve their political
goals. If we define political resources to be any tool that a group can use to influence pol-
icymakers, including politicians and bureaucrats, then groups’ stocks of resources should
translate into their abilities to influence policymakers. Important examples of political re-
sources are the number of group members, geographic coverage of group members, mon-
etary resources, and technical expertise.1 The number of group members and a group’s
geographic coverage are important determinants of a group’s ability to direct votes. Mon-
etary resources can be used to fund lobbying, campaign donations, or research to support
a given position. Technical expertise is information about the likely effects of particular
policies. These resources are not evenly distributed across groups, and different resources
will be useful at different stages of policymaking process. Support from a large portion of
the public with large geographic coverage is useful for influencing members of Congress,
for example, but it would not be as useful for specifying the technical points of policy. It
follows that a group’s political uncertainty may be related not only to the policy preferences
of politicians in office, but also to the ability of a group (as determined by its resources) to
participate in policymaking after an agency is created.
Groups that are trying to create an agency that regulates an industry in the public in-
terest serve as a useful illustration. Such groups typically rely on broad public support to
influence elected officials to create the agency the group prefers, but they lack the techni-
cal expertise or monetary resources that are often necessary to participate in policymaking
1I do not claim that this list is original. See Baron (2013) for an explanation of these, and other, resources.
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after the agency is created.2 Opposing groups, typically business interests, may lack pub-
lic support, but have technical expertise useful to agencies in making policy and monetary
resources that ensure they can participate in the policymaking process either through lob-
bying or the courts.
Consider, for example, the creation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. The
Commission was created by the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 to regulate con-
sumer products, and to ban those products that pose an unreasonable risk of injury.3,4
The proponents of the Commission were consumer groups and activists like Ralph Nader,
whose book Unsafe at Any Speed was a catalyst for the consumer movement of the 1960’s.
Opponents were (mostly) regulated firms.
The role of resources is demonstrated nicely by the testimony that Don Willner, Na-
tional President of the Consumer Federation of America, offered at a Congressional hear-
ing on the creation of the CPSC. In response to his support for a consumer advocate who
would be an employee of the Commission, Mr. Willner was asked if any private consumer
group had the funds or personnel to perform such a role. He responded that the Federation
was the largest consumer organization in the United States, but had only two professional
employees and one secretary as staff. He went on to say, “I know times like when a regula-
tory agency holds a hearing, and on one side of the table are the industry and their lawyers,
and their economists, people who carry the brief cases for the lawyer, and then you look
on the other side of the table and who is there?”5 Clearly, Mr. Willner was concerned that
consumer groups would not be able to influence policymaking after agency creation due
to their lack of resources. On its face, it appears that consumers groups did not expect to
have policy influence after an agency was created, and that concern was divorced from the
2See Patashnik 2003 and Wilson’s 1989, Ch. 5, discussion of entrepreneurial interest group environments.
3U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 1971, 1972. Consumer Produce Safety Act. 92nd Congress, 1st and
2nd sess., 1,2,3 November; 1,2,6,7,8,9; 24 January; 1,2,3 February.
4U.S. Senate. Committee on Commerce. 1971. Consumer Product Safety Act of 1971. 92nd Congress,
1st sess., 19,21,22,23,26 July.
5Ibid., page 189.
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preferences of future office holders.
The point here is not that electoral competition is an unimportant factor in determining
political uncertainty, but rather that it may not be a primary concern in every case. In
particular, if a group does not possess the resources to participate in policymaking after
agency creation, then it may expect to lack policy influence regardless of the preferences
of elected officials.
1.1.2 Agency Creation and Delegation
The decision to insulate an agency from political control is essentially a decision to
to delegate policymaking authority to the bureaucrats that will work in the agency. The
more insulated an agency is, the less politicians are able to influence agency policymak-
ing, and the more bureaucrats are able to determine agency policy. There is significant
variation in the ideology of bureaucrats across the executive branch (Aberbach, Putnam,
and Rockman 1981; Clinton et al. 2012; Clinton and Lewis 2008). If bureaucrats select
into agencies based on agency mission, then bureaucrats in an agency should have similar
policy views. Moreover, self-selection gives interest groups an expectation regarding the
policy views of the bureaucrats that will work in an agency and the degree to which they
will share the preferences of the interest group. For example, an environmental protection
interest group should expect that people who want to work for a prospective environmental
protection agency will want to improve environmental protection. Therefore, the group
expects bureaucrats in the agency, perhaps on average, to have similar policy goals to the
interest group. This preference similarity should then influence the group’s preferences for
insulating the bureaucrats from future political control.
In the next section, I develop a model that is designed to clarify the relationship between
the likelihood a group has policy influence after agency creation, preference congruence
between a group and a career bureaucrat who will work in the agency, and the group’s
preferences over the creation and insulation of the agency.
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1.2 The Model
Creating an agency requires answering two questions. First, should an agency be cre-
ated? Second, if it should be created, what should the structure of the agency be? A group’s
answers to these questions will be determined by the policy that the agency is expected to
create. I develop a model of agency creation and design, followed by policymaking by the
agency. To be clear, equilibrium behavior characterizes the agency a group prefers, not
necessarily what agency would be created via the lawmaking process.
I assume that policy is unidimensional: p ∈ R1, that there is an exogenous status quo
policy, q ∈ R1, and that there are two interest groups G1 and G2 with ideal points x1 ∈ R1
and x2 ∈R1, respectively. The game begins with G1 choosing whether to create an agency,
A, with insulation level λ ∈ [0,1] or retain the status quo policy. This assumes no pressure
to compromise because G1 is able to choose whether to create an agency and the level of
insulation without any influence by G2. This allows me to focus on the effect of political
uncertainty to untangle the influence of uncertainty and compromise on design. More-
over, this specification implies that politicians are essentially conduits of interest group
preferences, which is admittedly a strong assumption. That said, assuming politicians are
conduits of interest group pressure is congruent with the motivating theory (Moe 1989, p.
277-278).6
After the agency creation decision, nature selects G1 or G2 to have policymaking au-
thority. G1 retains authority to influence policymaking with probability θ ∈ (0,1). Oth-
erwise, G2 comes to power. This captures uncertainty about the group’s ability to control
future policy outcomes. An implication of the assumption that θ ∈ (0,1) is that neither
group expects to have control with certainty.7
6It is also consistent with assumptions of other formal models of policy insulation and political uncertainty
(De Figueiredo 2002). However, it is not consistent with characterizations of presidents’ preferences over
agency design (Lewis 2003; Moe 1989). Presidents are argued to oppose insulation because it limits their
ability to effectively control policymaking in the executive branch.
7This assumption also avoids tedious cases that add little to model analysis, for example, θ = 0 and
x2 = B, where B is the exogenous ideal point of a civil servant who works in the agency.
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If G1 creates an agency, the agency will have ideal point xA = (1−λ )xi+λB, i= {1,2},
where xi is the ideal point of the group in power, and B is the exogenous ideal point of the
careerists that selected into the agency based on agency mission. Thus, greater insulation
limits interest groups’ political control over the agency and increases the influence of career
bureaucrats.8
All players have single peaked preferences over policy outcomes and strictly prefer
policies closer to their ideal point. Player i’s utility function can be represented by the
following functional form, which assumes risk aversion:
Ui =−(p− xi)2, i = {1,2,A}
I assume x1 ≤ B ≤ x2 and x1 < x2. Thus, the career bureaucrat’s ideal point is not more
extreme than either of the interest groups and the interest groups do not share the same
ideal point. After nature’s draw, the agency chooses p. Let C = {Yes,No} where “Yes” is
a decision by G1 to create the agency and “No” is a decision by G1 to not create the agency
and retain the status quo policy.9 Strategy profiles are S1 = {C,λ} and SA = {p}.
Figure 1.1 presents the extensive form of this game. I solve for the Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium using backward induction. After Nature’s move, A will set p equal to xA
to maximize its utility, which yields the policy outcomes shown in Figure 1.1.
Before evaluating G1’s optimal insulation decision, it is useful to examine the effect of
8By assuming that greater insulation limits interest group influence, I am making a strong simplifying
assumption about the venues a group can use to influence the agency. Specifically, I am assuming that the
insulation limits interest group control. One interpretation is that this model is limited to control exercised
via politicians that specific insulation mechanisms can limit. For example, an expertise requirement for an
appointed position limits appointment authority of the president. However, certain avenues of influence (e.g.,
the right to sue an agency regarding a regulation) remain open to interest groups even for insulated agencies.
This also suggests that if insulation mechanisms limit control by politicians, then insulation may actually
increase group influence of an agency given a group has venues of access independent of politicians. In this
case, insulation could increase group influence by excluding competing influence from politicians.
9This assumption forces the group to create the agency if it wants to change policy from the status quo.
The group is unable to set policy directly via legislation, say set policy at p= x1, which would be a dominant
strategy given there is no policy uncertainty. This assumption simplifies the delegation decision to focus on
the optimal insulation decision at the cost of the realism of the range of policymaking options available to the
group. A model extension that addresses this simplification may be helpful to provide additional insight into
when groups’ prefer to create an agency.
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Figure 1.1: Extensive Form of the Agency Insulation Game
G1
G1
p = q
N
A
A
p = (1−λ )x1+λB
p = (1−λ )x2+λB
C=Yes
C=No
λ ∈ [0,1] θ
1−θ
p ∈ R
p ∈ R
insulation on policy given A’s optimal policy decision. If G1 creates the agency, the result is
a lottery over two policy outcomes – the policy that is realized if G1 retains power (denote
this p1) and the policy realized if G2 gains power (denote this p2). By insulating the agency,
G1 can reduce the variance in expected policy by moving the two policy outcomes closer to
B.10 Additionally, the closer B is to x1, the less costly the reduction in variance is in terms
of policy to G1. See Section A.1 of Appendix A for derivations of the changes in policy,
expected policy, and the variance in expected policy with respect to insulation.
Figure 1.2 shows the range of p1 and p2 for all levels of insulation (top panel) and
compares possible realizations of p1 and p2 (middle and bottom panels) to illustrate both
relationships. The top panel shows that x1≤ p1≤B and B≤ p2≤ x2. If G1 does not insulate
the agency (i.e., λ = 0), then p1 = x1 and p2 = x2 resulting in the greatest distance between
p1 and p2. Conversely, if G1 fully insulates the agency (i.e., λ = 1), then p1 = p2 = B and
there is no variance in agency policymaking. The change in pi with respect to λ is B− xi,
i= {1,2}. If x1 < B < x2, the effect of increasing insulation on p1 is positive and the effect
of increasing insulation on p2 is negative. Therefore, increasing insulation shifts p1 away
from x1 and shifts p2 toward x1. Accordingly, the middle and lower panels in Figure 1.2
show that if insulation is moderate (i.e., λ = 0.5), then p1 and p2 are both shifted closer to
B, but not equivalent to B. Additionally, the magnitude of the change in pi with respect to
10Var[p] = θ(1−θ)(x1− x2)2(1−λ )2
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Figure 1.2: The Policy Lottery, Insulation, and the Importance of B
x1 x2B
p1 = (1−λ )x1+λB p2 = (1−λ )x2+λB
x1 x2B
p1 p2
x1 x2B
p1 p2
Note: The top figure gives the range of p1 and p2 that are realizable for all values of λ . The middle and
bottom panels give p1 and p2 for λ = 0.5. For all panels, x1 = 1 and x2 = 11. B is 6, 3.5, and 8.5 in the top,
middle, and bottom panels, respectively.
insulation is equal to distance between B and xi. Therefore, the closer B is to x1 the smaller
the shift in p1 away from x1 and the larger the shift in p2 toward x1 for a given increase in
insulation. The middle and bottom panels of Figure 1.2 illustrate this effect. Moderately
insulating the agency (λ = 0.5) yields the same reduction in variance in expected policy in
the middle and lower panels of the figure. However, both p1 and p2 are closer to x1 when
B is close x1 (the middle panel) than when B is far from x1 (the bottom panel).
1.2.1 Optimal Level of Insulation
Given A’s optimal policy decision, p = (1− λ )x1 + λB if G1 retains power and p =
(1− λ )x2 + λB if G2 gains power. It follows that G1’s expected utility of creating the
agency is:
E[U1(C = Yes,λ )] =−θ [(1−λ )x1+λB− x1]2− (1−θ)[(1−λ )x2+λB− x1]2.
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Taking first order conditions of EU1 with respect to λ yields the unbounded optimal level
of insulation (λ ′):
λ ′ =
(1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2)
θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2 .
Given that λ ∈ [0,1], the following result characterizes the optimal insulation decision
by G1 for all relevant regions of the parameter space. See Section A.2 of Appendix A for
derivation of the optimal insulation decision. G1’s optimal insulation decision is:
λ ∗ =
 1 if B ∈ [x1,x2−θ(x2− x1)](1−θ)(B−x2)(x1−x2)
θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2 if B ∈ [x2−θ(x2− x1),x2]
Figure 1.3 helps to clarify this result. In the top panel in the figure, G1 prefers full
insulation. Greater insulation shifts expected policy closer to B and further from expected
policy given no insulation, E[p(λ = 0)] = x2−θ(x2− x1).11 It follows that, if B is closer
to x1 than expected policy given no insulation, G1 prefers policy at B with certainty (i.e.,
λ = 1). Once B is farther from x1 than expected policy given no insulation (the bottom
panel), G1 prefers to reduce insulation and retain some political control to move expected
policy closer to x1. In this case, risk aversion results in expected policy given optimal
insulation that is farther from x1 than expected policy given no insulation.
Figure 1.4 plots the optimal level of insulation across the range of B for θ = {0.25,0.50,0.95}.12
As B moves from x1 toward x2, G1 will set λ = 1 if B≤ x2−θ(x2−x1). The optimal level
of insulation decreases as B approaches x2 because, while increasing insulation reduces the
extremity of policy if G2 gains power, increasing insulation moves expected policy closer
to x2 if B > x2−θ(x2− x1). Therefore, if B is sufficiently far from x1, insulation is more
costly to G1, and it prefers to retain some political control over the agency.
11E[p(C = Yes,λ )] = θ [(1− λ )x1 + λB] + (1− θ)[(1− λ )x2 + λB] = (1− λ )[x2− θ(x2− x1)]+ λB→
E[p(C =Yes,λ = 0)] = x2−θ(x2−x1). The derivative of expected policy with respect to λ is decreasing for
B < x2−θ(x2− x1).
12Figure A.1 in Appendix A plots λ ∗ for all values of B and θ .
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Figure 1.3: Expected Policy for All Levels of Insulation and Optimal Insulation
x1 x2E[p(λ = 0)]E[p(λ = λ ∗ = 1)] = B
E[p(λ )] = [θx1+(1−θ)x2](1−λ )+λB
x1 x2E[p(λ = 1)] = BE[p(λ = 0)] E[p(λ = λ ∗)]
E[p(λ )] = [θx1+(1−θ)x2](1−λ )+λB
Note: This figures gives the range of possible expected policies for all λ ∈ [0,1] and expected policy for
λ = λ ∗ for two cases: B < E[p(λ = 0)] = θx1 + (1− θ)x2 in the top example and B > E[p(λ = 0)] =
θx1+(1−θ)x2 in the bottom example. For both examples, x1 = 1 and x2 = 14. In upper example, B = 4.25
and θ = 0.25. In the lower example, B = 11 and θ = 0.75
The range of B for which G1 prefers full insulation also depends on θ , the probability
G1 will have policy influence after agency creation, and the location of x2. The range is
decreasing in θ . As θ increases, expected policy given no insulation is closer to x1 because
G1 is more likely to be have policy influence in the future. The gray vertical lines in Figure
1.4 demonstrate how G1 fully insulates the agency over a smaller range of B at higher values
of θ . If G1 is confident it will have policymaking authority (θ = 0.95), then it is prefers to
retain more political control as B diverges from G1’s ideal policy. Likewise, if G1 expects to
lose policymaking authority (θ = 0.25), then it is more willing to fully insulate the agency
as B’s preferences diverge and only begins to retain some political control when B is close
to x2. In this case, G1 is willing to fully insulate B, which will result in p = B, even when
B has quite divergent preferences, because the most likely outcome is G2 exercising policy
influence after agency creation. In other words, if G1 expects to lose authority, then it
often prefers no political influence of agency policymaking because it is unlikely that G1
will wield political control over the agency. This result mirrors De Figueiredo’s (2002)
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result that groups that expect to lose power are more likely to insulate. My model also
demonstrates that if the preferences of bureaucrats are too different from the group, even
a group that expects to lose power will prefer an uninsulated agency. Moreover, if the
preferences of bureaucrats are very similar to the group, even a group that expects to have
power will prefer an insulated agency.
The range of B for which G1 prefers full insulation is increasing in x2. As x2 moves
away from x1, the extremity of policy if G2 has policy influence increases, making insula-
tion more attractive. More specifically, the rate of change is equal to 1−θ , which demon-
strates that the more certain G1 is that it will have policy influence, the less an increase in
the divergence between x1 and x2 increases the range of B for which G1’s prefers full insu-
lation. In short, the more G1 and G2 disagree about policy, the more attractive insulation
is, particularly for groups that are less certain they will retain policymaking authority.
In summary, I can make three statements about G1’s preference for insulation. First, the
less the bureaucrat that works in the agency shares G1’s policy preference, the less willing
G1 is insulate her from policy influence. Second, as G1 becomes more certain it will retain
policymaking authority, it is less willing to insulate and give up political control. Lastly,
the more G2’s ideal policy differs from G1’s ideal policy, the more G1 prefers insulation
to limit G2’s policy influence should it come to power; however, the more confident G1
is it will retain power, the less an increase in preference divergence between G1 and G2
increases G1’s preferred level of insulation. Crucially, the exact mapping of each of these
variables into G1’s choice of insulation is dependent on the other parameters in the model,
which I explain further below.
1.2.2 Optimal Agency Creation Decision
Having characterized the optimal insulation decision, I now turn to determining when
a group will prefer to create an agency. Simply put, G1 will prefer to not create the agency
and retain the status quo if and only if its expected utility from creation is less than its
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Figure 1.4: Optimal Insulation Across B
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Note: This figure plots optimal insulation (λ ∗) across the range of B for three probabilities that G1 has policy
influence after agency creation (θ ). The points pλ=0,θ denote expected policy evaluated at λ = 0 (i.e., no
policy insulation) and θ = {0.25,0.50,0.75}.
utility from maintaining the status quo:
U1(C = No,λ )> EU1(C = Yes,λ ∗)
→−(q− x1)2 >−θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2− (1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2
Solving this inequality for q and inserting the optimal level of insulation (see Section A.3
of Appendix A for derivation of the optimal creation decision and its properties) yields the
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range of status quo for which G1 strictly prefers to retain the status quo, rather than create
an agency:
qNo =

(2x1−B,B) if B ∈ [x1,x2−θ(x2− x1)](
x1−
√
θ(1−θ)(B−x1)2(x1−x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
,
x1+
√
θ(1−θ)(B−x1)2(x1−x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
)
if B ∈ [x2−θ(x2− x1),x2]
To glean some intuition from these intervals, Figure 1.5 shows the length of the intervals
for which G1 prefers not to create the agency when G1 fully insulates the agency (i.e., B
less than expected policy given no insulation) and when G1 prefers some political control
(i.e., B is greater than expected policy given no insulation) holding all other parameters in
the model constant. For B less than expected policy given no insulation (the upper panel),
G1 fully insulates the agency resulting in p = B with certainty. In this case, G1 will create
the agency if and only if it prefers p = B to p = q. If B is greater than expected policy
given no insulation (the lower panel), G1 prefers to retain some political control to yield
expected policy closer to x1 than B. However, due to risk aversion, the status quo must be
farther from x1 than expected policy for G1 to create the agency. The effect of risk aversion
is shown in lower panel of Figure 1.5 by q+ > E[p(λ = λ ∗)], where q+ and q− give the
upper and lower bounds of qNo, respectively.
To better illustrate how qNo depends on both the location of B and the likelihood that
G1 retains power, Figure 1.6 plots the length qNo across the range of the bureaucrat’s ideal
point, B, for the values of θ that are illustrated in Figure 1.4.13 The curve in Figure 1.4
for θ = 0.25 corresponds to the two intervals of qNo shown in Figure 1.5. Given θ = 0.25,
G1 expects to lose power and will insulate the agency over a large range of B. Therefore,
qNo increases linearly at a rate of 2 as B approaches x2, and qNo does not depend on θ .
This result demonstrates that when a group’s optimal insulation decision is full insulation,
13Figure A.2 in Appendix A plots the length qNo for all values of B and θ .
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Figure 1.5: Size of the “No-Agency” Interval as B approaches x2
x1 x2E[p(λ = 0)]B = E[p(λ = λ ∗ = 1)]2x1−B
qNo
x1 x2Bq+q−
E[p(λ = 0)] E[p(λ = λ ∗)]
qNo
Note: This figures gives the range of the interval of status quo for wich G1 will not create the agency, qNo,
for two cases: B < E[p(λ = 0)] = θx1 +(1−θ)x2 in the top panel and B > E[p(λ = 0)] = θx1 +(1−θ)x2
in the bottom panel. For both examples, x1 = 4 and x2 = 14, and θ = 0.25. In the upper panel, B = 7. In the
lower panel, B = 13. The upper and lower bounds of qNo are give by q+ and q−, respectively, in the lower
panel.
the group allows the bureaucrat to set policy without any political influence; therefore, the
greater the preference divergence between the bureaucrat and the group, the less likely the
group is to create the agency (i.e., the larger the set of status quo for which the group prefers
retaining the status quo to creating the agency). The result can also be seen by comparing
the size of qNo in the upper and lower panels of Figure 1.5.
For B greater than expected policy given no insulation, G1 decreases insulation as B ap-
proaches x2 reducing the influence of B on expected final policy. For example, if θ = 0.95,
G1 decreases insulation rapidly as B approaches x2 (Figure 1.4), which corresponds to a
decreasing rate of increase in qNo as B approaches x2 (Figure 1.6).14 This result demon-
strates that preference divergence between the group and the bureaucrat is less important
for determining whether the group creates the agency the more certain the group is that it
will retain power.
14The length of qNo is maximized with respect to B at B = x2.
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Figure 1.6: Size of the “No-Agency” Interval Across B
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Note: This figure plots the size of the interval for which G1 prefers to not create the agency across the range
of B for three probabilities that G1 has policy influence after agency creation (θ ). The points pλ=0,θ denote
expected policy evaluated at λ = 0 (i.e., no policy insulation) and θ = {0.25,0.50,0.95}. The maximum of
this interval is 2(x2− x1) given x1 ≤ B≤ x2.
1.2.3 Agency Design in Equilibrium
Having described the optimal insulation and agency creation decisions by G1, I can now
characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium to the game. The Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium consists of an optimal creation decision, C, by G1, an optimal insulation
decision, λ , by G1, and an optimal policy decision, p, by the agency, A, as follows:
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S∗1 =

C = Yes,λ = 1 if B ∈ [x1,x2−θ(x2− x1)] and q 6∈ (2x1−B,B),
C = Yes,λ = (1−θ)(B−x2)(x1−x2)θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2 if B ∈ [x2−θ(x2− x1),x2] and q 6∈ (q−,q+),
C = No,λ = [0,1] if B ∈ [x1,x2−θ(x2−1)] and q ∈ [2x1−B,B]
or B ∈ [x2−θ(x2−1),x2] and q ∈ [q−,q+]

,
where q− = x1−
√
θ(1−θ)(B−x1)2(x1−x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
,
and q+ = x1+
√
θ(1−θ)(B−x1)2(x1−x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
.
S∗A =
{
p = xA
}
This equilibrium demonstrates that a group’s optimal insulation and agency creation
decisions depend on both the preferences of bureaucrats who will work in the agency and
the group’s expectation about future policymaking authority. Together Figures 1.4 and 1.6
illustrate how a bureaucrat’s preferences, B, and expectations about future policy authority,
θ , influence these decisions. When B is very close to x1 (say less than pλ=0,θ=0.95), then
groups that expect to retain power (θ = 0.95) and groups that do not (θ = 0.25) create fully
insulated agencies and will create the agency for the same broad range of q. The similarity
of B and x1 make insulation inexpensive (recall Figure 1.2) and ensuring final policy is
at B with certainty is very attractive. As B moves away from x1 toward x2, however, a
group that expects to retain power is able to rely on expected future policy authority to
achieve desirable policy outcomes. The group reduces insulation relatively rapidly as B
approaches x2, thereby, reducing the influence of B on expected policy. Reducing insulation
also reduces the influence of B on the range of status quo for which the group prefers to
create the agency, which is illustrated by the nearly flat slope given θ = 0.95 in Figure
1.6 once the group begins decreasing insulation. On the contrary, a group that expects to
lose power (θ = 0.25) must rely on insulating B to achieve preferred policy outcomes. The
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group continues to insulate B fully as B approaches x2, and the group only begins to reduce
insulation when B is quite close to x2. When the group relies on full insulation of B, it
only prefers to create the agency if p = B is preferred to p = q. Therefore, an increase in
preference divergence between the group and the bureaucrat maps linearly into an increase
in the range of q for which the agency prefers to create the agency. This linear relationship
is reflected in the steep slope given θ = 0.25 in Figure 1.6, and persists until the group
begins to decrease insulation once B is close to x2.
In short, three conclusions about agency insulation and creation can be drawn from the
equilibrium. First, if the preferences of career bureaucrats are very close to the preferences
of the group, then groups that expect to lose power, as well as groups that expect to retain
power, will create fully insulated agencies for a broad range of status quo policies. Sec-
ond, groups that expect to retain power are generally more likely to create less-insulated
agencies, and they do so over a broader range of status quo than groups that expect to
lose power. Finally, groups that expect to lose power will most likely create fully-insulated
agencies, but only if there is sufficient preference congruence between the group and career
bureaucrats. Because such groups essentially delegate complete policymaking authority to
the bureaucrat by limiting political influence, the more the preferences of the bureaucrat
differ from the group, the more extreme the status quo must be for the group to prefer to
create the agency.
1.3 Discussion
The contribution of my model is demonstrating the importance of the preferences of bu-
reaucrats that will work in the agency, in conjunction with groups’ expectations about their
future policy influence, for determining groups’ preferences over insulation and agency
creation. I confirm the result from previous work that groups that are likely to lose pol-
icymaking authority (“electorally weak groups”) are most likely to insulate policies (De
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Figueiredo 2002).15 Additionally, I characterize not only when groups prefer more or less
insulation, but when they prefer to create an agency or retain the status quo. I now dis-
cuss how results from the model relate to the agencies and interest group environments we
observe.16
Entrepreneurial politics are characterized by concentrated costs born by organized in-
terests and diffuse benefits that accrue to the public at large. Often some crisis, policy
entrepreneur, or both make the public aware of the need for a government agency endowed
with authority to regulate an offending industry or group. Groups favoring more stringent
regulation know that they have broad public support, but will face organized opposition
once public support wanes. Moreover, industry is likely to have technical expertise that
groups supporting regulation cannot match giving industry an edge when bureaucrats are
seeking information about the likely effects of policy. In terms of the model, pro-regulation
groups in an entrepreneurial politics environment expect to lose power after agency creation
and, therefore, rely on insulation of career bureaucrats to prevent regulated interests from
influencing policy after agency creation. It follows that pro-regulation groups will only
want to create the agency if they expect career bureaucrats to share their preferences, the
status quo is extreme relative to the groups’ preferences, or both.
Returning to the consideration of the creation of the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission (CPSC), consumer groups knew that they did not have the necessary resources to
participate in policymaking after agency creation. Therefore, they preferred an independent
commission with technical and laboratory facilities for the testing of products. Importantly,
15A key difference between the model I develop and De Figueiredo’s (2002) model is that he assumes insu-
lation has an exogenous cost that either group pays if it insulates its policies, whereas, I do not. De Figueiredo
finds that if insulation is sufficiently costly neither group will insulate and if insulation is sufficiently cheap
both groups will insulate. His claim that electorally weak groups are most likely to insulate assumes a mod-
erate cost of insulation. Preference divergence between the bureaucrat and the group in my model could be
considered a cost of insulation, but the cost of preference divergence in my model can be asymmetric across
groups. Importantly, this causes opposing groups to prefer different levels of insulation in cases where De
Figueiredo’s model predicts both groups prefer insulation (e.g., uncertainty = 0.50). This difference has im-
portant implications for when we expect agencies to be insulated, and may affect the durability of agency
structure in equilibrium.
16See Wilson 1989, Ch. 5 for discussion of the types of politics and corresponding agencies. My discussion
of types of politics and interest group environment relies on the well known Wilson-Lowi matrix.
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consumer groups also favored a federally-employed consumer advocate to ensure similarity
between their preferences and bureaucrats’ preferences. If, as the model predicts, groups
that expect to lose power rely on insulation and preference similarity between themselves
and bureaucrats to achieve preferred policy outcomes, it follows that such groups would
want to ensure that bureaucrats share their preferences, if possible. Similar to consumer
groups and the creation of the CPSC, the recent financial crisis made financial regulation
salient to the public and empowered consumer finance advocates. Consistent with the re-
sults of the model and the argument that pro-regulation groups prefer insulated agencies,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that emerged from the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is estimated to be one of the most
insulated agencies in the federal government (Selin 2015).
In contrast to entrepreneurial interest group environments, cases of client politics are
characterized by concentrated benefits and diffuse costs accrued to various interests. This
dispersion of costs results in organized interests that support the agency with effectively
no organized opposition. Although a client group is quite certain it will retain power, it
might still create an insulated agency if bureaucrats in the agency are expected to share
the groups preferences (i.e., B = x1). One reason this may occur is that the bureaucrats
rely on the group as a sole source of information.17 In this case, the model predicts an
insulated agency even when the group is quite certain it will remain in power. Insulation
is preferred because it guarantees a policy outcome close to the group’s most preferred
outcome by eliminating any possibility that opposing groups will exercise political control
over the agency.
Previous work argued that because groups that prefer insulated policies are electorally
weak and only rarely hold public authority, then little policymaking is likely to be affected
by the loss of policy effectiveness created by insulation (De Figueiredo 2002). However,
17See Wilson’s (1989, p. 79-80) discussion of the Federal Maritime Commission and Civil Aeronautics
Board. This also suggests the importance of other venues of influence as discussed above. A client group that
knows it will have direct access to the agency via information provision (and not via politicians) may prefer
insulation to eliminate any interference by politicians.
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insulated agencies have been found to be durable across time (Lewis 2004); therefore, even
if the conditions for their creation only occur occasionally, once they occur the agencies
will persist after the insulating group has lost power. My results suggest that groups that
expect to retain power, like those found in client politics, may also create insulated agencies
if a group expects bureaucrats to share its preferences. Lastly, I argue agencies that are the
product of entrepreneurial politics, meaning agencies that make policies intended to benefit
the public at large (i.e., policies that have diffuse benefits) are most likely to be insulated.
Altogether, this paper clarifies the set of conditions that may produce insulated agencies
and suggests that insulation may be an important cause of policy ineffectiveness.
Finally, I have modeled the multiple types of agency characteristics that reduce political
control as a single parameter. However, specific insulating mechanisms may have varied
effects, particularly with respect to agency performance and policy ineffectiveness. For
example, mandating that an agency implement a specific policy (e.g., regulate the amount
of lead in natural waterways) limits bureaucratic discretion and could reduce agency effec-
tiveness, but creates certainty that the group’s concern will be addressed. (Mandated poli-
cymaking may also be useful if the group is uncertain over the preferences of bureaucrats or
bureaucrats do not share the group’s preferences.) Conversely, delegating broad discretion
(e.g., regulate environmental pollutants), giving appointees a fixed term of appointment and
for cause protections, and exempting agency rulemaking from political review by the Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs insulates an agency from political control while
preserving discretion and should result in development of policy expertise (Gailmard and
Patty 2007).18 Scholars should pursue theoretical development of models that parse spe-
cific insulating mechanisms observed in law, their effects, and how that influences groups’
preferences over insulation to improve our understanding of agency design.
18Civil servants’ policy expertise and uncertainty about what public policy is a fundamental reason for del-
egation of policymaking authority by political principals to federal agencies in the literature (e.g., Epstein and
O’Halloran 1999). Any model incorporating an effect of insulation on expertise would need to incorporate
uncertainty over policy outcomes or a variation in the quality of public policy.
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1.3.1 Model Extension: Incorporating Separation of Powers and Interest Group Compe-
tition
This model identifies an interest group’s induced preferences over agency design, but
is unable to predict the characteristics of agencies that will actually be created because the
model does not include lawmaking under separation of powers. Additionally, the group not
initially in power (G2) is unable to redesign the agency if it comes to power, which limits
the richness of the strategic interaction of groups in the model. In this section, I sketch an
extension of the model that addresses both shortcomings.
To better address separation of powers, the president could be added to the model and
given a veto over the proposed agency. The groups could be re-conceived of as coalitions
(similar to De Figueiredo 2002) and thought of as political parties and groups working
together (e.g., the Democratic members of Congress and labor unions versus Republican
members of Congress and businesses). This reformulation incorporates separation of pow-
ers via preference divergence between the president and the coalitions while promoting
tractability by not modeling groups separately from members of Congress. Elections would
then bring one of the two coalitions to power and one of two presidents to power.
To incorporate group competition, the coalition that comes to power after the election
is able to redesign the agency. This addition will force the coalition that makes the initial
design proposal to consider whether the opposing coalition would redesign that agency in
equilibrium. This reformulation of the model may also provide insight into the durability
of agencies over time.
Figure 1.7 provides the extensive form of the reformulated game prior to the election.
The sequence of play in the reformulated model would be:
1. The coalition in power passes legislation designing an agency or retains the status
quo.
2. If legislation is passed, the president vetoes the legislation or signs the legislation.
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3.a. If the president signs the legislation, the agency is created and sets policy.
3.b. If the president vetoes the legislation, the status quo is retained.
4. An election occurs that puts one of the coalitions in power and elects a new president.
5. Repeat steps 1-3 with the inherited policy outcome from prior play and newly elected
policymakers.
6. If an agency exists, it sets final policy. Otherwise, the status quo policy is the final
outcome.
7. Players receive payoffs based on final policy.
Lastly, this reformulation of the model could be further extended to incorporate the
presidential appointment process with the coalition in power providing “advice and con-
sent.” This would give the agency’s post-election ideal point as xA = (1−λ )xp +λB, i =
{1,2}, where xp is the ideal point of the political appointee chosen by the president and
confirmed by the coalition.
Figure 1.7: Pre-Election Extensive Form of the Reformulated Agency Insulation Game
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1.4 Conclusion
Federal agencies make policies that affect nearly every aspect of modern life and some-
times these agencies prove to be inefficient and ineffective. Scholars have argued that the
design of these agencies is partly to blame. Interest groups face uncertainty about their
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future ability to influence policy, which causes them to favor agency structures that insulate
agencies from political control; however, these structures may reduce agency effectiveness.
Initial theory was unclear about how political uncertainty might vary across groups and
across time and did not consider how preference congruence between interest groups and
bureaucrats that will work in the agency might affect groups’ preferences regarding agency
creation and insulation. Subsequent work clarified the relationship between political uncer-
tainty, defined as electoral uncertainty, and policy insulation, finding that groups that expect
to lose power are most likely to favor insulation. However, this work also did not consider
bureaucrats’ policy preferences. I developed a model that clarifies the determinants of inter-
est groups’ induced preferences over agency design. The model demonstrates that agency
design depends critically on the policy preferences of the bureaucrat. When the bureaucrat
and group have very similar preferences, even a group that expects to retain policymaking
authority will prefer an insulated agency. When the bureaucrat and group have dissimilar
preferences, groups that expect to lose authority are likely to prefer to retain some political
control or the status quo.
These results have important implications for agency design and, by extension, the
quality of public policy. Coupling the model results with the insight that differences in po-
litical resources across groups cause political uncertainty to vary predictably with the type
of interest group environment yields predictions about which interest group environments
are most likely to produce insulated agencies. It follows that if insulation reduces agency
effectiveness, then the quality of policy should also vary predictably across across interest
group environments and the associated policy domains.
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Chapter 2
Ideology and Presidential Appointment Strategies
Effective staffing of the executive branch is fundamental to a president’s administrative
success. Newly elected presidents must fill over 4,000 appointed positions, including ap-
proximately 500 key positions that require Senate confirmation.1 Political appointees hold
senior policy and management position across the executive branch, and include Cabinet
secretaries, heads of independent agencies, and senior staff who assist Cabinet secretaries
and agency heads. Presidents need appointees in these positions who will faithfully pursue
the president’s policy agenda and who have the managerial and policy expertise to imple-
ment that agenda (Lewis 2008; Moe 1985; Weko 1995); however, it is difficult to find
appointees who are loyal and expert to fill each position. This forces presidents to choose
whether to emphasize loyalty or expertise when selecting an appointee for a position (Ed-
wards III 2001; Lewis 2008). Some scholars have argued that presidential personnel offices
often stress loyalty and ideology above other traits (Edwards III 2001; Moe 1985). Indeed,
Lyn Nofziger, who worked in President Reagan’s personnel office, said, “[T]he first thing
you do is get loyal people, and competence is a bonus” (Nofziger 2003).
Political scientists have generally formalized the president’s staffing problem as a principal-
agent model where the president (principal) must choose an appointee (agent) that will
best manage a federal agency to implement the president’s agenda (e.g., Hammond and
Hill 1993; Hollibaugh, Jr 2015; see Bendor and Meirowitz 2004, for a general discussion
of principal-agent models of delegation). Within this principal-agent framework, a set of
models has adopted ideology as the primary trait presidents care about when selecting ap-
pointees. These models incorporate the president’s ability to nominate an appointee to a
position that requires Senate confirmation or to appoint them unilaterally (Bonica, Chen,
1The Partnership for Public Service (PPS) has identified 559 key positions: https://ourpublicservice.
org/issues/presidential-transition/political-appointee-tracker.php. In total, there are about 1,200 Senate-
confirmed positions, including positions, such as U.S. Marshals, who do not hold senior leadership positions.
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and Johnson 2015), the influence of interest groups on agency policymaking (Bertelli and
Feldmann 2007), and appointee’s imperfect control of career civil servants (Jo and Rothen-
berg 2014) to yield competing predictions about if and when it is optimal for presidents to
select appointees with policy views identical to their own.
Using a method developed by Clinton et al. (2012), I use two surveys of senior federal
employees – one fielded at the end of President George W. Bush’s second term and one
fielded at the end of President Obama’s second term – to estimate the ideology of Presi-
dent Bush, President Obama, members of Congress, political appointees, and career civil
servants on the same scale. The estimates allow me to evaluate predictions about the effect
of Senate confirmation and imperfect control of civil servants on the ideology of political
appointees.
I find that the ideology of Senate-confirmed appointees differs more from presidents’
ideology than does the ideology of non-Senate confirmed appointees, which, consistent
with related research (e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2011; Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015;
Nixon 2004), suggests that Senate confirmation does force presidents to select appointees
whose ideology differs from their own to secure Senate confirmation. While liberal (conser-
vative) presidents clearly select liberal (conservative) appointees, I find that within admin-
istrations presidents tend to place more conservative appointees in agencies with conserva-
tive career civil servants and more liberal appointees in agencies with liberal career civil
servants. This finding implies that career civil servants possess an informational advantage
over political appointees, and that this advantage plays an important role in presidents’ ap-
pointment strategies. Presidents select appointees with an ideology similar to appointees to
promote information sharing between appointees and careerists (Jo and Rothenberg 2014),
which has the potential to improve the quality of public policy. I conclude by relating
my findings to the larger literature on how presidents balance appointee traits and discuss
important questions that remain.
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2.1 Presidential Appointment Strategies and Ideology
Scholars have generated competing predictions about if and when it is optimal for pres-
idents to choose political appointees who share their ideology, all operating within a shared
principal-agent framework. A useful starting place is a basic principal-agent model in
which the president chooses an appointee to head an agency and that appointee implements
her most preferred policy (e.g., Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). This model, which assumes
there is no uncertainty in policy implementation,2 and that appointees can perfectly control
career civil servants, predicts that it is always optimal for presidents to select appointees
who share their policy views exactly. This claim is commonly referred to as the ally prin-
ciple. I focus on how Senate confirmation and imperfect control of civil servants yield
alternative predictions that conflict with the ally principle because the data I have are best
suited to test these models.
2.1.1 Senate Confirmation
Article II Section 2 of the United States Constitution gives the president the authority to
appoint senior government officials, such as secretaries of executive departments, subject
to the advise and consent of the Senate. Article II Section 2 also grants Congress the
authority to vest appointment authority for “inferior” offices in the president alone. In the
modern executive branch, Congress has created several types of “inferior” positions that
presidents may staff at their discretion (e.g., non-career positions in the Senior Executive
Service, presidential appointees, and Schedule C positions). Therefore, there are, broadly,
two types of presidential appointees - those that require Senate confirmation and those that
do not (see Lewis 2008, for a detailed description).
If the ally principle holds, but the president’s nominees to Senate-confirmed positions
must satisfy the ideological preferences of Senators who do not share the president’s views,
2An equivalent assumption is that appointees’s policy expertise is homogenous.
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then the ideology of appointees to positions that do not require Senate confirmation will
be more similar to the president’s ideology than the ideology of appointees to Senate-
confirmed positions3 (Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015). This prediction yields the first
hypothesis:
H1: The ideology of appointees who do not require Senate confirmation will be more
similar to the president’s ideology than Senate-confirmed appointees.
2.1.2 Imperfect Control of Civil Servants and Information Asymmetry
Another extension of the baseline principal-agent model incorporates bureaucratic hi-
erarchy by analyzing the president’s choice of appointee when that appointee must oversee
a career civil servant, who sets initial policy which the appointee can override (Jo and
Rothenberg 2014). If it is costly for the appointee to evaluate and change the civil servants’
policy choice, then the president’s optimal appointee has an ideology more extreme than
president’s and on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum from the civil servant.4
3There are multiple models of presidential appointments that incorporate Senate confirmation (e.g., Bon-
ica, Chen, and Johnson 2015; Bertelli and Feldmann 2007; Hollibaugh, Jr 2015). They make varying as-
sumptions about what Senator is influential (e.g., the relevant committee chair, the median member) and
what occurs if a nominee is rejected (e.g., both the Senator and president pay an exogenous cost, policy
reverts to an exogenous agency ideal point). Before testing such models, I must complete additional data col-
lection, namely determining the timing of Senate-confirmed appointments to determine the relevant Senators.
(I will likely also need to estimate ideal points for additional Congresses.) One possible reversion point is to
assume that policy will be set by a careerist serving in acting capacity using previously delegated policymak-
ing authority, which could be measured using the mean careerist ideal point from the agency. Applying the
classic Romer-Rosenthal agenda-setter model (Romer and Rosenthal 1978) with the president making a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the relevant Senator, would predict the president should be able to get appointees with
more similar preferences to his own confirmed as the ideology of the careerist (i.e., the status quo) diverges
from the ideology of the relevant Senator. However, assuming policy is set by an acting careerist may not
be valid assumption for cases when appointees have a fixed term and serve across administrations, such as
independent commissions. See Nixon (2004) for a discussion of reversion points, including this point about
commissions.
4Bertelli and Feldman 2007 make an identical prediction using an alternative model. If agency policymak-
ing requires negotiation with an outside group, resulting in policy that is a compromise between the agency
head and the interest group, then the president may prefer an appointee whose opposes the group more than
the president does. (In this model, negotiated policy is assumed to be a convex combination of the ideal
policy of the group and the appointee with a coefficient, λ ∈ [0,1], that gives the influence of the appointee.)
My data lack estimates of the preferences of interests groups that would be necessary to test Bertelli and
Feldman’s (2007) model.
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Moreover, as the difference between the president’s ideology and the civil servant’s ideol-
ogy increases, the difference between the president’s ideology and the optimal appointee’s
ideology also increases (assuming fixed costs of appointee oversight). This relationship
occurs because civil servants propose policies that are as similar as possible to their most
preferred policy without inducing the appointee to conduct oversight, and change the pol-
icy. Therefore, an appointee whose ideology is more extreme than the president causes
civil servants to strategically propose policy near the president’s most preferred policy.
This prediction yields the second hypothesis:
H2: If the president is more conservative (liberal) than career civil servants in the agency,
the ideology of the optimal appointee will become more conservative (liberal) as the
ideology of career civil servants becomes more liberal (conservative).
Civil servants often have an informational advantage over both the appointee and the
president. Indeed, civil servants spend decades developing expertise in specific policy do-
mains, whereas appointees may have no prior experience working in an agency and often
leave government service within a few years. Choosing an appointee with preferences sim-
ilar to civil servants can induce the civil servant to share information with appointees (Jo
and Rothenberg 2014). Therefore, the president may prefer to trade ideological congruence
with an appointee for an improvement in the quality of policymaking. This yields the third
hypothesis:
H3: If civil servants possess an informational advantage over political appointees, the
ideology of the optimal appointee will become more conservative (liberal) as the
ideology of career civil servants become more conservative (liberal).
2.2 Data, Variables, and Methods
I use data from the 2007-2008 and 2014 Surveys on the Future of Government Service
to estimate the individual-level ideology of federal employees, members of Congress, and
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Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama using a method developed by Clinton et
al. (2012). Specifically, respondents to the surveys were asked whether they would have
supported a set of 25 Congressional measures, 14 from the 109th Congress and 11 from
the 113th Congress. I combine survey respondents’ positions (yes or no) with roll call
votes from the 109th and 113th Congresses, including public positions of Presidents Bush
and Obama, to generate estimates of individual ideology that are directly comparable.5
Please refer to Appendix B for estimation details, including question text. In Section B.2 of
Appendix B, I show that results from the main text are replicated using survey respondents’
self-reported ideology. Moreover, the distribution of self-reported ideology is reassuringly
similar to the distribution of ideal points.
The first survey was in the field in late 2007 and early 2008 at the end of President
Bush’s second term. The second survey was in the field in the field from August to De-
cember 2014 at the end of President Obama’s second term. Both surveys targeted se-
nior appointed and career civil servants (e.g., career members of the Senior Executive Ser-
vice, other senior career executives at the GS-14 or GS-15 level) from across the executive
branch, including the 15 executive departments, over 60 independent agencies, and 7 agen-
cies in the Executive Office of the President. The surveys targeted 7,448 and 14,698 federal
employees, and the response rates were 33% and 24%, respectively.6 From the Bush Ad-
ministration, I have ideal point estimates for 2,008 career civil servants (31% of the target
population) and 203 political appointees (19%), of which 82 required Senate confirmation
(PAS). From the Obama Administration, I have ideal point estimates for 2,882 career civil
servants (23%) and 383 political appointees (16%), of which 125 were PAS.7 The range of
5Jeff Lewis and Keith Poole compiled the roll call data and presidents’ public positions on legislation. I
downloaded them from votview.com.
6Clinton et al. (2012) compared the distribution of partisanship in the target population to the distribution
of self-reported partisanship among survey respondents, where possible, and did not find that Democrats,
Republicans, or Independents responded at higher rates. For the second survey, a private firm was used
to determine partisanship among the target population, where possible. The distribution of self-reported
partisanship among respondents does not differ differ materially from the distribution of partisanship among
the target population. There is mixed statistical evidence that suggests that Democrats are slightly more likely
to respond to the second survey.
7Both surveys used a commercial database of federal employees maintained by Leadership Directories,
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Figure 2.1: Ideal Points of PAS and Non-PAS Appointees by Administration
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estimated ideal points, including the presidents and members of Congress, is -2.59 to 2.71,
with an interquartile range of -0.84 to 0.74 and a median of -0.09.
Using these ideal points to make inferences about the ideology of appointees, civil
servants, and their political principals requires two primary assumptions. First, the votes
by members of Congress, public positions of the presidents on legislation, and positions
reported by survey respondents are sufficiently similar to be treated as equivalent when
estimating ideal points. Second, the single-dimension recovered is sufficiently correlated
with each agency’s policy jurisdiction that the estimated ideal points capture relevant pref-
erences. In other words, it assumes that the policy domains of federal agencies map onto
a single dimension and that these ideal points recover a relevant preference ordering. Im-
portantly, the measures included on the surveys are related to relevant policy dimensions
such as immigration reform, national defense, environmental protection, health policy, and
social services.
Inc. to identify the target population. The database was also used to identify political appointment type.
For additional details on the 2007-2008 survey, refer to Clinton et al. (2012). For additional details on the
2014 survey, refer to Lewis and Richardson (2017) available here: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/
lewis richardson 2014sfgs.pdf.
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I begin by comparing the distribution of ideal points among PAS and non-PAS ap-
pointees (Presidential Appointees, Schedule C Appointees, and Non-Career Members of
the Senior Executive Service). Figure 2.1 plots the distributions of PAS and Non-PAS ap-
pointees and the ideal points of the President Bush (1.53) and President Obama (-0.79)
by administration. Larger values indicate more conservative ideology. The distribution
of Non-PAS appointees is more conservative than PAS appointees in the Bush Adminis-
tration, while the opposite is true in the Obama Administration. This pattern is further
demonstrated by Model 1 in Table 2.1, which regresses appointees’ ideal points on indi-
cator variables for the Obama Administration, PAS, and the interaction between PAS and
Obama administration. The unit of analysis is the political appointee. Non-PAS and PAS
appointees have average ideal points of 0.75 and 0.46 in the Bush Administration, respec-
tively, compared to an average of -0.58 among Non-PAS appointees and an average of -0.22
among PAS appointees in the Obama Administration. (The same ordering holds analyzing
medians.) Overall, this provides support for H1 – the ideology of Non-PAS appointees is
more similar to the president than PAS appointees, which suggests that Senate confirma-
tion does force the president to select appointees whose ideology differs from his own more
than he prefers. However, Figure 2.1 shows that the ideology of many appointees, includ-
ing many Non-PAS appointees, differs substantially from the President. Indeed, the ally
principle implies that the ideal points of Non-PAS appointees should be clustered around
the ideal points of the presidents. I now turn to testing hypotheses 2 and 3 to evaluate
two predictions about why presidents may prefer appointees that do not share their policy
preferences.
Figure 2.2 plots the distribution of appointees and career civil servants in the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) by
administration. The careerists in DOD tend to be conservative and the careerists in HHS
tend to be liberal across administrations. Appointees to HHS in the Bush Administration
tend to be more conservative than careerists at HHS, but more liberal than President Bush.
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Figure 2.2: Ideal Points of Appointees and Careerists by Administration
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Appointees to DOD in the Bush Administration are about as conservative as careerists in
DOD, and both tend to be more liberal than President Bush. The converse is true in the
Obama Administration. Appointees to HHS have similar ideal points to careerists in HHS.
Appointees to DOD tend to be more liberal than careerist in DOD, but both tend to be
more conservative than President Obama. Overall, Figure 2.2 suggests that careerist and
appointee ideology is positively correlated.
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Figure 2.3: Ideal Points of Appointees and Careerists less Presidents’ Ideal Point
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Note: I limited agencies to those with at least a 10% response rate for appointees and a 15% response rate
for careerists. I also limited agencies to those with at least 30 respondents in the target populations to protect
anonymity.
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To provide a more systematic analysis, Figure 2.3 plots the mean ideal point of ap-
pointees less the presidents’ ideal point (y-axis) and the mean ideal point of careerists less
the presidents’ ideal point (x-axis) for those agencies with a sufficient number of respon-
dents for each administration. In general, this plot shows that, on average, if careerist are
more liberal (conservative) than the president, the appointees are more liberal (conserva-
tive) than the president. There is little evidence supporting H2, and there is some evidence
in support of H3. If Presidents Bush and Obama were selecting appointees whose ideology
is more extreme than their own and on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum from
civil servants, as H2 predicts, then there would be more observations in the upper-left and
lower-right quadrants. On the contrary, nearly all the observations fall into the quadrants
where both the mean ideal points of appointees and career civil servants are more liberal or
more conservative than the president.
Model 2 in Table 2.1 further evaluates both H2 and H3 by including the mean careerist
ideal point aggregated by executive departments, independent agencies, and agencies in the
Executive Office of the President in addition to the controls for presidential administration
and appointee type.8 I limited the sample to agencies for which the careerist response rate
was at least 15% and clustered the standard errors on the agency. The coefficient on the
mean careerist ideal point by agency is positive and distinguishable from zero with a high
degree of confidence. As the careerists in an agency become more conservative, on average,
the appointees to that agency also become more conservative.
Model 2 shows that, while the average Bush appointee is more conservative than the
average Obama appointee, appointees to conservative agencies, like DOD, tend to be more
conservative than appointees to liberal agencies, like HHS, within administrations. Specif-
8I aggregated by executive department to preserve observations. Appointees in executive departments
often work in Offices of the Secretary (or the Office of the Attorney General). Respondents that work there are
not identified in the first survey, resulting in many appointees in executive departments that are not assigned
to a specific agency within the executive department. Therefore, aggregating at the agency-level within
executive departments results in significant case loss in the Bush Administration, because it is not clear
what the correct careerist agency mean is for many appointees. Aggregating by agency within executive
departments does not produce different conclusions.
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Table 2.1: OLS Models of Appointee Ideology
Model (1) (2) (3)
Obama Appointee −1.32∗∗∗−1.31∗∗∗−1.34∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
PAS −0.29∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.27∗∗
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
Obama App. × PAS 0.65∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.14) (0.15)
Mean Careerist Ideal Point 0.37∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(0.18) (0.19)
Mn. Careerist × Skill 0.18
(0.33)
Workforce Skill −0.03
(0.08)
Constant 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
N 586 538 496
R2 0.28 0.30 0.34
N Clusters 64 46
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered on agency in Models 2 & 3.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01
in a two-sided test.
ically, the mean ideal point of careerists in HHS is -0.38 and the mean ideal point of ca-
reerists in DOD is 0.44 in the Obama Administration. Therefore, a Non-PAS appointee to
HHS is expected to have an ideal point of -0.70, very near president Obama’s ideal point of
-0.79. A Non-PAS appointee to DOD is expected to have an ideal point of -0.40. Given the
careerist means of -0.48 and 0.42 at HHS and DOD, respectively, the equivalent calculation
for the Bush Administration predicts the ideal point for a Non-PAS appointee to DOD will
be 0.61 compared to 0.28 at HHS. Overall, this provides evidence against H2 and in support
of H3.
Respondents to the second survey were asked to evaluate the skill of the workforce of
federal agencies. Applying a Bayesian multi-rater model to respondents’ evaluations gen-
erates estimates of the workforce skill of 159 federal agencies, including the 15 executive
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departments (Richardson, Clinton, and Lewis 2017).9 The estimate ranges from -1.99 to
1.83. Agencies like NASA, the Federal Reserve, and the National Institutes of Health are
among the most skilled. Agencies like the Office of Personnel Management, Transportation
Security Administration, and Department of Veterans Affairs are among the least skilled.
More skilled workforces should possess a larger informational advantage over appointees
than less skilled workforces. A larger information asymmetry between career civil servants
should result in a stronger incentive to select appointees that share career civil servants’
ideology to promote information sharing. In other words, the positive correlation between
mean careerist ideology and appointee ideology should be larger in agencies with more
skilled workforces if the information asymmetry exists.
In Model 3 in Table 2.1, I interact the estimate of workforce skill with the mean ca-
reerist ideal point to further evaluate H3. The coefficient on the interaction of workforce
skill and average careerist ideal point by agency is positive, suggesting that the positive
correlation between mean careerist ideal points and appointee ideal points is larger among
more skilled agencies, but it is not distinguishable from zero with a high degree confidence.
While intriguing, I cannot make any additional claims based on the results from Model 3.10
Nonetheless, the positive correlation between the average careerist ideal point by agency
and appointees’ ideal points in Models 2 and 3 supports H3. These models provide evi-
dence consistent with a formal model that emphasizes careerists informational advantage
over appointees, which incentivizes Presidents Bush and Obama to choose appointees with
ideologies less similar than their own and more similar to the ideologies of career civil
9Respondents were asked, “In your view, how skilled are the workforces of the following agencies?”
Respondents were asked to rate the skill level of 5-8 agencies on a one-to-five scale from “Not at all skilled” to
“Very skilled.” All respondents were given the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel
Management to “bridge” respondents evaluations because most federal executives have experience with these
two agencies. Prior to this question, the survey asked respondents to select the three federal agencies that
they work with the most. These three agencies were then included in the list of agencies the respondent was
asked to evaluate. The average evaluations of respondents who reported working with each agency were used
to create an informed prior to give the perceptions of more knowledgeable respondents greater weight. The
multi-rater model allowed each respondent to have a unique mapping from the latent space to the survey
response scale.
10The coefficient is distinguishable from zero using self-reported ideology as the dependent variable. See
Model B3 in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
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servants to improve the quality of public policy.
2.2.1 Alternative Explanations for the Correlation between Careerist and Appointee Ide-
ology
I have relied on a set of formal models (Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015; Jo and
Rothenberg 2014) that assume appointee ideology is the primary trait that presidents (and
Senators) care about when evaluating appointees because the data I have are best suited
to test these theories. However, a related body of research measures appointees’ traits in
addition to ideology, including policy and managerial expertise (Krause and O’Connell
2014; Hollibaugh, Jr., Horton, and Lewis 2014; Hollibaugh, Jr 2015; Parsneau 2012).11
This literature suggests an alternative explanation for the positive association between mean
careerist ideal points and appointee ideal points: presidents seek appointees who share their
ideology and who meet a minimum competence threshold (see Hollibaugh, Jr 2015, for a
formal treatment). If expertise in these policy domains is correlated with certain policy
views, then presidents selecting appointees who possess the necessary competence would
decrease appointees’ ideological congruence with the president in certain policy domains,
which would result in a positive association between the ideology of expert careerists and
expert political appointees.
The magnitude of the correlation between ideology and expertise is a function of the
pool of potential appointees (Lewis 2009). If the pool of potential appointees contains
many individuals whose policy views span the ideological spectrum and who are expert,
then presidents of both parties should be able to fill positions with experts who share the
president’s policy views. If the experts are concentrated at one end of the ideological spec-
trum, then presidents on the end of the spectrum that lacks appointees may be forced to
trade ideological congruence for expertise or vice versa.12 An important task for scholars
11See Hollibaugh, Jr., Horton, and Lewis (2014) and Hollibaugh, Jr (2015) for research on presidents’
patronage concerns in addition to loyalty and expertise.
12If presidents require a minimum level of expertise and they cannot find appointees who posses both
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going forward is identifying the set of policy domains for which the correlation between
ideology and expertise is large and the set for which it is weak. Moreover, there are some
policy domains in which an individual’s ideology is less likely to predict her views about
what policy is best (e.g., the National Archives and Records Administration, General Ser-
vices Administration).13 Presidents may emphasize other appointee characteristics in these
cases, making it important to identify this set of policy domains as well.14
Another alternative explanation is that career civil servants tend to be moderate or lib-
eral in general. For example, many civil servants in the Department of Defense, one of the
most conservative agencies, are moderate as shown in Figure 2.2 (and Figure B.4). If both
presidents are following the ally principle, a correlation between appointee ideology and ca-
reerist ideology may exist because President Obama tends to appoint liberal and moderate
appointees, career civil servants tend to be liberal or moderate, and there are more obser-
vations from the Obama Administration in the data. To address this potential explanation,
I estimated Model 2 in Table 2.1 on each administration separately. The coefficient on the
mean careerist ideal point by agency is positive in both administrations, but smaller in the
Bush Administration (0.31 compared to 0.43). The coefficient in the Bush Adminstration
cannot be distinguished from zero with a high degree of confidence (p-value= 0.32) due
to the decreases in magnitude and sample size, but the result holds in the Obama Adminis-
tration (p-value < 0.01). The positive coefficient within administrations suggests that the
result is not driven by the ally principle and the overall distribution of career civil servants.
ideological congruence and expertise, then the loyalty-competence tradeoff would result in higher variation
in appointee ideology in such agencies relative to agencies to agencies where many appointees with both
traits are available. For example, it may be that variance in appointee ideology at HHS is lower in the Obama
Administration than in the Bush Administration. The challenge is identifying which agencies are subject to
the pool constraint across administrations.
13A president may want loyal individuals (who are also more likely to share the president’s ideology) in
such agencies to direct resources for partisan purposes. For example, political appointees at the General Ser-
vices Administration directed government spending to potentially vulnerable Congressional districts during
the Administration of George W. Bush (Gordon 2011).
14Another important question is: For which domains is ideological policy conflict sufficiently severe (or ex-
pertise sufficiently unimportant) to cause presidents to prefer ideological congruence over expertise? Formal
models of delegation that consider variation in exogenous agent expertise (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004) or
endogenous expertise formation (Gailmard and Patty 2007) predict that once preference divergence between
the principal and agent is too great, the principal will not delegate to that agent regardless of expertise.
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Indeed, the data indicate that appointees in the Obama Administration were, on average,
more conservative in agencies where career civil servants were also more conservative. It
is likely that the coefficient in the Bush Administration would be distinguishable from zero
with a high degree of confidence if the sample size were larger.15
2.3 Discussion and Conclusion
I analyze estimates of the ideology of presidents, political appointees, and career civil
servants from two presidential administrations to test predictions from formal models about
if and when presidents prefer to select appointees who share their ideology. I find that
the difference between the ideology of Senate-confirmed appointees and the president’s
ideology is greater, on average, than the difference between the ideology of non-Senate
confirmed appointees and the president’s ideology. This suggests that Senate confirmation
constrains presidents’ choice of appointees, forcing them to nominate appointees with less
congruent ideology to secure Senate confirmation. (This replicates a finding by Bonica,
Chen, and Johnson (2015) using a different measure of ideology and among a larger class
of appointees - they analyze data on PAS and Schedule C appointees only.) I do not find ev-
idence that presidents select appointees whose ideology is more extreme than their own and
on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum from career civil servants to affect civil ser-
vants’ policy proposals. Rather, while appointees selected by a liberal president are clearly
more liberal than appointees selected by a conservative president, appointees tend to be
more conservative (liberal) if career civil servants working at the agency are conservative
15The smaller effect in the Bush Administration may be due to the fact that even the most conservative
agencies contain many moderates. About 40% of career civil servants in the Department of Defense report
that they are “Moderate” across administrations. See Figure B.4. Therefore, it may be that President Bush
suffers greater agency loss by choosing appointees that share careerists’ ideology in the most liberal agencies
than President Obama suffers by choosing appointees who share careerists’ ideology in the most conservative
agencies, which causes the Bush Administration to emphasize ideology over expertise in more agencies than
the Obama Administration. The proportions of conservative appointees to HHS in the Bush Administration
and moderate appointees to DOD in the Obama Administration in Figure B.4 suggest such a relationship,
which would be consistent with formal models of delegation that consider variation in agent expertise as
discussed in footnote 14.
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(liberal) textbfwithin administrations. This implies that career civil servants’ informational
advantage over political appointees plays an important role in presidential appointment
strategies (Jo and Rothenberg 2014). Presidents are willing to trade some ideological con-
gruence with their appointees to promote information sharing among appointees and career
civil servants.
The correlation between the ideology of appointees and career civil servants is an in-
triguing finding and consistent with a theoretical model that emphasizes career civil ser-
vants informational advantage, but there are at least two reasons for caution.16 First, I
cannot evaluate whether the ideology of appointees and career civil servants is sufficiently
similar to promote information sharing. For example, the mean ideal point of careerists in
the Department of Defense in the Obama Administration is 0.44 compared to a mean ideal
point of appointees to DOD of -0.03, which is similar to the ideal points of conservative
Democrats in Congress. It’s unclear how this distance in ideal-point space relates to point
predictions in the underlying formal model (Jo and Rothenberg 2014) and whether the dis-
tance is sufficiently small to promote information sharing. Moreover, it is unclear how the
distance between careerists’ and appointees’ policy preferences as measured in ideal-point
space relate to defense policy. It may be that the observed differences are driven by differ-
ences in views on social policy (which are included in the positions used to generate the
ideal point estimates), while views on defense policy are very similar.17 Overall, scholars
should work to develop domain specific measures of policy disagreement to better measure
relevant policy views.
While I have shown that variation in Senate confirmation and careerist ideology can
explain variation in appointee ideology, appointed positions vary in other important ways
within and across agencies, including by their location in the internal agency hierarchy, by
16An additional concern is whether careerists as first-movers is always a good approximation of agency
policymaking and how changing this assumption might change theoretical predictions.
17One way to evaluate this is to look at the individual positions related to an agency’s policy domain where
possible (e.g., look at the item on the surveillance of suspected terrorists on the Bush Administration survey
and funding of the National Security Agency on the Obama Administration survey.)
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the type of expertise needed for the job, and by the statutory limitations on the president’s
appointment and removal authority. The hierarchy within agencies may affect the impor-
tance of appointee characteristics. Research that measures Senate-confirmed appointees’
loyalty, which should be correlated with ideological congruence,18 and expertise finds that
agency heads – department secretaries, commission chairs, and agency administrators –
possess less policy expertise than subordinate Senate-confirmed appointees, while loyalty
is much higher among agency heads than their subordinates. It may be that presidents at-
tempt to assemble an effective team by emphasizing ideological congruence at the top to
ensure the person with ultimate authority shares their views, while selecting someone with
expertise to fill subordinate roles (as Krause and O’Connell (2014) suggest). For example,
the Attorney General may be selected for ideological congruence while the Deputy Attor-
ney General is selected for expertise and promoted from within the Department of Justice.
If a similar pattern holds across agencies, this may also produce a correlation between
appointee ideology and careerist ideology that could be better explained by considering
hierarchy within the agency.19
The types of expertise needed to do a job may vary by position within agency and
between agencies. For example, it may be easy for all presidents to find someone with
expertise and ideological congruence to fill a position as an assistant secretary of public
affairs or an assistant secretary for legislative affairs because there are many people across
the ideological spectrum (i.e., in both major political parties) who have the relevant ex-
pertise. Conversely, it may be harder for presidents to find ideological congruence and
expertise when selecting appointees for more specialized positions, such as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering or the Under Secretary of Commerce
18Krause and O’Connell (2014) define loyalty in the context of organizational hierarchy. This includes
appointees’ conception of their role as subordinates who should be responsive to their superior, the president,
regardless of their personal views. The data they use to measure loyalty includes shared party affiliation with
the president and similar measures that are correlated with ideology.
19Using the survey data, this claim could be evaluated by whether the correlation between appointee and
careerist ideology is stronger among appointees who report a long tenure in their agency, which would indi-
cate they are a career civil servant promoted from within.
48
for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.20
In other words, the pool of potential appointees that possess ideological congruence and
expertise may vary by position independent of or in addition to agency, and the strength of
the correlation between expertise and ideology may vary by position. This suggests a more
careful consideration of the characteristics of each position would be useful.
Figure 2.4: PAS Appointees by Agency Type and Administration
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Lastly, the president’s appointment authority for certain positions is restricted by statute
(Selin 2015; Lewis 2003). Some positions are subject to limits on the type of person that
can be appointed through expertise, geographic, or party-balancing requirements. Other
positions are subject to limits on the president’s removal of appointees via fixed terms,
which may be staggered in multi-member bodies, and “for cause” protections. Indepen-
dent regulatory commissions tend to be managed by multi-member boards filled with posi-
tions that have many of the characteristics that limit presidents’ appointment authority (see
Lewis and Selin 2012, Tables 4 and 5). Figure 2.4 shows that PAS appointees to indepen-
dent regulatory commissions tend to be more moderate than appointees to other agencies
across administrations. (I look only at PAS positions because these are the positions subject
20Haglund (2017) and Mackenzie (1981) make this point.
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to statutory restrictions.) The mean ideal point of PAS appointees appointed to regulatory
commissions was 0.07 compared to 0.59 in other agencies in the Bush Administration,
while the mean ideal point of PAS appointees appointed to regulatory commissions was
-0.09 compared to -0.26 in other agencies in the Obama Administration. The difference
is distinguishable from zero with a high degree of confience (p-value=0.10 in a two-tailed
test) the Bush Administration, but not during the Obama Administration (p-value=0.47 in
a two-tailed test). Moreover, the difference in the mean ideal point of PAS appointees to
regulatory commissions across administrations is not statistically distinguishable from zero
with much confidence (p-value=0.65 in a two-tailed test).21 Determining whether the ideal
points of PAS appointees to regulatory commissions are moderate and similar across ad-
ministrations because of statutory restrictions on appointee characteristics or because the
specialized policy domains that these commissions oversee make expertise more impor-
tant than ideology to presidents of both parties requires additional data collection. (For
example, I need to code whether individual appointees are subject to relevant statutory re-
strictions.) Nonetheless, this finding makes it clear that a more careful consideration of
statutory restrictions on appointment authority is necessary.22
Presidents’ appointment authority is one of the most important tools that they have to
gain control of the executive branch upon taking office. The choices they make are impor-
tant for the success of their administrations and the content of public policy. My findings
are consistent with formal models that emphasize the constraint on presidents’ choices
of appointees created by Senate confirmation and that career civil servants’ informational
advantage over political appointees makes presidents willing to trade some ideological con-
gruence with their appointees to promote information sharing among appointees and career
civil servants. While these findings are important, a more thorough examination of the
21Krause and O’Connell (2014) also find that PAS appointees to executive departments posses more loyalty
than appointees to independent commissions (while there is essentially no difference in the expertise).
22The models in Table 2.1 are robust to excluding independent regulatory commissions from the mod-
els. The coefficient on PAS appointees in the Bush Administration decreases to -0.19, which decreases the
confidence that it is different from zero to p < 0.10 in a one-tailed test of β < 0.
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characteristics of appointed positions – characteristics that may vary with or independent
of agency – is needed to fully understand presidential appointment strategies.
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Chapter 3
Politicization and Expertise: Exit, Effort, and Investment
Elected officials ask federal civil servants to accomplish difficult tasks, from maintain-
ing the soundness of the financial system to reducing poverty to ensuring national security.
Civil servants need expertise to formulate and implement effective public policy; however,
presidents and Congresses do not confer such expertise when they delegate responsibility
for policymaking. Rather, civil servants must invest effort in acquiring and applying the
necessary expertise.
Many civil servants work for the federal government to craft public policy that achieves
their agency’s mission and accomplishes goals they believe are important. When the presi-
dent and civil servants have similar policy goals, civil servants can work with the president’s
political appointees to achieve these shared goals. However, presidents do not always share
the policy goals of civil servants and, when they do not, presidents often use their politi-
cal appointees to gain control of agency policymaking, which is commonly referred to as
politicizing the agency (Edwards III 2001; Golden 2000; Lewis 2008; Moe 1985; Nathan
1975; Waterman 1989; Weko 1995). At the president’s direction, these appointees can alter
how an agency pursues its mission, and they often exclude civil servants who do not share
the president’s views from agency policymaking. The change in agency policy and loss
of policy influence decreases the value affected civil servants derive from public service,
increasing their incentives to exit the agency and decreasing their incentives to invest in
policy expertise.
The election of Donald Trump to the presidency has had dramatic consequences for
career civil servants, and the changes in policy implemented by his administration provide
illustrative examples of how politicization alters civil servants’ job satisfaction. At the De-
partment of Homeland Security, the employee unions of U.S. Immigrations and Customs
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Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) endorsed President
Trump during his campaign. Soon after taking office, President Trump increased the dis-
cretion of ICE agents to determine enforcement priorities and directed additional resources
to both agencies, which has reportedly improved morale among the agents and officers
(Bedard). An ICE agent told a reporter with the New York Times, “The discretion has come
back to us; it’s up to us to make decisions in the field. We’re trusted again” (Kulish, Dick-
erson, and Nixon). Conversely, at the Environmental Protection Agency, President Trump
has implemented changes intended to undo the Obama Administration’s policies to limit
climate change and appointed an Administrator, Scott Pruitt, who sued to vacate the same
Obama era policies when he was Attorney General of Oklahoma (Dennis). Many civil ser-
vants at the EPA do not share the policy views of the President or Administrator Pruitt, and
some have resigned rather than work for the Trump Administration (Davidson; Dennis).
Employees who believe in anthropogenic climate change and continue to work at the EPA
have little expectation that their efforts on the job will improve the public policies they care
about. As a result, EPA employees have described morale as “at rock botton,” “bleak,” and
“in the dumps” as they wait for years of work to be undone and face possible downsizing
associated with the proposed budget cuts (Davidson; Dennis and Eilperin).
In general, federal agencies serve as repositories of policy expertise across presidential
administrations. The choices of individual civil servants to acquire policy expertise, apply
that expertise, and, ultimately, whether to remain in public service across presidential ad-
ministrations determine the quality of policymaking by the executive branch. Identifying
the determinants of these choices is necessary to understand the development and mainte-
nance of agency expertise.
Despite the importance of policy expertise for effective policymaking, little empirical
work analyzes career civil servants’ decisions to remain in public service and exert effort
acquiring and applying policy expertise systematically across agencies (but see Andersen
and Moynihan 2016; Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Bolton, de Figueiredo, and Lewis 2016;
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also, see Carpenter 2001; Gailmard and Patty 2013, for agency-level case studies). Impor-
tant work by previous scholars identified the potential for agency politicization to reduce
policy expertise (e.g., see Golden 2000; Lewis 2008), but they lacked direct, systematic
measures of individual-level perceptions and behavior across the executive branch (but see
Resh 2015).
In this paper, I use data from an original survey of more than 3,500 federal execu-
tives to answer three questions. First, are career civil servants whose preferences diverge
from those of political appointees more likely to be excluded from policymaking? Second,
are career civil servants that perceive their agency is politicized more likely to exit their
agency? Third, are career civil servants that perceive their agency is politicized less likely
to exert effort investing in and applying policy expertise? Accounting for potential threats
to statistical inference, I find that greater preference divergence between career civil ser-
vants and political appointees increases the probability that careerists perceive appointees
in their agency have more policy influence than senior career civil servants (i.e., that their
agency is politicized). I find that civil servants who perceive that appointees have more pol-
icy influence than senior civil servants are more likely to express intent to exit the agency
within a year, replicating a finding by Bertelli and Lewis (2013). While I do not find a rela-
tionship between perceived politicization and hours worked per week (i.e., general effort), I
do find that senior civil servants who perceive greater politicization are less likely to report
that they engage in activities associated with investment in policy expertise (e.g., attending
training or consulting external policy experts). In total, these findings provide some of the
first systematic, micro-level evidence that civil servants whose policy preferences diverge
from those of political appointees are more likely to be excluded from policymaking, and
that this loss of policy influence is associated with reduced expertise investment.
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3.1 How Politicization Reduces Expertise
Politicization reduces expertise at federal agencies by reducing many civil servants’
job satisfaction, which increases their likelihood of exiting their agency and reduces their
incentives to invest in policy expertise if they stay. Most civil servants intrinsically care
about the content of the public policy their agency will create.1 Civil servants invest in
policy expertise by acquiring information that can be used to better predict the outcomes of
agency policymaking because it allows them to craft policies that are more likely to produce
their preferred results. When deciding whether to remain in public service and, if so, how
much effort to exert, a fundamental question policy-motivated civil servants must answer
is: Will I have policy influence? Their expectations of future policy influence will be based
on the probability they will be assigned key policy tasks and be included in policymaking
at their agency.
Careerists’ policy influence is partly determined by presidents’ staffing choices, and
careerists’ policy views are an important determinant of these choices. Presidents are more
likely to politicize agencies filled with career civil servants who do not share the presi-
dents’ policy views because presidents worry such agencies will not otherwise produce
policy congruent with their preferences (Lewis 2008). A common technique of presiden-
tial control is to concentrate policy influence among employees who share the president’s
policy views, often political appointees. Senior political appointees make policy and per-
sonnel decisions including delegating policymaking tasks and reviewing policy proposals
by their subordinates.2 These decisions often involve excluding a careerist who appointees
determine to be problematic from policymaking by replacing the person with an appointee
or acceptable careerist, adding an appointed manager above the problematic careerist in the
1Seventy-five percent of respondents reported that opportunities to influence public policies that are im-
portant to them is an important or very important attribute of their job.
2Formal models of delegation provide insight into how appointees are likely to choose which civil servants
are assigned important policy tasks. These models suggest that there exists a delegation cutoff threshold: the
appointee (i.e. principal) will delegate if and only if some careerist (i.e., agent) is at least as ideologically
close to her as this threshold (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Gailmard and Patty 2007). Any careerist with
preferences sufficiently extreme to exceed this threshold will never be delegated policymaking authority.
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organizational hierarchy, or adding appointed special assistants (often Schedule C appoint-
ments) that have significant informal authority (Lewis 2008, p. 30-37). In each case, the
end result is that the targeted careerist loses policy influence.
Losing policy influence reduces the value policy-motivated careerists receive from pub-
lic service. They have at least two options to compensate for this loss.3 First, they can find
another job that is more satisfying. The more civil servants lack policy influence, the more
likely they are to want to leave the agency for a better opportunity and, eventually, to find
another job taking their expertise with them.4 Second, careerists that choose to remain in
public service despite a loss of policy influence are likely to put forth less effort because
they do not expect to reap a reward commensurate with their cost of effort. Civil servants
must believe the gains from expertise investment, in particular being able to use that ex-
pertise to make policy, are sufficient to offset the costs of acquisition; otherwise they will
prefer not to invest (Gailmard and Patty 2007).5
In sum, politicization increases civil servants’ incentives to exit their agency and re-
duces their incentives to exert effort on the job, including acquiring policy expertise. Civil
servants with preferences that diverge from the president and the president’s appointees are
most likely to be excluded from policymaking because, to gain control, appointees prefer
to delegate key policymaking tasks to employees with policy preferences that are similar
to their own. This loss of policy influence creates incentives for policy-motivated civil ser-
vants to exit public service or, if they remain, to reduce their level of effort. The cumulative
effects of increased turnover and reduced effort acquiring and applying expertise are less
policy expertise in federal agencies and less effective public policy.
Three testable hypotheses follow from the discussion above. First, careerists with pref-
3See Golden (2000, Ch. 2) for a broader discussion of options.
4An important factor in this decision is the careerists’ time horizon. Career civil servants may have a
long-term view of policymaking and respond to agency politicization by waiting out appointees, which may
limit the effect of politicization on turnover.
5Loss of policy expertise via exit is less concerning if it can be replaced through contracting or hiring new
employees. While general expertise may be available in the labor market, a new hire must expend effort and
time to learn about the effects of a specific policy proposal by collecting and analyzing data or talking with
knowledgeable outside parties (see Stephenson 2007, p. 470, for elaboration of this point).
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erences that diverge from appointees are less likely to be delegated key policymaking tasks
and be included in policymaking decisions by appointees. This yields the following hy-
pothesis:
H1: Career civil servants should perceive that senior civil servants have less policy in-
fluence relative to appointees as preference divergence between themselves and ap-
pointees in their agency increases.
Politicization, defined as concentrating policy influence among political appointees, re-
duces the value of public service for careerists. Therefore, greater politicization should
make careerists more likely to exit the agency and less likely to exert effort to acquire and
apply policy expertise. This yields two additional hypotheses:
H2: Career civil servants should be more likely to express intent to exit the agency as they
perceive their agency to be more politicized.
H3: Career civil servants’ level of effort investing in and applying policy expertise should
decrease as they perceive their agency to be more politicized.
3.2 Data, Variables, and Methods
The hypotheses above require measures of federal civil servants’ intent to exit their
agency, their effort exerted, perceived politicization, and policy preferences. I use an orig-
inal survey of senior appointed and career civil servants who work across the executive
branch, including the 15 executive departments, 66 independent agencies, and seven agen-
cies in the Executive Office of the President, to measure each concept and to address po-
tential threats to statistical inference.
The survey was in the field from August 14, 2014 to December 15, 2014. The response
rate was 24 percent (3,551 of 14,698). The response rate among appointees was 18 percent
(429 of 2,444) compared to 25 percent among careerists (3,122 of 12,254). I limit the
sample to career civil servants. The questions about hours worked per week, frequency
of investment in policy expertise, whether the respondent has been approached about a
job, and agency-specific expertise were asked of a random half-sample (N = 1,465 in the
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random half-sample). Additional description of the survey design is provided in Appendix
C.
Survey data is particularly well suited to the questions at hand. Individuals’ perceptions
of their work environment are precisely the beliefs that they would use when evaluating
their job prospects, deciding how much effort to exert, and whether to remain in public
service. Nonetheless, social desireability bias and survey selection bias are concerns with
survey data. Social desireability bias may cause respondents to overstate their investment
frequency and understate their desire to leave their agency because they believe such re-
sponses will reflect poorly on themselves and their agency. However, these biases would
make it more difficult for me to find a positive association between politicization and intent
to exit and a negative association between politicization and frequency of investment. Se-
lection bias would occur if respondents in politicized agencies are more likely to respond
to the survey causing the sample to perceive more politicization than the population. In
terms of partisanship, this type of selection would cause Republicans to be more likely to
respond. In Section C.12 of the Appendix, I provide evidence that, while Democrats may
be slightly more likely to respond than Republicans, the distribution of partisanship among
respondents is not materially different from the target population.
3.2.1 Measuring Politicization
I define agency politicization as the concentration of policy influence among political
appointees in an agency. To measure politicization, respondents were asked about their
perceptions of the policy influence of “senior civil servants” and “political appointees”
in their agency. Response options were “A great deal,” “A good bit,” “Some”, “Little,”
“None,” and “Don’t know.” I operationalize agency politicization as the difference between
the influence of appointees and the influence of senior civil servants, which ranges from -4
(maximum careerist influence) to 4 (maximum appointee influence). Most observations are
between 0 and 2, indicating that appointees generally have moderately more influence than
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career civil servants. (Sections C.2 and C.3 of the Appendix provide question screenshots
and plots of the distributions of key variables.)
This measure of agency politicization captures the loss of policy influence by career
civil servants. Therefore, greater politicization should be associated with a lower value of
employment derived from policy influence. This type of politicization should most affect
those employees that value policy influence highly.6 When asked about the importance
of certain job attributes, 90% of respondents reported that “[o]pportunities to influence
public policies that are important to me” were “somewhat important,” “important,” or “very
important” with 75% reporting “important” or “very important.” Given that almost all of
the respondents value policy influence highly, the value they derive from public service
should be affected by the loss of policy influence due to agency politicization. In other
words, the respondents are generally policy-motivated.
3.2.2 Measuring Intent to Exit, Effort, and Investment
Civil servants’ intent to exit was measured by asking: “How likely is it that you will
leave [your agency] in the next 12 months?” Responses were “Very likely,” “Likely,” “Un-
likely,” “Very unlikely,” and “Not sure.” Of course, not everyone that expresses an intent
to exit will leave; however, expressing an intent to exit should be associated with actual
exit. Most respondents (73%) report that they are “unlikely” or “very unlikely” to leave the
agency within one year.
General effort, which includes investing in and applying policy expertise, was mea-
sured by asking: “How many hours per week do you USUALLY work at your job at [your
agency]?” Possible responses were any integer between 20 and 99, as well as “Fewer than
20” and “More than 99.”7 This is an admittedly rough measure of effort. First, a reduction
6I do not find that the effect of politicization is conditional on valuing policy influence, perhaps because
of limited variation how much respondents value policy influence. See Section C.15 of the Appendix.
7Respondents to the paper version of the survey wrote their answers rather than selecting an option from
a drop-down menu. Responses to the paper survey that provided a range of hours, e.g., 40-50, were coded by
taking the midpoint and rounding to the nearest integer.
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in effort does not necessarily lead to fewer hours worked per week - it may manifest in-
stead in reduced effort during working hours. Second, there is likely a lower limit on hours
worked per week, say 40 hours per week for most respondents, that sets the lower bound
on how few hours someone can work per week and retain their job. However, most respon-
dents work more than 40 hours per week, and those putting forth more effort likely work
considerably more than 40 hours per week. If the respondent is given less work because
she is being excluded from key projects or she reduces her effort, she should work fewer
hours per week.
I define expertise investment as acquiring information that can be used to better predict
policy outcomes (this follows the definition of expertise invesment in Gailmard and Patty
2013, p. 32). Respondents were asked: “Since joining [your agency] how often do you
do each of the following in a typical calendar year?” They where provided a list of tasks
that can build policy expertise, namely reading professional or trade journals, attending
seminars or training related to the policy jurisdiction of their agency, discussing policy with
outside experts, attending industry or trade conferences related to the policy jurisdiction
of their agency, consulting subject matter experts at state or international agencies, and
conducting or reading academic research related to the policy jurisdiction of their agency.
The possible responses where “Never,” “Rarely,” “Few times a year,” “Monthly,” “Weekly,”
“Daily,” or “Don’t know.”8
3.2.3 Measuring Preference Divergence
I measure individual ideology by asking respondents for their positions on 11 measures
voted on by the 113th Congress.9 I combine these “votes” with the roll call matrix from the
relevant Congress, using six final passage and conference votes to “bridge” the chambers
8I omitted 47 respondents who reported they attend seminars or training or that they attend industry
or trade conferences weekly or daily from the sample because attending training or conferences with that
frequency does not seem feasible.
9See Section C.6 in the Appendix for details of the estimation of ideal points.
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of Congress. I then use this matrix to estimate ideal points for all members of Congress,
President Obama, and senior federal executives on the same scale (this technique follows
Clinton et al. 2012). Preference divergence is operationalized as the absolute difference in
the ideal point of each career civil servant and the average ideal point of political appointees
that work in the same agency and, for agencies in an executive department, appointees
that are in the agency’s supervisory hierarchy. The hierarchy includes appointees in the
relevant Office of the Secretary (or the Office of the Attorney General for employees of
the Department of Justice) and appointees in agencies that are above the agency in the
organizational hierarchy.
Formally, consider all career respondents selecting agency A as their workplace. Let
i index careerists and j index appointees. Then divergence for the ith careerist selecting
agency A as her workplace is: |(∑nJj=1
ideal point j
nJ
)− ideal pointi|, where nJ is the number
of appointee respondents as defined above for agency A. Preference divergence is a con-
tinuous measure that ranges from 0.00 (indicating no preference divergence) to 3.57 (the
maximum preference divergence observed), with most observations falling between zero
and two.10
3.2.4 Control Variables
Civil servants career decisions are determined by factors other than politicization. There-
fore, I include a set of control variables to account for other determinants. The literature on
civil servant motivation accepts civil servants are motivated by salary and generally focuses
on two types of employees: those that care about both salary and policy outcomes and those
that care only about salary (Brehm and Gates 1999; Carpenter 2001; Downs 1967; Gail-
10This measure relies on two assumptions. First, I assume this general measure of ideology is sufficiently
correlated with policy preferences in the policy jurisdictions of each agency to measure relevant preference di-
vergence. If this correlation is not sufficiently high, then I should not find any association between preference
divergence and perceived politicization. Second, I assume the average ideology of responding appointees
is representative of the ideology of the appointees managing career respondents. In Section C.14.3 of the
Appendix, I show that results are robust to using a measure of preference divergence that better captures pref-
erences relevant to each agencys’ policy domain. This measure is only available for a subset of respondents.
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mard and Patty 2007; Perry and Wise 1990; Perry 1996). Of course, the career decisions
of civil servants that care only about salary will be unaffected by losing policy influence.
Furthermore, civil servants may invest in policy expertise to earn a higher salary through
merit-based raises, promotion within government (Teodoro 2009), or exit to the private
sector. Pecuniary incentives may be sufficient to motivate civil servants who care about
policy to invest in policy expertise regardless of their current or expected policy influence.
Additionally, there are other reasons to engage in the investment behaviors above other
than building policy expertise. For example, a civil servant may attend a trade conference
or contact an outside expert to network in an effort to move to the private sector.
To measure intrinsic motivation, respondents were asked the following: “We’d like to
understand what you value about your job. How important are each of the following job at-
tributes to you?” The attributes included “[o]pportunies to influence public policies that are
important to me,” “[o]pportunities to develop skills to move to a job in the private sector,”
and “[o]pportunities to develop professional skills to move to a higher job in the federal
government,” and “[s]alary and benefits.” Response options were “Not at all important,”
“Not too important,” “Somewhat important,” “Important,” and “Very important.” I control
for how much civil servants value opportunities for promotion within the government or
exiting the private sector to account for these alternative motivations. I also control for
how much respondents’ value policy influence (i.e., policy-motivation). Securing a pro-
motion within government likely increases both salary and policy influence while exiting
to the private sector likely eliminates opportunities to influence public policy but may in-
crease salary. Results are robust to controlling for how much civil servants’ value salary
and benefits rather than controlling for how much they value promotions.11
The marketability of civil servants’ skills determines how easily they can find outside
employment, and the more valuable skills are the more likely a civil servant is to invest
in them. Therefore, I control for marketability of skills using three variables.12 First,
11See Section C.7 of the Appendix.
12See Section 13.2 for models that include fixed effects for agency mission, which provide an additional
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respondents were asked,“Have you been approached about a job outside [your agency]
since July 1, 2013?” Civil servants that have been actively sought for other positions clearly
have viable outside options. Second, members of the Senior Executive Service should have
more outside options because the SES was designed to provide a core group of government
managers that can move between agencies. The management skills these employees learn
should be marketable. Third, civil servants whose positions require expertise that is only
useful if employed by the agency, i.e., agency-specific expertise, should have fewer outside
options (Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Gailmard and Patty 2007). Additionally, sources of
expertise external to the agency, such as outside policy experts, should be less useful for
building the expertise a job requires if that expertise is agency-specific.
The measurement strategy for agency-specific expertise centered on asking respondents
about expertise that can only be acquired at their agency, because such expertise is not
likely to be valued elsewhere. Nonetheless, to account for the possibility that the expertise
that can only be acquired by working at an agency could be valued by other employers,
respondents were asked what percentage of the expertise that could only be acquired at their
agency is valued by other employers, including the private, public, and non-profit sectors
to account for the possibility that each sector values different skill sets. Then agency-
specific expertise is defined as the percentage of expertise that can only be acquired at
an agency that is not valued by another employer.13 Formally, let xi be the percentage of
expertise that the ith respondent says can only be acquired by working at her agency. Let yi j
be the ith respondent’s assessment of what percentage of that expertise is valued by the jth
employment sector. Then agency-specific expertise is operationalized as: xi−xi×max j yi j.
Preference divergence may have a direct effect on civil servants’ career decisions in
control for the market value of skills.
13The measure of agency-specific expertise investment may be an underestimate. Suppose 80% of
a respondent’s skills can only be learned on-the-job. Also, suppose that government contractors value
30% of those skills and non-profits value 20%. Then the respondent’s agency-specific expertise will be
.80− .80(.30) = .56. This assumes that the 20% valued by non-profits is included in the 30% valued by
government contractors. If this is not the case, then agency-specific expertise will be underestimated because
more than 30% of the skills are valued by other employers.
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addition to its indirect effect via politicization. A civil servant who does not share the
preferences of appointees leading her agency may be more likely to exit, exert less effort,
or invest less in policy expertise because she does not like how appointees are managing
the agency (e.g., what policies appointees choose to pursue) regardless of whether she has
policy influence or not. Therefore, I control for preference divergence in models estimating
the effect of politicization on civil servants’ career decisions.
Civil servants that have served in the agency during different periods of time should
have different perceptions of politicization, and employees that have worked in the agency
longer are closer to retirement and more likely to exit the agency. Therefore, I control for
tenure in the agency and, in models of intent to exit, self-reported retirement eligibility.
Additionally, the question about expertise investment asks about behavior since joining the
agency, which could cause responses to vary systematically based on tenure. Lastly, em-
ployee perceptions of politicization should vary with the frequency of contact with political
appointees. Therefore, I control for the respondent’s self-reported frequency of contact with
appointees.
3.3 Data Analysis
I estimate ordered probit models when the dependent variable is an ordered categor-
ical variable (e.g., perceived politicization, likelihood of exit, and investment frequency)
to account for the possibility of unequal intervals between response categories. For ex-
ample, the response categories for investment activities cover various frequencies making
it unlikely that the difference between response categories is uniform (i.e., the difference
between “Rarely” and a “Few times a year” is likely not the same as the difference between
“Monthly” and “Weekly”). I estimate an Ordinary Least Squares Model when the depen-
dent variable is hours typically worked per week or a factor score. The unit of analysis is
an individual nested in an agency; therefore, I cluster the standard errors on agencies to
account for covariance between politicization and agency resulting in model error that is
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correlated with agency.14 Overall, I find that greater preference divergence is associated
with increased likelihood that civil servants perceive their agency is politicized (Table 1).
I also find that civil servants who perceive that their agency is politicized are more likely
to express intent to exit their agency within a year and less likely to report that they attend
training or seminars or that they discuss policy with outside experts frequently (Table 2). I
do not find that politicization reduces hours worked per week or the frequency with which
civil servants engage in other investment activities when analyzing the full sample. I dis-
cuss possible explanations for why I do not find a relationship below, including variation in
investment behavior due to position and agency mission because both may influence how
useful a specific task is for building policy expertise.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.1 estimate the effect of preference divergence on perceived
politicization.15 The coefficient on divergence is positive and the estimate is sufficiently
precise to be distinguished from zero with a high degree of confidence in Model 1. The co-
efficient on divergence squared in Model 2 is also positive and statistically distinguishable
from zero, which indicates that as preference divergence increases, the likelihood that civil
servants perceive their agency is politicized increases at an increasing rate.16 Consistent
14Rather than using agency fixed effects, I prefer to control for variables directly when possible (e.g, the
marketability of skills varies at the agency and individual level, and I think the controls I include effectively
control for both). In Section 14.2, I discuss concerns about omitted variable bias related to unobserved agency
characteristics and show that results are robust to including agency fixed effects. Importantly, using agency
fixed effects in these models is problematic because key variables, e.g., politicization, vary at the agency-
and individual-level. Therefore, agency fixed effects absorb inter-agency variation in politicization, which is
only desirable if fixed effects are necessary to prevent omitted variable bias. The fact that results are robust to
including agency fixed effects suggests there is important intra-agency variation in civil servants’ perceptions
of their workplace and responses to those perceptions. Additionally, there are often few respondents per
agency, which creates concerns about overfitting the model when using agency fixed effects. This is one
reason to prefer the agency mission fixed effects in Section C.13.2 of the Appendix if they address the specific
omitted variable concern. See the Appendix for details.
15See Appendix Section C.5 for additional discussion of concept measurement for preference divergence,
politicization, and why an individual civil servant’s policy influence should be correlated with her perceptions
of civil servants’ policy influence in general.
16The non-linear effect of preference divergence on perceived politicization in Model 2 is consistent with
the existence of a delegation cutoff threshold, as predicted by formal models of delegation, beyond which ap-
pointees will exclude civil servants whose preferences diverge too greatly from their own from policymaking.
Civil servants with slight preference divergence (divergence of one) are somewhat less likely to be included
in policymaking (i.e., these civil servants are likely in the delegation set) while civil servants with extreme
preference divergence (divergence of 2 or greater) are much less likely to be included in policymaking (i.e.,
they are less likely to be in the delegation set). Given that delegation cutoff thresholds vary across appointees,
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Table 3.1: Models of Politicization
Model (1) (2)
Dependent Variable Pol. Pol.
Preference Divergence 0.14∗∗∗ −0.03
(0.04) (0.10)
Divergence2 0.07∗
(0.04)
SES 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.00
(0.002) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.03) (0.03)
τ1 −2.20∗∗∗ −2.27∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17)
τ2 −1.53∗∗∗ −1.60∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12)
τ3 −1.00∗∗∗ −1.06∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
τ4 −0.32∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10)
τ5 0.84∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10)
τ6 1.74∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11)
τ7 2.54∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13)
τ8 3.46∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21)
N 1,630 1,630
N Clusters 173 173
Pct. Correctly Predicted 38% 38%
Wald χ2 89.94 92.27
Robust standard errors clustered on
agencies in parentheses. ∗ significant at
p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided
test; χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models 1 and 2 are ordered probit models.
the association between preference divergence and perceived politicization would, on average, increase at an
increasing rate.
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Table 3.2: Models of Intent to Exit, Effort, and Expertise Investment
Model (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.07∗∗ 0.02 −0.09∗∗ 0.00 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.03) (0.23) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Preference Divergence −0.02 0.86 0.06 0.05 −0.11∗∗ 0.02
(0.06) (0.58) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)
Value Policy Influence −0.06 0.30 0.32∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.37) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.16∗∗∗ 0.41 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.30) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.01 −0.07 −0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.28) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.31∗∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 0.12 0.13∗ 0.05 0.10∗
(0.09) (0.72) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.23 −3.29 −0.49 −0.01 −0.01 −0.21
(0.36) (2.16) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.22)
SES 0.14 2.86∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.12 0.15 −0.01
(0.10) (0.66) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.005) (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact 0.01 0.74∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.02 0.09∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.04) (0.25) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.81∗∗∗
(0.09)
τ1 (3, 5-7) & Con. (4, 8) 0.05 42.69∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.27 −0.97∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗
(0.24) (1.54) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.14)
τ2 1.09∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.34
(0.24) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
τ3 1.63∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22)
τ4 2.23∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.22)
τ5 3.24∗∗∗ 2.81∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.23)
N 710 753 765 765 765 763
N Clusters 159 160 161 160 161 160
R2 0.13 0.15
Pct. Correctly Predicted 45% 35% 29% 52%
Wald χ2 110.73 193.29 49.49 47.29
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models 3 and 5 - 7 are ordered probit models. Models 4 and 8 are OLS models.
with H1, senior civil servants are likely to perceive that senior civil servants and appointees
have similar levels of policy influence at lower levels of preference divergence and, as pref-
erence divergence increases, civil servants are more likely to perceive that their agency is
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politicized.17
The upper left quadrant of Figure 3.1 shows the predicted probability from Model 1
that the typical18 career civil servant perceives their agency is politicized, defined as politi-
cization of two or greater, as preference divergence increases. (For example, politicization
of two is a response that appointees have “a great deal” of policy influence and senior civil
servants have “some” or appointees have “a good bit” and senior civil servants have “lit-
tle.”) The predicted probability that a civil servant perceives that her agency is politicized
increases 13 percentage points, or nearly doubles, as preference divergence increases from
zero to three. The change in predicted probability for each unit increase in divergence is
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
The relationship between preference divergence and perceived politicization is impor-
tant because it provides evidence for the partisan foundation of the temporal dynamics
of politicization and identifies which civil servants and agencies should be the targets of
politicization across presidential administrations (Lewis 2008). The preference divergence
of Republican civil servants is larger, on average, than Democratic civil servants’ during a
Democratic administration. The relationship is the opposite during a Republican adminis-
tration (see Section C.11 of the Appendix). Therefore, conservative civil servants are more
likely to perceive politicization during Democratic administrations while liberal civil ser-
vants are more likely to perceive politicization during Republican administrations. Having
identified who is more likely to be subject to politicization, I now turn to the effects of
politicization on civil servants career decisions.
Model 3 in Table 3.2 estimates the effect of politicization on a civil servants’ intent to
17Some agencies are designed to be insulated from political control by the president (Lewis 2003; Selin
2015). Results in Table 3.1 are robust to including agency fixed effects to account for any systematic time-
invariant agency characteristics, including agency structure. See Section C.14.2 of the Appendix.
18A “typical” respondent perceives no politicization, has preference divergence of 0.87, has not been ap-
proached about a job, has expertise that is 13.72% agency-specific, is not a member of the SES, has agency
tenure of 17.32 years, has daily contact with appointees, and is not eligible to retire. For the typical respon-
dent, policy influence is very important, promotion within the federal government is important, and moving
to the private sector is not too important. Divergence, agency-specific expertise, and agency tenure are held
at their means. Modal values are used for all other variables.
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exit. Consistent with H2, the coefficient on politicization is positive and estimated with
sufficient precision to distinguish it from zero with a high degree of confidence. The upper
right quadrant in Figure 3.1 shows the predicted probability that a typical respondent says
she is “likely” or “very likely” to exit her agency within one year as politicization increases.
Overall, increasing politicization from zero to three increases the predicted probability that
a civil servant expresses intent to exit from 9% to 12%, an increase of one-third. The change
in predicted probability for each unit increase in politicization is statistically significant at
the 90% confidence level.
Turning to Model 4 (an Ordinary Least Squares model), there is little evidence that
politicization reduces effort as measured by hours worked per week.19 The estimate of the
coefficient on politicization in Model 4 is not sufficiently precise to be distinguished from
zero with much confidence. This may be because hours worked is a rough measure of effort
as discussed above. Overall, this model provides little support for hypothesis H3.
The questions about specific tasks associated with investment in policy expertise mea-
sure effort more precisely than hours worked per week and provide an additional test of
hypothesis H3. Table 3.2 contains models of expertise investment in activities that should
be relevant for many civil servants, a claim that I discuss further below. The coefficient on
politicization is negative and distinguishable from zero with a high degree of confidence in
two of the three models.20 Consistent with H3, the more politicized civil servants perceived
their agency to be, the less likely they are to attend training or seminars (Model 7) and the
less likely they are to consult outside policy experts (Model 5). Lastly, the dependent vari-
able in Model 8 is a factor score based on the investment activities in Models 5, 6, and 7.21
This model shows that politicization is negatively associated with this aggregate measure
19This model is not sensitive to excluding extreme responses of less than 40 hours and more than 80 hours.
20A particular concern related to statistical inference is that presidents and appointees may concentrate
policy influence among appointees because of agency dysfunction. See Section C.14.2 of the Appendix for
additional discussion.
21The factor loadings from principal components factor analysis suggests a singe dimension and loadings
range from 0.43 to 0.64. The Eigen value is 0.95. Given the diversity of activities covered, a single underlying
factor suggests that the underlying dimension is investment in policy expertise.
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of latent expertise investment.
The bottom quadrants of Figure 3.1 plot the predicted probabilities that a typical senior
civil servant reports that they rarely or never discuss policy with outside experts (left quad-
rant) and that they rarely or never attend training or seminars (right quadrant). Increasing
politicization from zero to three increases the predicted probability that a civil servant re-
ports rarely or discussing policy with outside policy experts from 0.9 to 0.14, an increase of
over one-half. The same increase in politicization increases the predicted probability that
a civil servant reports rarely or never attending training from 0.33 to 0.44, an increase of
over one-third. The change in predicted probability for each unit increase politicization is
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
Attending training may require the approval of superiors in the agency, which raises
the question of whether the mechanism leading to less frequent investment is appointees
preventing careerists from attending training or a reduction in effort by careerists. My data
cannot differentiate between these mechanisms and both may contribute to the observed
association. The similar effect sizes for investment behaviors, such as discussion with
outside experts, that are less likely to require approval suggests that reduction of effort is
at least partly responsible. Importantly, either mechanism leads to less frequent investment
in policy expertise.
I do not find that higher levels of perceived politicization are negatively associated
with reduced frequency of reading professional or trade journals, attending industry or
trade conferences, consulting subject matter experts at state or international agencies, or
conducting or reading academic research when analyzing the full sample. There are at
least two potential explanations for this finding. First, if an investment activity is low cost,
its benefits may continue to exceed its costs for most civil servants despite the negative
effect of politicization. Reading professional and trade journals is a particularly low cost
activity, and 71% of civil servants report doing it at least monthly.
Second, an investment activity is not necessarily useful for every civil servant. For
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example, civil servants working in an agency that does not regulate an industry may not at-
tend industry or trade conferences, and there may not be academic research relevant to each
civil servants’ job. Isolating positions or agencies for which a task is relevant for building
expertise is a challenge to measuring expertise investment across agencies. To address this,
I examine whether civil servants’ investment frequencies vary by position or agency mis-
sion. More frequent investment suggests that a task is useful for building expertise. I then
examine whether politicization reduces investment frequency in cases where civil servants
invest more frequently (see Section C.13 of the Appendix). I find, for example, that civil
servants involved in notice-and-comment rulemaking report attending industry and trade
conferences more often than other civil servants, and that rulemakers who perceive their
agency is politicized attend industry and trade conferences less often. The same is true for
consulting subject matter experts. Similarly, I estimate the effect of politicization condi-
tional on whether civil servants working in agencies with a given mission complete a task
more frequently than average, and I find find the effect of increasing politicization on the
frequency with which civil servants read or conduct academic research is negative condi-
tional on agency mission. Similar to the analysis of rulemakers, the effect of politicization
on attending industry or trade conferences is also negative conditional on mission. While
the evidence is mixed overall, this analysis demonstrates that isolating observations for
which expertise should be more useful can reveal relationships between politicization and
investment behavior that are not evident in the pooled analysis. Scholars should be mindful
of this variation when designing future research on expertise investment by civil servants
across agencies.
3.4 Discussion
Analyzing data from a survey of over 3,500 federal civil servants, I find that greater
preference divergence between appointees and senior civil servants is associated with in-
creased likelihood that senior civil servants perceive that appointees have more policy influ-
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Figure 3.1: Predicted Probabilities of Politicization, Intent to Exit, and Expertise Invest-
ment
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Note: Lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Confidence intervals for the predicted prob-
abilities are bootstrapped (N=10,000). Predicted probabilities are based on a typical re-
spondent (see footnote 18 for a definition). The upper left quadrant plots the predicted
probability a respondent perceives politicization of 2 or greater.
ence than careerists. This finding is consistent with appointees being less likely to delegate
key policymaking tasks to careerists that do not share the appointees’ policy views and with
these careerists being excluded from policymaking. This loss of policy influence alters ca-
reerist incentives in ways that reduce the stock of expertise in federal agencies. Senior civil
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servants who perceive their agency is politicized (i.e., senior civil servants have less policy
influence than appointees) are more likely to express intent to exit the agency within one
year. Furthermore, civil servants who perceive their agency is politicized are less likely
to engage behaviors that build policy expertise, namely attending training or seminars or
consulting external policy experts. In total, politicization reduces expertise by increasing
turnover and reducing investment among careerists that remain in the federal government.
The estimates of the effect of politicization on civil servants’ intent to exit and frequency
of expertise investment are realistic. Changing jobs is a major decision that affects multiple
aspects of civil servants’ lives. Therefore, it is not surprising that most civil servants report
they are unlikely to exit their agency at all levels of politicization. Civil servants may prefer
to stay and wait for the next election which brings the possibility of a president who shares
their policy views. Similarly, the effect sizes of politicization on investment frequency
are realistic because it is unlikely that dissatisfied career civil servants can exert no effort
investing in and applying expertise and retain their job. So, even dissatisfied careerists are
likely to report some investment.
The effect of politicization on exit intention is also likely to be underestimated relative
to effects temporally nearer to a change in party control of the White House. The survey
was in the field six years into the Obama presidency. Employees most affected by politi-
cization are likely to have exited before the survey was administered. Recent research uses
data on millions of career civil servants provided by the Office of Personnel Management
to analyze the effect of elections on civil servants’ career decisions between 1988 and 2011
(Bolton, de Figueiredo, and Lewis 2016). Consistent with my findings that divergent pol-
icy views between appointees and careerists leads to politicization which leads to exit, this
work finds that senior career civil servants in agencies with policy views that diverge from
the president are more likely to exit, particularly at the start of presidential terms.
Prior scholarship, both theoretical (e.g., Gailmard and Patty 2007) and empirical (e.g.,
Lewis 2008), suggested that appointees exclude civil servants who do not share the pres-
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ident’s policy views from policymaking, and that this loss of influence should lead to in-
creased turnover and less investment in expertise. This paper provides some of the first
systematic, micro-level evidence demonstrating these relationships exist. Survey data are
particularly well suited to examine the mechanisms by which politicization affects agency
policy expertise because they are able to measure concepts systematically across agencies
that are difficult to measure with available objective data (e.g., frequency of expertise in-
vestment, perceptions of policy influence). Furthermore, civil servants’ perceptions of their
work environment are precisely the beliefs that affect their decisions to leave public service
or, if they remain, whether to acquire and apply expertise.
Despite these strengths, a single cross-sectional data set is unable to establish the tem-
poral order of events described above: presidents choose an appointee, the appointee ex-
cludes careerists with divergent preferences from policymaking, and the excluded careerists
then exit the agency or reduce their effort. The ideal research design would use panel data
to examine civil servants career decisions across time. While I do not have a large panel
data set,22 I replicate the relationships between preference divergence and perceived politi-
cization as well as perceived politicization and intent to exit using similar data from the
adminstration of President George W. Bush in Section C.10 of the Appendix. Most impor-
tantly, I also show that Democrats have greater preference divergence and are more likely
to perceive that their agency is politicized than Republicans, on average, during the Bush
Administration. The converse is true during the Obama Administration (see Section C.11
of the Appendix). The changes in the relationships between partisanship and both pref-
erence divergence and politicization concurrent with the change in party of the president
clearly demonstrate that this temporal order drives politicization and its effects.
Another concern is that appointees, like presidents, may face a competence-loyalty
tradeoff (e.g., Edwards III 2001; Lewis 2008). Appointees may be willing to sacrifice
some preference congruence to gain access to a civil servant’s existing policy expertise,
22See Section C.11 of the Appendix for analysis of a small panel data set.
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i.e., delegate policymaking to an expert civil servant that does not share their policy prefer-
ences rather than an inexpert civil servant with similar preferences (Bendor and Meirowitz
2004). The potential for reverse causality between politicization and expertise investment
is something my data cannot address. That said, the correlations I find are consistent with
previous theoretical and empirical work on the temporal ordering of the effects of politi-
cization on expertise (e.g., Andersen and Moynihan 2016; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Lewis
2008).
3.5 Conclusion
Federal civil servants need policy expertise to formulate and implement effective pub-
lic policy. To control agency policymaking, presidents often concentrate policy influence
among employees, often political appointees, that share the president’s policy preferences.
These political appointees prefer to delegate key policymaking tasks to civil servants that
share their policy views and to exclude from policymaking those civil servants who do not.
Loss of policy influence reduces the value policy-motivated civil servants derive from pub-
lic service, which increases their incentives to exit and decreases their incentives to invest
in and apply policy expertise.
Aggregating the estimated effect of politicization on turnover across the executive branch
demonstrates that a small increase in the probability of exit within one year, applied across
hundreds of agencies and hundreds of thousands of employees that perceive higher levels
of politicization over the four or eight years of a presidency, can result in a large cumu-
lative loss of expertise due to exit. More concretely, there were 7,079 U.S.-based career
members of the SES as of December 2014, and about 49% of career SES respondents in
the survey report politicization of one or greater.23 Using Model 3, the predicted proba-
bility that a career member of the SES expresses intent to exit increases by 1.3 percentage
points as politicization increases from zero to one.24 Assuming all individuals that express
23United States Office of Personnel Management, FedScope
24Based on a career member of the SES with divergence of 0.86, that has not been approached about a
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intent to exit eventually do so, this increase in politicization translates into an additional 45
members of the SES that depart each year and 180 individuals that depart over a four-year
presidential term.25
The marginal effects of politicization on the frequency of expertise investment are also
concerning when applied across the executive branch. For example, increasing politiciza-
tion from zero to one is estimated to result in an additional 2 civil servants per 100 who
rarely or never discuss policy with outside experts and an addition 3 per 100 who rarely or
never attend training or seminars. An increase in politicization from zero to three is esti-
mated to result in an additonal 5 civil servants per 100 who rarely or never discuss policy
with outside experts less and an additional 11 civil servants per 100 who rarely or never
attend training or seminars. Considering that approximately two million non-postal civil-
ian civil servants work in the executive branch, these small percentages could translate to
thousands of people who invest in expertise less frequently.
Increased turnover and reduced expertise investment are likely to be greater at specific
agencies because civil servants in the same agency tend to have similar policy preferences,
and civil servants who do not share the policy views of the president and the presidents’
appointees are more likely to be subject to politicization. The loss of several senior agency
managers or senior personnel in charge of major federal programs can be severe at the
agency level. Similarly, the harmful effect of reduced expertise investment concentrated at
the agency or program level could be significant.
Federal civil servants need policy expertise to develop effective policies. They tackle
complex problems and the solutions they develop and implement affect the quality of mil-
lions of people’s lives. If presidents and political appointees are not mindful of the harmful
effects of politicization on policy expertise, then presidents and the public may find that
job, is not eligible to retire, has 18.67 years with the agency, and has daily contact with appointees. For the
typical member of the SES, policy influence is very important, promotion within the federal government is
important, and moving to the private sector is not too important.
25The calculation is 7,079× 0.49× 0.013 = 45.09. Of course, not all individuals that express intent to exit
will in fact leave the agency. However, it is also true that respondents that perceive greater politicization will
also have a greater predicted probability of exit.
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federal agencies lack the expertise needed to solve the nation’s policy problems.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Change in Policy, Expected Policy, and Variance of Expected Policy as Insulation
Increases
Given that A sets p equal to its ideal point in equilibrium, the derivative of p with respect
to λ given the group in power is:
∂ p
∂λ
=
∂
∂λ
(1−λ )xi+λB =−xi+B, i = {1,2}
Expected policy is:
E[p] = θ [(1−λ )x1+λB]+ (1−θ)[(1−λ )x2+λB]
= (1−λ )[x2−θ(x2− x1)]+λB
Derivative of expected policy with respect to λ given the agency is created:
∂E[p(C = Yes,λ )]
∂λ
=
∂
∂λ
θ [(1−λ )x1+λB]+ (1−θ)[(1−λ )x2+λB]
= θ [−x1+B]+ (1−θ)[−x2+B]
= θ(x2− x1)− x2+B
Determine when the derivative of expected policy with respect to λ is decreasing in terms
of B:
θ(x2− x1)− x2+B < 0→ B < x2−θ(x2− x1)
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Derivative of expected policy given no insulation with respect to x2:
∂E[p(C = Yes,λ = 0)]
∂x2
=
∂
∂x2
x2−θ(x2− x1) = 1−θ
Variance of policy if the agency is created is:
Var[p] = E[p2]− (E[p])2
= θ [(1−λ )x1+λB]2+(1−θ)[(1−λ )x2+λB]2− [(θx1+(1−θ)x2)(1−λ )+λB]2
= θ(1−θ)(x1− x2)2(1−λ )2
Determine when the derivative of variance of policy with respect to λ is less than 0:
∂Var[p]
∂λ
=−2θ(1−θ)(x1− x2)2(1−λ )< 0 if θ ∈ (0,1) and λ ∈ [0,1)
A.2 Derivation of Optimal Insulation
Isolate λ in G1’s expected utility:
E[UG1] =−θ [(1−λ )x1+Bλ − x1]2− (1−θ)[(1−λ )x2+Bλ − x1]2
=−θ [λ (−x1+B)]2+(1−θ)[x2−λx2+Bλ − x1]2
=−θλ 2(x1−B)2− (1−θ)[x22+ x22λ 2+B2λ 2+ x21
=−2x22λ +2x2Bλ −2x1x2−2x2Bλ 2+2x1x2λ −2x1Bλ ]
=−θλ 2(x1−B)2− (1−θ)[(λ 2(x2−B)2−2λ (B− x2)(x1− x2)+(x1− x2)2]
= λ 2[−θ(x1−B)2− (1−θ)(x2−B)2]+2λ (1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2)− (1−θ)(x1− x2)2
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A.2.1 Derivation of Optimal Insulation Unbounded
Take first order conditions of EU1 with respect to λ :
∂E[UG1]
∂λ
= 2λ [−θ(x1−B)2− (1−θ)(x2−B)2]+2(1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2)
2λ [−θ(x1−B)2− (1−θ)(x2−B)2]+2(1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2) = 0
→ λ [−θ(x1−B)2− (1−θ)(x2−B)2] =−(1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2)
→ λ ′ = (1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2)
θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2
A.2.2 Derivation of Optimal Insulation Bounded
G1’s choice of insulation is required to lie on [0,1]. I next examine when λ ′ 6∈ [0,1] by
evaluating λ ′ over the range of B. The relevant properties of λ ′ are:
1. limB→x2 λ ′ = 0
2. If B = x1 or B = x2−θ(x2− x1), then λ ′ = 1.
3. Given x1 < x2 and θ ∈ (0,1), λ ′ is increasing in B on the interval [x1,x2−
√
θ(x1− x2)2).
4. Given x1 < x2 and θ ∈ (0,1), λ ′ is decreasing in B on the interval (x2−
√
θ(x1− x2)2,x2].
5. Given θ ∈ (0,1), x2−θ(x2− x1)≥ x2−
√
θ(x1− x2)2.
Altogether this shows that λ ′ = 1 at B = x1, λ ′ > 1 on B ∈ (x1,x2 − θ(x2 − x1)), and
λ ′ decreases from 1 to 0 on B ∈ [x2− θ(x2− x1),x2]. If follows G1’s optimal insulation
decision is:
λ ∗ =
 1 if B ∈ [x1,x2−θ(x2− x1)](1−θ)(B−x2)(x1−x2)
θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2 if B ∈ [x2−θ(x2− x1),x2]
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Property 1: The limit of λ ′ as B approaches x2:
lim
B→x2
λ ′ =
(1−θ)(x2− x2)(x1− x2)
θ(x1− x2)2+(1−θ)(x2− x2)2 = 0
Property 2: For what value of B does λ ′ = 1?
(1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2)
θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2 = 1
→ (1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2) = θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2
→−B2+B[(1−θ)(x1−x2)+2(1−θ)x2+2θx1]−(1−θ)(x1−x2)x2−(1−θ)x22−θx21 = 0
Applying the quadratic formula gives:
λ ′ = 1 if B = x1 or B = x2+θ(x1− x2)
Properties 3 & 4: Derivative of λ ′ with respect to B:
∂λ ′
∂B
=
(1−θ)(x1− x2)[θ(x1− x2)2− (x2−B)2]
[θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2]2
Given x1 < x2 and θ ∈ (0,1), this is negative iff:
(1−θ)(x1− x2)[θ(x1− x2)2− (x2−B)2]< 0
θ(x1− x2)2 > (x2−B)2√
θ(x1− x2)2 >±(x2−B)
→ B < x2+
√
θ(x1− x2)2 and B > x2−
√
θ(x1− x2)2
→ B ∈ (x2−
√
θ(x1− x2)2,x2+
√
θ(x1− x2)2)
→ B ∈ (x2−
√
θ(x1− x2)2,x2] given B≤ x2
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Property 5: Determine when x2−θ(x2−x1) is greater than or equal to x2−
√
θ(x1− x2)2 :
x2−θ(x2− x1)≥ x2−
√
θ(x1− x2)2
→−θ(x2− x1)≥−
√
θ(x2− x1) given x1 < x2
→−θ ≥−
√
θ which is true for θ ∈ (0,1)
A.2.3 Derivative of λ ′ with respect to θ
∂λ ′
∂θ
=
[θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2][−(B− x2)(x1− x2)]
[θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2]2
−[(x1−B)2− (x2−B)2][(1−θ)(B− x2)(x1− x2)]
[θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2]2
=
−θ(x1−B)2(B− x2)(x1− x2)− (1−θ)(x2−B)2(B− x2)(x1− x2)
[θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2]2
−(1−θ)(x1−B)2(B− x2)(x1− x2)+(1−θ)(x2−B)2(B− x2)(x1− x2)
[θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2]2
=
−(x1−B)2(B− x2)(x1− x2)
[θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2]2
This is negative for x1 < B < x2 and x1 < x2.
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Figure A.1: Optimal Insulation
Note: This figure plots λ ∗ for all values of B and θ with x1 = 0 and x2 = 1. The black portion of the surface
is above B ∈ [x1,x2−θ(x2− x1)] and the gray portion is above B ∈ [x2−θ(x2− x1),x2] .
A.3 Optimal Creation Decision
G1 prefers not to create the agency iff:
UG1(q)> EUG1(λ
∗)
−(q− x1)2 >−θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2− (1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2
(q− x1)2 < θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2+(1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2
±(q− x1)<
√
θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2+(1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2
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q > x1−
√
θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2+(1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2
or
q < x1+
√
θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2+(1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2
Then G1 prefers to not create the agency for:
q ∈
(
x1−
√
θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2+(1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2,
x1+
√
θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2+(1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2
)
Define q∗ as
√
θ [(1−λ ∗)x1+Bλ ∗− x1]2+(1−θ)[(1−λ ∗)x2+Bλ ∗− x1]2.
If λ ∗ = 1, then:
q∗ =
√
θ [B− x1]2+(1−θ)[B− x1]2
= B− x1
→ (x1−q∗,x1+q∗) = (2x1−B,B)
The length of the interval is:
B− (2x1−B) = 2(B− x1)
The derivative of the length of the interval with respect to B is:
∂ 2(B− x1)
∂B
= 2
If λ ∗ = (1−θ)(B−x2)(x1−x2)θ(x1−B)2+(1−θ)(x2−B)2 , then:
q∗ =
√
θ(1−θ)(B− x1)2(x1− x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
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→ (x1−q∗,x1+q∗) =
(
x1−
√
θ(1−θ)(B− x1)2(x1− x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
,
x1+
√
θ(1−θ)(B− x1)2(x1− x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
)
The length of the interval is:
x1+q∗− (x1−q∗) = 2q∗ = 2
√
θ(1−θ)(B− x1)2(x1− x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
Taking first order conditions of this term with respect to B yields:
argmax
B
2
√
θ(1−θ)(B− x1)2(x1− x2)2
B2+θx21+(1−θ)x22−2B(θx1+(1−θ)x2)
= x2
Figure A.2: Size of the “No-Agency” Interval
Note: This figure plots qNo for all values of B and θ with x1 = 0 and x2 = 1. The black portion of the surface
is above B ∈ [x1,x2−θ(x2− x1)] and the gray portion is above B ∈ [x2−θ(x2− x1),x2] .
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Estimating Ideology
I used 14 votes to bridge the 109th Congress and 11 votes to bridge the 113th Congress.
I used legislators and survey respondents serving over time to create bridges between Con-
gresses. I treated members of the House who represented different Congressional districts
due to redistricting as separate legislators to account for the change in constituency influ-
ence. Only survey respondents with at least two “votes” were included. I estimated ideal
points using R 3.3.3 and the ideal function in the pscl package version 1.4.9. I ran one
MCMC chain for 375,000 iterations thinned by 75 with the first 75,000 iterations discarded
as burn-in, leaving 4,000 observations for inference. Diagnostics indicated the chain con-
verged. The space was locally identified using a mean of 0 and variance of 1. Figures B.1
and B.2 give the question text. The discrimination parameters of the 25 measures are dis-
tinguishable from zero with 95% confidence. This suggests that all 25 measures are useful
for inferring ideology. The mean cut points of the 25 parameters range from -2.05 to 1.54,
with 10 means greater than zero and 15 less than zero.
B.2 Replication using Self-Reported Ideology
Figures B.3 and B.4 and Table B.1 replicate the analysis in main text using self-reported
ideology. Respondents to both surveys were asked, “In general, would you describe your
political views as:”. Responses were “Very conservative,” “Conservative,” “Somewhat con-
servative,” “Moderate,” “Somewhat liberal,” “Liberal,” “Very liberal,” and “Don’t know.”
Responses are coded 0 to 7 with 0 equal to “Very liberal” and 7 equal to “Very conserva-
tive.” Findings are reassuringly similar to findings in the main text.
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Figure B.1: Measures from the 109th Congress
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Figure B.2: Measures from the 113th Congress
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Figure B.4: Self-Reported Ideology of Appointees and Careerists by Administration
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Table B.1: Replication of OLS Models of Appointee Ideology
Model (B1) (B2) (B3)
Obama Appointee −2.25∗∗∗−2.17∗∗∗ −2.23∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.16) (0.17)
PAS −0.53∗∗∗−0.49∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.14) (0.13)
Obama App. × PAS 0.97∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
Mean Careerist Ideal Point 0.26∗ 0.33∗
(0.15) (0.19)
Mn. Careerist × Skill 0.30∗
(0.16)
Workforce Skill −0.97∗∗
(0.46)
Constant 4.02∗∗∗ 3.25∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.46) (0.57)
N 585 533 497
R2 0.38 0.40 0.43
N Clusters 64 45
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered on agency in Models B2 & B3.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01
in a two-sided test.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Survey Design
Contact information for the target population (i.e., mailing address, email address, and
telephone number) was obtained from the Leadership Federal Government Premium database,
an online directory that is used to create the Federal Yellow Book, both of which are pub-
lished by Leadership Directories, Inc. The survey was in the field from August 14, 2014
to December 15, 2014. Respondents were sent invitations to take the survey by regular
mail and email when available. Email addresses were obtained for 79 percent of the target
population. The database was also used to identify appointed positions.
Agencies of the United States government that were headed by Senate-confirmed ap-
pointees and whose functions were not exclusively advisory in nature were targeted. This
includes 155 agencies within the fifteen executive departments, 66 independent agencies,
and seven agencies within the Executive Office of the President. The Sourcebook of United
States Executive Agencies (Lewis and Selin 2012) was used to create a list of workplaces.
Respondents were asked to select their workplace from a list of prominent bureaus in cab-
inet departments, including offices of the secretaries, and independent agencies. The se-
lected workplace was inserted in question text. If no workplace was selected or “Other”
was selected because a respondent’s workplace inside a cabinet department was not listed,
“your agency” was inserted. If a respondent selected the relevant Office of the Secretary or
Attorney General, the executive department was inserted for “[your agency].” This removes
uncertainty about what the respondents considers her agency when answering questions.
Agencies in the Executive Office of the President were identified using Table 1 of the
Sourcebook. The Executive Residence, Office of Administration, and White House Office
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were excluded. Prominent bureaus and agencies within executive departments were iden-
tified using Table 2 of the Sourcebook. Limited adjustments were made to this list based
on which agencies and bureaus the research team wanted to be able to analyze separately
from the executive department as a whole. Agencies outside the executive departments
were identified using Table 5 of the Sourcebook. Scholarship agencies, regional agencies,
and non-profits and cooperatives were excluded because they do not play a prominent role
in policymaking. Respondents were asked to select their workplace from the list of promi-
nent bureaus in cabinet departments, including offices of the secretaries, and independent
agencies.
The target population was political appointees (appointees with Senate confirmation, ap-
pointees without Senate confirmation, non-career members of the Senior Executive Service
(SES), and Schedule C appointees), career members of the SES, members of the Senior
Foreign Service, and other senior career executives (e.g., at the GS-14 or GS-15 level) with
responsibility for policymaking, who were based in the United States. The response rate to
the survey was 24 percent (3,551 of 14,698). The response rate among appointees was 18
percent (429 of 2,444) compared to 25 percent among careerists (3,122 of 12,254). The sur-
vey was offered online and on paper. Of the 3,551 respondents, 586 chose the paper survey.
Nineteen respondents submitted both the online and paper surveys. The earlier completed
response was kept in these cases. These cases are not counted in the 586 respondents that
chose the paper survey.
C.2 Question Screen Shots
This section contains screen shots of relevant questions from the 2014 Survey on the
Future of Government Service. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is used
here to show where the respondents’ agencies appeared in the text.
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Figure C.1: Perceptions of Relative Influence
Figure C.2: Self-Reported Frequency of Specific Investment Behaviors
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Figure C.3: Questions about Intrinsic Motivations
102
Figure C.4: Perceptions of the Market Value of Expertise
Note: If the respondent was a U.S. Attorney or Assistant U.S. Attorney, this question included law firms as
an employer.
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Figure C.5: Contact with Appointees, Years of Service, and Retirement Eligibility
C.3 Distributions of Key Variables
This sections contains plots of the distributions of key variables. For each variable, I plot
the distribution for all respondents and the distribution for a relevant regression model in
the tables in the main text. Please note that questions measuring intent to exit, perceived
politicization, and preference divergence were asked of all respondents while certain con-
trol variables were asked of a random half-sample which causes a reduction in observations
between the full sample and the regression models.
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Figure C.6: Distributions of Intent to Exit
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Figure C.7: Distributions of Effort
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Note: Hours worked are divided into 5-hour bins. Bins include the lower bound, for exam-
ple, the bin to the right of 40 on the x-axis includes responses of at least 40 and less than
45.
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Figure C.8: Distributions of Politicization
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Figure C.9: Distributions of Preference Divergence
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Figure C.10: Distribution of Investment by Civil Servants (All Observations)
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Figure C.11: Distribution of Investment by Civil Servants (Observations in Models in Table
2)
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C.4 Scatter Plots and Joint Distributions
This section contains scatter plots and, when both variables are categorical, joint distri-
bution tables for each bivariate relationship relevant for the hypotheses in the paper. Again,
I present one plot of all observations and second plot of only observations from regression
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models. If I estimated the relationship using an ordered probit model, I include a LOESS
line in the plot to account for non-linearity in the relationship. If I estimated the relation-
ship using an OLS model, I include a fitted line in the plot. The plots generally support the
relationships described in the main text.
The joint distribution tables are particularly useful for understanding bivariate relation-
ships estimated using an ordered probit model. For example, the seventh row of Table C.1
gives Pr(Exit = i|Politicization= 2), where i= {Very unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very likely}.
Table C.1 can be used to compare the probability of exit intention at various levels of politi-
cization. The third column shows that Pr(Exit = Likely|Politicization = 0) = 0.1171 and
Pr(Exit = Likely|Politicization = 2) = 0.1563, which demonstrates the basic bivariate re-
lationship - as politicization increases the likelihood of exit increases. I do not use a χ2 test
of independence to determine whether the conditional distributions are statistically distin-
guishable because the small sample sizes in some cells, particularly cases where the cell
sample size is zero, make this test unreliable. These tables generally support the relation-
ships described in the main text.
Figure C.12: Preference Divergence and Politicization
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Figure C.13: Politicization and Intent to Exit
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Table C.1: Joint Distribution of Politicization and Exit Intention (Full Sample)
Exit intention
Politicization Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely Total
-4 5 3 2 0 10
Row Pct. 50.00 30.00 20.00 0.00 100
-3 18 9 3 4 34
52.94 26.47 8.82 11.76 100
-2 29 22 12 11 74
39.19 29.73 16.22 14.86 100
-1 117 89 29 30 265
44.15 33.58 10.94 11.32 100
0 370 303 106 126 905
40.88 33.48 11.71 13.92 100
1 274 252 98 104 728
37.64 34.62 13.46 14.29 100
2 106 100 45 37 288
36.81 34.72 15.63 12.85 100
3 26 23 17 15 81
32.1 28.4 20.99 18.52 100
4 2 5 3 2 12
16.67 41.67 25.00 16.67 100
Total 947 806 315 329 2,397
39.51 33.63 13.14 13.73 100
111
Table C.2: Joint Distribution of Politicization and Exit Intention (Observations in Model 3)
Exit intention
Politicization Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely Total
-4 2 0 1 0 3
Row pct. 66.67 0.00 33.33 0.00 100
-3 7 4 0 1 12
58.33 33.33 0.00 8.33 100
-2 9 9 3 3 24
37.50 37.50 12.50 12.50 100
-1 29 32 9 10 80
36.25 40.00 11.25 12.50 100
0 107 86 30 40 263
40.68 32.70 11.41 15.21 100
1 74 90 33 25 222
33.33 40.54 14.86 11.26 100
2 25 28 15 13 81
30.86 34.57 18.52 16.05 100
3 8 7 4 3 22
36.36 31.82 18.18 13.64 100
4 0 1 1 1 3
0.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 100
Total 261 257 96 96 710
36.76 36.2 13.52 13.52 100
112
Figure C.14: Politicization and Work Hours
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Figure C.15: Politicization and Investment Frequency (Full Sample)
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Note: Categorical responses for frequency of investment are coded as follows: 0 - “Never”,
1 - “Rarely”, 2 - “Few times a year”, 3 - “Monthly”, 4 - “Weekly”, and 5 - “Daily.”
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Table C.3: Joint Distribution of Politicization and Investment Frequency
Discuss policy with outside experts
Politicization Never Rarely Few times Monthly Weekly Daily Total
a year
-4 0 0 4 1 1 0 6
Row Pct. 0.00 0.00 66.67 16.67 16.67 0.00 100
-3 2 4 6 5 4 0 21
9.52 19.05 28.57 23.81 19.05 0.00 100
-2 0 6 17 5 7 3 38
0 15.79 44.74 13.16 18.42 7.89 100
-1 6 26 42 31 27 11 143
4.2 18.18 29.37 21.68 18.88 7.69 100
0 13 95 132 116 95 28 479
2.71 19.83 27.56 24.22 19.83 5.85 100
1 23 74 128 108 70 19 422
5.45 17.54 30.33 25.59 16.59 4.5 100
2 10 34 58 36 22 4 164
6.1 20.73 35.37 21.95 13.41 2.44 100
3 5 11 12 11 3 2 44
11.36 25 27.27 25 6.82 4.55 100
4 3 0 2 1 1 0 7
42.86 0.00 28.57 14.29 14.29 0.00 100
Total 62 250 401 314 230 67 1,324
4.68 18.88 30.29 23.72 17.37 5.06 100
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Table C.4: Joint Distribution of Politicization and Investment Frequency
Consult subject matter experts
Politicization Never Rarely Few times Monthly Weekly Daily Total
a year
-4 0 1 2 2 1 0 6
Row Pct. 0.00 16.67 33.33 33.33 16.67 0.00 100
-3 6 3 7 3 2 0 21
28.57 14.29 33.33 14.29 9.52 0.00 100
-2 7 7 11 9 3 1 38
18.42 18.42 28.95 23.68 7.89 2.63 100
-1 12 32 54 28 13 4 143
8.39 22.38 37.76 19.58 9.09 2.8 100
0 58 139 134 84 51 16 482
12.03 28.84 27.8 17.43 10.58 3.32 100
1 49 110 123 74 53 13 422
11.61 26.07 29.15 17.54 12.56 3.08 100
2 24 42 44 28 19 6 163
14.72 25.77 26.99 17.18 11.66 3.68 100
3 8 11 12 6 6 1 44
18.18 25 27.27 13.64 13.64 2.27 100
4 1 1 2 1 2 0 7
14.29 14.29 28.57 14.29 28.57 0.00 100
Total 165 346 389 235 150 41 1,326
12.44 26.09 29.34 17.72 11.31 3.09 100
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Table C.5: Joint Distribution of Politicization and Investment Frequency
Attend training or seminars
Politicization Never Rarely Few times Monthly Total
a year
-4 0 1 3 2 6
Row Pct. 0.00 16.67 50.00 33.33 100
-3 1 5 9 6 21
4.76 23.81 42.86 28.57 100
-2 0 10 23 5 38
0.00 26.32 60.53 13.16 100
-1 3 46 75 19 143
2.1 32.17 52.45 13.29 100
0 34 147 243 57 481
7.07 30.56 50.52 11.85 100
1 26 133 207 56 422
6.16 31.52 49.05 13.27 100
2 18 54 81 11 164
10.98 32.93 49.39 6.71 100
3 4 24 13 3 44
9.09 54.55 29.55 6.82 100
4 0 3 3 0 6
0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 100
Total 86 423 657 159 1,325
6.49 31.92 49.58 12 100
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Figure C.16: Politicization and Investment Frequency (Models in Table 2)
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Note: Frequency of investment is coded as follows: 0 - “Never”, 1 - “Rarely”, 2 - “Few
times a year”, 3 - “Monthly”, 4 - “Weekly”, and 5 - “Daily.”
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Table C.6: Joint Distribution of Politicization and Investment Frequency (Observations in
Model 5)
Discuss policy with outside experts
Politicization Never Rarely Few times Monthly Weekly Daily Total
a year
-4 0 0 3 1 0 0 4
Row Pct. 0.00 0.00 75.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 100
-3 1 4 3 1 3 0 12
8.33 33.33 25.00 8.33 25.00 0.00 100
-2 0 4 11 1 6 2 24
0.00 16.67 45.83 4.17 25.00 8.33 100
-1 5 11 27 18 18 7 86
5.81 12.79 31.40 20.93 20.93 8.14 100
0 6 58 76 67 59 17 283
2.12 20.49 26.86 23.67 20.85 6.01 100
1 10 39 75 63 40 9 236
4.24 16.53 31.78 26.69 16.95 3.81 100
2 3 14 33 24 15 4 93
3.23 15.05 35.48 25.81 16.13 4.30 100
3 1 7 5 6 3 2 24
4.17 29.17 20.83 25.00 12.50 8.33 100
4 1 0 2 0 0 0 3
33.33 0.00 66.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 100
Total 27 137 235 181 144 41 765
3.53 17.91 30.72 23.66 18.82 5.36 100
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Table C.7: Joint Distribution of Politicization and Investment Frequency (Observations in
Model 6)
Consult subject matter experts
Politicization Never Rarely Few times Monthly Weekly Daily Total
a year
-4 0 1 1 1 1 0 4
Row Pct. 0.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 0.00 100
-3 4 2 3 1 2 0 12
33.33 16.67 25.00 8.33 16.67 0.00 100
-2 5 6 5 5 2 1 24
20.83 25.00 20.83 20.83 8.33 4.17 100
-1 5 17 32 19 9 4 86
5.81 19.77 37.21 22.09 10.47 4.65 100
0 34 78 78 49 33 12 284
11.97 27.46 27.46 17.25 11.62 4.23 100
1 27 63 62 43 35 6 236
11.44 26.69 26.27 18.22 14.83 2.54 100
2 8 21 27 18 12 6 92
8.70 22.83 29.35 19.57 13.04 6.52 100
3 5 6 5 2 5 1 24
20.83 25.00 20.83 8.33 20.83 4.17 100
4 0 1 1 0 1 0 3
0.00 33.33 33.33 0.00 33.33 0.00 100
Total 88 195 214 138 100 30 765
11.5 25.49 27.97 18.04 13.07 3.92 100
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Table C.8: Joint Distribution of Politicization and Investment Frequency (Observations in
Model 7)
Attend training or seminars
Politicization Never Rarely Few times Monthly Total
a year
-4 0 1.00 2 1.00 4
Row Pct. 0.00 25.00 50.00 25.00 100
-3 1 2 7 2 12
8.33 16.67 58.33 16.67 100
-2 0 6 15 3 24
0.00 25.00 62.50 12.50 100
-1 2 23 47 14 86
2.33 26.74 54.65 16.28 100
0 19 87.00 147 30.00 283
6.71 30.74 51.94 10.60 100
1 15 75 122 24 236
6.36 31.78 51.69 10.17 100
2 6 32 47 8 93
6.45 34.41 50.54 8.60 100
3 1 13 7 3 24
4.17 54.17 29.17 12.50 100
4 0 2 1 0 3
0.00 66.67 33.33 0.00 100
Total 44 241 395 85 765
5.75 31.50 51.63 11.11 100
C.5 Additional Discussion of Concept Measurement: Preference Divergence and
Agency Politicization
The measure of preference divergence is individual-level while the measure of politi-
cization is individual-level perception of the relative influence of senior civil servants, not
the influence of the individual senior civil servant answering the question, and political
appointees in the agency. Respondents were not asked about their individual influence be-
cause they are less likely to give a truthful answer if they are not influential. A senior
civil servant’s policy influence will be correlated with their perception of the influence of
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all senior civil servants for two reasons. First, the individual’s experience is likely to be
heavily weighted in their perception of all senior civil servants. Second, civil servants’ pol-
icy preferences and, therefore, their preference divergence with appointees are correlated
within agencies. One-way Analysis of Variance of individual ideal points and preference
divergence by agency rejects the null hypothesis that mean ideology or mean divergence is
equivalent across agencies (p < .01).
C.6 Ideal Point Estimates
Final passage or conference votes from the 113th Congress that were used for “bridging”
are HR 325, S 47, HR 1911, HR 2775, HR 2642, and HR 83. The estimates were computed
using the ideal function in the pscl package version 1.4.9 and R version 3.2.1. The
space was locally identified using a mean of 0 and variance of 1. Estimates are computed
using 100,000 iterations thinned by 25 with the first 10,000 iterations used as “burn-in.”
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Figure C.17: Civil Servants’ Positions on Congressional Measures
C.7 Controlling for the Value of Salary and Benefits
Table C.9 replicates models in Table 2 in the main text controlling for the value of salary
and benefits to a civil servant rather than the value of promotion within the federal govern-
ment or taking a job in the private sector. See Figure C.3 for question text.
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Table C.9: Models of Intent to Exit, Effort, and Expertise Investment
Model (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.07∗∗ 0.02 −0.09∗∗ −0.00 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.03) (0.22) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Preference Divergence 0.01 1.06∗ 0.08 0.05 −0.10∗ 0.03
(0.06) (0.57) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
Value Salary & Benefits −0.08 −1.10∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.03 −0.04
(0.05) (0.41) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Value Policy Influence −0.06 0.28 0.32∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.35) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Approached about a Job 0.36∗∗∗ 3.48∗∗∗ 0.12 0.14∗ 0.05 0.10∗∗
(0.09) (0.68) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.26 −4.09∗ −0.61∗ −0.16 −0.07 −0.30
(0.36) (2.08) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.22)
SES 0.15 2.78∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.13 0.14 −0.01
(0.10) (0.66) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.005) (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact 0.00 0.71∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.02 0.08∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.04) (0.24) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.80∗∗∗
(0.09)
τ1 (C1, C3-C5) & Con. (C2, C6) −0.36 46.47∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −1.12∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗
(0.26) (1.97) (0.22) (0.20) (0.25) (0.14)
τ2 0.67∗∗∗ 0.21 0.46∗∗ 0.19
(0.26) (0.23) (0.20) (0.25)
τ3 1.20∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.22) (0.20) (0.26)
τ4 1.88∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.21)
τ5 2.88∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22)
N 712 755 767 767 767 765
N Clusters 159 160 161 160 161 160
R2 0.13 0.16
Pct. Correctly Predicted 42% 35% 30% 52%
Wald χ2 105.63 212.40 48.70 41.40
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C1 and C3 - C5 are ordered probit models. Models C2 and C6 are OLS models.
C.8 Models of Investment Not in the Main Text
Table C.10 provides models of investment for the tasks not included in Table 2 in the
main text. Controlling for the value of salary and benefits rather than the value of promotion
124
yields identical conclusions to the models in Table C.10.
Table C.10: Models of Expertise Investment
Model (C7) (C8) (C9)
Dependent Variable Read Academic Conferences
Politicization 0.00 0.02 0.00
(Std. Err.) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Preference Divergence 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Value Policy Influence 0.13∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.06 0.00 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Approached about a Job 0.06 0.11 0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.01 −0.42 0.12
(0.36) (0.33) (0.38)
SES 0.24∗∗∗ −0.02 0.14∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Frequency of Contact 0.02 0.02 0.03
with Appointees (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
τ1 −1.38∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ −0.36∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
τ2 −0.51∗∗ 0.24 0.88∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.20) (0.20)
τ3 0.03 0.95∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.20) (0.20)
τ4 0.75∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.21)
τ5 1.65∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.22)
N 763 763 765
N Clusters 161 161 161
Pct. Correctly Predicted 14% 21% 48%
Wald χ2 29.82 83.72 32.68
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models are ordered probit models.
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C.9 Question Wording from the 2007-2008 Survey
This section provides screen shots of questions from the 2007-2008 survey used to repli-
cate the models in the main text.
Figure C.18: Intent to Exit
Figure C.19: Perceptions of Relative Influence
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Figure C.20: Questions about Intrinsic Motivation
The items in Figure C.20 asking about salary and benefits, opportunities to influence
policy, and opportunities for advancement were used as controls in Table C.12.
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Figure C.21: Civil Servants’ Positions on Congressional Measures
Figure C.22: Agency Specific Expertise and Approached About a Job
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The items in Figure C.22 asking whether necessary expertise can only be gained through
on-the-job experience (agency-specific expertise) and how often people are approached
about high paying jobs are used as controls in Table C.12.
Figure C.23: Frequency of Contact with Appointees
Figure C.24: Agency Tenure
The item in Figure C.24 asking about tenure in the respondents current department or
agency was used to measure agency tenure.
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Figure C.25: Retirement Eligibility
C.10 Replication of Cross-Sectional Analysis using the 2007-2008 Survey
Table C.11 replicates models 1 & 2 from the main text using data from a survey of ca-
reer and appointed senior government employees fielded in late 2007 and early 2008 (see
Clinton et al. (2012) for details about the survey and estimation of ideal points). The 2007-
2008 survey does not identify employees that work in Offices of the Secretary or the Office
of the Attorney General, therefore, estimates of average appointee ideology only includes
appointees that work in the same agency as the career respondent and there are fewer agen-
cies that have a 15% response rate of political appointees with ideal points (which is the
threshold applied in the main text to improve the reliability of the estimate of preference
divergence). I also estimate models of preference divergence with President Bush because
this allows inclusion of all respondents regardless of appointee response rate and whether
the respondents’ agency is categorized as “Other” in an executive department. These mod-
els better estimate preference divergence if appointees are attempting to faithfully imple-
ment the policy preferences of the president, rather than the appointees’ personal policy
preferences.
Overall, the ordered porbit models in Table C.11 provide additional evidence that there
is a positive association between preference divergence and perceived politicization. While
the estimated coefficient on preference divergence in model C10 is not sufficiently precise
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to be distinguished from zero with a high degree of confidence, it is positive and would
likely achieve statistical significance with a sample size similar to Model 1 in the main text.
Model C11 provides evidence that perceived politicization increases at an increasing rate,
similar to Model 2 in the main text. Finally, while model C13 does not provide evidence
for a non-linear relationship, model C12 (similar to models in Table C.29) again shows
a positive relationship between preference divergence (with the president) and perceived
politicization.
Each ordered probit model in Table C.12 demonstrates a positive relationship between
perceived politicization and intent to exit. Given that these data were collected during a Re-
publican administration when, as shown below, the relationship between partisanship and
politicization was inverted from the Obama Administration, these models provide convinc-
ing evidence that the cross sectional data capture the relevant temporal dynamics. Please
note that questions measuring agency-specific expertise, intrinsic motivation, being ap-
proached about a job differ between the two surveys. There is also a slight difference in
response categories for the question about exit intention. See Section C.9 of Appendix C
for question wording.
C.11 Comparing the Two Surveys
The change in party control of the presidency between the two surveys allows me to an-
alyze temporal dynamics of the relationships between preference divergence and perceived
politicization and perceived politicization and civil servants’ intent to exit. Broadly, the
theory I present in the paper suggests that Democrats should be more likely to be excluded
from policymaking during the Bush Administration and that Republicans should should be
more likely to be excluded from policymaking during the Obama Administration. There-
fore, Democratic civil servants should be more likely to perceive politicization during the
Bush Administration and Republicans should be more likely to perceive politicization dur-
ing the Obama Administration. Demonstrating this inversion of the relationship between
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Table C.11: Replication of Models of Politicization
Model (C10) (C11) (C12) (C13)
Dependent Variable Pol. Pol. Pol. Pol.
Preference Divergence 0.09 −0.36
(Std. Error) (0.09) (0.25)
Divergence2 0.22∗
(0.13)
Divergence from Pres. Bush 0.12∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.04) (0.14)
Divergence from Pres. Bush2 0.05
(0.06)
SES −0.01 −0.02 0.04 0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
τ1 −1.76∗∗∗ −1.9∗∗∗ −1.65∗∗∗ −1.68∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.13)
τ2 −1.64∗∗∗ −1.81∗∗∗ −1.32∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12)
τ3 −1.01∗∗∗ −1.17∗∗∗ −0.76∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11)
τ4 −0.52∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
τ5 1.07∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
τ6 1.93∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
τ7 2.71∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)
τ8 3.44∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗ 3.73∗∗∗ 3.70∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.21) (0.15) (0.16)
N 709 709 1,737 1,737
N Clusters 60 60 201 201
Pct. Correctly Predicted 50% 49% 47% 47%
Wald χ2 93.85 99.35 234.18 238.01
Standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p≤ .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
p = 0.10 for the coef. on Divergence2
partisanship and politicization is sufficient to demonstrate the temporal dynamics I argue
in the paper do exist.
The distributions of perceived politicization among Republicans and Democrats, includ-
ing leaners, for each survey are plotted in Figures C.26 and C.27, respectively. The pro-
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Table C.12: Replication of Models of Exit
Model (C14) (C15) (C16) (C17)
Dependent Variable Exit Exit Exit Exit
Politicization 0.11∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(Std. Error) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Preference Divergence −0.05 −0.05
(0.09) (0.09)
Divergence from Pres. Bush −0.05 −0.05
(0.05) (0.06)
Value Policy −0.04 −0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Value Salary & Benefits −0.07 −0.05
(0.06) (0.04)
Value Advancement −0.03 −0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
SES −0.06 −0.06 0.02 0.02
(0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.003)
Frequency of Contact −0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.02
with Appointees (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Agency-Specific Exp. −0.10 −0.10 −0.09∗∗ −0.09∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Often Approached about a Job 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Eligible to Retire 0.84∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08)
τ1 −0.27 −0.14 0.14 0.22
(0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
τ2 0.21 0.34∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
τ3 0.84∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19)
N 524 525 1,275 1,278
N Clusters 55 55 182 182
Pct. Correctly Predicted 49% 50% 53% 53%
Wald χ2 74.12 94.91 195.87 195.68
Standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
portion of Republicans and Democrats that perceive politicization of one increase from
2007-2008 to 2014; however, the proportion of Republicans that perceive politicization of
two or greater increases while the proportion of Democrats declines slightly. The distri-
butions of perceived politicization among Republicans across surveys, among Democrats
across surveys, and among Republicans and Democrats within each survey are statistically
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different.1
Overall, the differences among the distributions demonstrates that, while there is a gen-
eral increase in perceived politicization from 2007-2008 to 2014, the increase is greater
among Republicans. Furthermore, the Ordinary Least Squares models (C18, C19, C21,
and C22) and ordered probit models (C20 and C23) in Table C.13 show that the directions
of the relationships between partisanship and preference divergence, preference divergence
with the president, and perceived polarization are opposite in 2007-2008 and 2014.2 (Re-
publicans and Independents who lean Republican are coded 1, Independents are coded 0,
and Democrats and Independents who lean Democrat are coded -1.) Republicans and those
who lean Republican have less divergent preferences, on average, and are less likely to
perceive politicization during the Bush Administration than during the Obama Adminis-
tration. On the other hand, Democrats and those who lean Democrat have more divergent
preferences, on average, and are more likely to perceive politicization during the Bush
Administration than during the Obama Administration. Coupled with the relationships
between preference divergence and politicization and politicization and intent to exit that
exist in both cross sectional data sets, the change in the relationship between these key
measures and partisanship across the surveys clearly demonstrates the temporal dynamic
of politicization.
Some individuals completed both the 2007-2008 and 2014 surveys, providing the oppor-
tunity for analysis of changes in individual preferences overtime. Measures of intrinsic mo-
tivation, agency-specific expertise, and whether a respondent was approached about a job
1Tests of independence for each combination of distributions gives p < 0.01 comparing Republicans in
2007-2008 to Republicans in 2014 and comparing Democrats in 2007-2008 to Democrats in 2014. The
χ2 test of independence gives p < 0.03 comparing Republicans to Democrats in 2007-2008 and comparing
Republicans to Democrats in 2014. I collapsed politicization of greater than 2 and less than -2 into 2 and -2,
respectively, to prevent the χ2 tests from being invalid due to small cell size.
2I use a measure of preference divergence based on “votes” of bureaucrats from both surveys so that
the measure of preference divergence is on the same scale across surveys. I do not include appointees in
the Offices of the Secretary or the Office of the Attorney General in average of ideal points of political
appointees to ensure the measures of divergence are comparable across surveys. I continue to exclude cases
with a response rate for appointees with ideal points of less than 15% and respondents that selected “Other”
as their workplace.
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Figure C.26: Distributions of Perceived Politicization Among Republicans
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
2007−2008
Percieved Politicization (N=363)
0
50
100
150
200
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.28 0.83
3.31
7.71
53.44
23.42
9.64
1.1 0.28
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
2014
Percieved Politicization (N=584)
0
50
100
150
200
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.17 0.68
3.25
8.39
36.13
31.68
14.04
4.45
1.2
Figure C.27: Distributions of Perceived Politicization Among Democrats
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are omitted because these questions differ between the two surveys. I also omitted agency
tenure because it would be constant for respondents who remained in the same agency or
negative for respondents who moved to another agency. I used sets of questions asking
respondents to “vote” on certain bills considered by the 109th and 113th Congresses to
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estimate ideal points for survey respondents, members of Congress, President George W.
Bush, and President Obama on the same scale to provide estimates of preference diver-
gence that are comparable across time. I do not place any restriction on appointee response
rate for ideal points to limit loss of observations; however, respondents whose workplace
is “Other” on either survey are omitted in models using preference divergence based on
appointee averages.
Individual-level first-difference ordered probit models are provided in Table C.14. While
the sample sizes are too small to provide much statistical power, the coefficients on the
key independent variables are generally correctly signed. The coefficients on change in
preference divergence are positive in models C25-C27 and the coefficients on politicization
are negative in models C28 and C29. To be clear, this evidence is suggestive but lacks
statistical support. First, the χ2 tests for models C24 - C28 are not statistically significant;
therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients are equal to zero.
It is particulary difficult to find evidence of a relationship between politicization and exit
using this data because respondents who remain in public service across administrations
are likely to either not experience politicization or, if they do, to be the least sensitive to
politicization and least likely to exit. This limited sensitivity is reflected in the limited
change in exit intention among respondents that took both surveys.
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Table C.13: Relationships with Party Identification Across Surveys
Model (C18) (C19) (C20) (C21) (C22) (C23)
Survey 2007-2008 2014
Dependent Variable Div. Div. Pres. Pol. Div. Div. Pres. Pol.
Party Identification −0.16∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(Std. Error) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
τ1 (C20, C23) & Con. 0.84∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ −2.43∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ −2.80∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.11) (0.04) (0.01) (0.11)
τ2 −2.17∗∗∗ −2.20∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08)
τ3 −1.68∗∗∗ −1.73∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
τ4 −1.19∗∗∗ −1.08∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
τ5 0.23∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
τ6 1.08∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
τ7 1.87∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06)
τ8 2.55∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.10)
N 851 1,986 1,918 1,198 2,769 2,778
N Clusters 70 208 205 94 227 227
R2 0.04 0.43 0.22 0.51
Pct. Correctly Predicted 47% 37%
Wald χ2 4.40 9.42
Standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .05.
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Table C.14: Individual Level First Difference Models
Model (C24) (C25) (C26) (C27) (C28) (C29)
Dependent Variable Pol. Pol. Pol. Pol. Exit Exit
∆ Politicization −0.10 −0.06
(0.11) (0.07)
∆ Pref. Div. −0.06 −0.03 0.01
(0.14) (0.14) (0.19)
∆ Pref. Div.2 0.11
(0.13)
∆ Pref. Div. from Pres. 0.03 0.03 0.13∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
∆ Pref. Div. from Pres.2 0.00
(0.04)
∆ SES −0.09 −0.07 0.20 0.20 0.44∗ 0.19
(0.24) (0.25) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.17)
∆ Freq. Contact w. Appointees −0.08 −0.09 0.01 0.01 −0.21 0.03
(0.16) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.07)
∆ Retirement Eligibility 0.15 0.49∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.17)
τ1 −2.23∗∗∗ −2.16∗∗∗ −2.58∗∗∗ −2.58∗∗∗ −2.15∗∗∗ −2.08∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.39) (0.34) (0.35) (0.43) (0.28)
τ2 −1.31∗∗∗ −1.23∗∗∗ −2.33∗∗∗ −2.34∗∗∗ −1.40∗∗∗ −1.79∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.23)
τ3 −0.40∗∗ −0.32 −1.45∗∗∗ −1.46∗∗∗ 0.14 −1.16∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.19) (0.14) (0.18) (0.24) (0.16)
τ4 0.37∗∗ 0.46∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.09
(0.16) (0.19) (0.11) (0.14) (0.27) (0.13)
τ5 1.23∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.23) (0.10) (0.14) (0.27) (0.15)
τ6 1.93∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.34) (0.12) (0.15) (0.17)
τ7 1.88∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.21)
N 73 73 198 198 62 171
Wald χ2 0.67 1.84 1.64 1.64 7.66 17.22
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01 for model C29 only.
C.12 Partisan Response Rates to the 2014 Survey on the Future of Government Service
A general concern in survey research is that respondents select into the survey via a
mechanism that causes the sample to be unrepresentative of the population with respect
to the measures of interest. With regard to my findings, a specific concern is that respon-
dents in politicized agencies take the survey to express their dissatisfaction with their work
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environment, resulting in a sample that experiences greater politicization and is more dis-
satisfied, on average, than the population.
In terms of partisanship, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to have diver-
gent preferences and, therefore, to perceive that their agency is politicized in a Democratic
administration. Therefore, the selection concern is that Republicans are more likely to
respond to the survey than Democrats. Comparing partisanship in the population to par-
tisanship in the sample, I do not find evidence that the distribution of partisanship among
respondents is substantively different from the target population. There is mixed statistical
evidence indicating that Democrats are slightly more likely to respond than Republicans.
A private firm was provided contact information for the target population to identify
their partisanship. Of the 14,698 individuals in the target population, 6,855 (47%) were
determined to be Republican, Democrat, or unaffiliated (i.e., independent). The firm la-
beled individuals as “Inferred Democrat” if they voted more times in a Democratic primary
than a Republican primary between 2000 and 2013. If no primary voting history exists,
individuals are labeled an “Inferred Democrat” if they donated to Democratic or liberal
organizations including groups that are pro-choice or support “Obamacare.” Individuals
are labeled “Inferred Republican” if they voted more times in a Republican primary than
a Democratic primary between 2000 and 2013. If no primary voting history exists, indi-
viduals are labeled an “Inferred Republican” if they donated to Republican or conservative
organizations including groups that are pro-life, oppose “Obamacare,” or oppose gun con-
trol.
Table C.15 contains the frequency of each categorization by the private firm and the self-
reported party identification of survey respondents with percentages for each row. Eighty-
nine percent of respondents identified as Democrat by the private firm self-identify as a
Democrat or leaning Democrat. Similarly, 78 percent of the respondents identified as “In-
ferred Democrat” by the private firm self-identify as a Democrat or leaning Democrat.
Identification of Republicans is less accurate. Seventy percent of the respondents identi-
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Table C.15: Self-Reported Partisanship versus Private Firm Categorization
Private Firm
Self-Reported Dem. Inferred Dem. Ind. Inferred Rep. Rep. Total
Democrat 499 184 66 31 13 793
Column Pct. 82.89 66.43 23.24 19.25 12.38 55.49
Lean Democrat 39 32 70 8 4 153
6.48 11.55 24.65 4.97 3.81 10.71
Independent 26 32 77 34 14 183
4.32 11.55 27.11 21.12 13.33 12.81
Lean Republican 10 9 24 23 14 80
1.66 3.25 8.45 14.29 13.33 5.6
Republican 14 12 36 61 59 182
2.33 4.33 12.68 37.89 56.19 12.74
Don’t know 14 8 11 4 1 38
2.33 2.89 3.87 2.48 0.95 2.66
Total 602 277 284 161 105 1,429
fied as Republican by the private firm self-identify as a Republican or leaning Republican.
However, only 52 percent of the respondents identified as “Inferred Republican” by the pri-
vate firm self-identify as a Republican or leaning Republican. Independents as identified
by the private firm are more likely to identify as partisan, particularly as a Democrat or
leaning Democrat, than independent.
Table C.16 contains the response rate for each category identified by the private firm.
The proportions of Democrats, Republicans, and Inferred Republicans differ only slightly
among respondents and non-respondents while Inferred Democrats are slightly over-represented
and independents are slightly under-represented among respondents. While these differ-
ence are sufficient to make the distributions of partisanship among respondents and non-
respondents statistically distinguishable using a χ2 test of independence (Pr(χ2 > χ̂2) <
0.01), it is difficult to draw a conclusion about what this difference means for partisan se-
lection into the survey given the large proportion of “Independents” that self-identify as
Democrat or leaning Democrat in Table C.15. Due to the high classification error rate
among independents, I also analyzed the distribution of partisanship excluding indepen-
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dents. As shown in the right half of Table C.16, there is little substantive difference in
the distribution of partisanship among respondents and the target population. Omitting
the problematic category of independents does not materially reduce the confidence that
the distribution of partisanship is statistically distinguishable among respondents and non-
respondents (Pr(χ2 > χ̂2) = 0.02). If independents are omitted and “inferred” partisans
are combined with partisans (Pr(χ2 > χ̂2) = 0.44) or “inferred” partisans are also omitted
(Pr(χ2 > χ̂2) = 0.90), the distributions are not statistically distinguishable.
In sum, the distributions of partisanship among respondents and the target population are
not substantively different. If there is a selection effect based on partisanship, the statistical
evidence suggests it is Democrats who are over-represented among survey respondents.
Given that Democrats are less likely to perceive partisanship, any selection bias should
create a sample that experiences less politicization, on average, than the population.
Table C.16: Response Rate by Partisanship
Responded Responded
Partisanship No Yes Total No Yes Total
Democrat 2,138 711 2,849 2,138 711 2,849
41.52 41.68 41.56 54.2 52.01 53.63
Inferred Dem. 809 327 1,136 809 327 1,136
15.71 19.17 16.57 20.51 23.92 21.39
Independent 1,204 339 1,543
23.38 19.87 22.51
Inferred Rep. 595 197 792 595 197 792
11.56 11.55 11.55 15.08 14.41 14.91
Republican 403 132 535 403 132 535
7.83 7.74 7.8 10.22 9.66 10.07
Total 5,149 1,706 6,855 3,945 1,367 5,312
C.13 The Usefulness of Expertise: Agency and Position Characteristics
The expertise needed to be competent varies significantly across jobs in the federal gov-
ernment. This may be due to differences in the missions of agencies or differences in
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specific positions. If a task is not useful for acquiring the expertise needed to perform
civil servants’ jobs at their agency, then civil servants should report completing the task
infrequently regardless of politicization. Identifying expertise that is useful across all po-
sitions and agencies or subsetting agencies and positions to isolate cases for which a given
investment task is useful are challenges to measuring expertise investment, and, therefore,
to measuring the effect of politicization on expertise investment. In this section, I isolate
cases by position and agency mission to control for variation in the usefulness of expertise.
I find evidence that isolating cases where expertise should be more useful can reveal rela-
tionships between politicization and investment behavior that are not evident in the pooled
analysis.
C.13.1 Position: Rulemakers
The survey asked respondents to identify whether their job involved “[d]eveloping No-
tices of Proposed Rulemaking, summarizing related comments, writing final rules.” Rule-
making is the process through which civil servants proscribe and implement policy that has
the force of law under authority delegated in statute. Subsetting the data to civil servants in-
volved in rulemaking isolates positions that require expertise needed to formulate policy at
each agency, which may isolate particular types of expertise that are not useful for all civil
servants. For example, Table C.17 shows that rulemakers are more likely than other civil
servants to atttend industry or trade conferences at least a few times per year. Specifically,
60% of rulemakers report that they attend industry or trade conferences at least a few times
a year, while 43% of other civil servants report that they attend with the same frequency.
The difference in proportions is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence.
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Table C.17: Response Rate by Partisanship
Few times
Never Rarely per year Monthly Weekly Daily Total
Read professional or trade journals
Others 22 104 161 250 255 147 939
Row Pct. 2.34 11.08 17.15 26.62 27.16 15.65 100
Rulemakers 9 33 69 113 142 100 466
1.93 7.08 14.81 24.25 30.47 21.46 100
Total 31 137 230 363 397 247 1,405
Discuss policy with outside experts
Others 62 213 289 211 128 35 938
6.61 22.71 30.81 22.49 13.65 3.73 100
Rulemakers 13 49 136 121 111 37 467
2.78 10.49 29.12 25.91 23.77 7.92 100
Total 75 262 425 332 239 72 1,405
Consult subject matter experts
Others 142 268 265 138 104 23 940
15.11 28.51 28.19 14.68 11.06 2.45 100
Rulemakers 40 110 137 103 57 20 467
8.57 23.55 29.34 22.06 12.21 4.28 100
Total 182 378 402 241 161 43 1,407
Conduct or read academic research
Others 70 168 251 208 175 62 934
7.49 17.99 26.87 22.27 18.74 6.64 100
Rulemakers 17 82 104 114 109 42 468
3.63 17.52 22.22 24.36 23.29 8.97 100
Total 87 250 355 322 284 104 1,402
Attend training or seminars
Others 78 300 459 102 939
8.31 31.95 48.88 10.86 100
Rulemakers 22 135 246 66 469
4.69 28.78 52.45 14.07 100
Total 100 435 705 168 1,408
Attend industry or trade conferences
Others 141 397 364 38 940
15 42.23 38.72 4.04 100
Rulemakers 42 143 246 37 468
8.97 30.56 52.56 7.91 100
Total 183 540 610 75 1,408
A χ2 test finds that the distributions of investment frequency differs between rulemakers and others (p <
0.02). Non-response to the question asking whether a respondent is involved in rulemaking reduces the
sample size from number of respondents in Figure C.10.
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Table C.18 shows models of investment for rulemakers. Politicization is associated with
less frequent attendance of industry and trade conferences (Model C34) among rulemakers,
as evidenced by the negative coefficient on politicization that is distinguishable from zero
with moderate confidence, despite the significant decrease in the number of observations.
Model C9 in Table C.10 shows that the coefficient on politicization rounds to zero when the
same model is estimated on the full sample. Similarly, 68% of rulemakers contact subject
matter experts at least a few times a year compared to 56% of other civil servants, and
the difference in proportions is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. The
coefficient on politicization is negative and distinguishable from zero with a high degree
of confidence if the dependent variable is frequency of consulting subject matter experts
(Model C31), but rounds to zero when the same model is estimated on the full sample in
Model 6 in the main text. Looking at the other tasks, except discussing policy with outside
experts, the difference in the proportions of rulemakers and non-rulemakers that complete
the task at least a few times a year is less than 7%. While the porportion of rulemakers
who report discussing policy with outside experts at least monthly is 16 percentage points
higher than among other civil servants, 70% of other civil servants report that they have
such discussions at least a few times a year, which suggests discussions with outside experts
are important for both groups.
The patterns in Table C.18 are replicated if the effect of politicization is conditioned on
whether the respondent is a rulemaker (Table C.19). On average, rulemakers are more likely
to discuss policy with outside experts, consult subject matter experts, and attend industry or
trade conference as evidenced by the statistically significant coefficients on the rulemaker
indicator variable. The effect of politicization is negative among rulemakers for consulting
subject matter experts and attending industry or trade conferences, and coefficients on the
interaction between rulemaker and politicization are statistically distinguishable from zero
with a high degree of confidence in models when the frequency of completing these two
investment tasks are the dependent variables.
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Overall, the analysis in this section provides suggestive evidence that consulting subject
matter experts and attending industry and trade conferences are useful tasks for rulemakers
to build expertise, but less important for other civil servants. This explains why models
of investment (Table C.18) estimated using only rulemakers or conditioning the effect of
politicization on whether the respondent is a rulemaker (Table C.19) finds that higher per-
ceived levels of politicization are associated with less frequent investment, while models
estimated on all respondents (Tables C.10 and Table 2 in the main text) find no relationship.
Model C35 is a factor score estimated using all investment tasks and among rulemak-
ers. Factor loadings range from 0.50 to 0.68 with an Eigen value of 2.02 on the first factor
and 0.30 on the second factor. This suggests a single underlying dimension among all of
these behaviors among rulemakers. The coefficient on politicization is negative and distin-
guishable from zero with a moderate degree of confidence. If the restriction on appointee
response rate is eliminated to increase the sample size, the coefficient is statistically signifi-
cant at the 90% level of confidence using a one-tailed test. While the usefulness of tasks for
building expertise may vary, this models suggests that increased politicization is negatively
associated with this measure of latent expertise investment among rulemakers.
145
Figure C.28: Distribution of Investment by Civil Servants involved in Rulemaking (All
Observations)
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Table C.18: Models of Investment by Rulemakers
Model (C29) (C30) (C31) (C32) (C33) (C34) (C35)
Dependent Variable Read Outside SME Academic Training Conferences Factor
Politicization 0.01 −0.09† −0.12∗∗ 0.03 −0.12∗∗ −0.08† −0.07†
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Preference Divergence 0.10† −0.03 0.01 −0.03 −0.01 −0.09 −0.02
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08)
Value Policy Influence 0.22∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.04 0.46∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.11† 0.25∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.17∗∗ 0.11† 0.13∗ 0.11† 0.08 0.19∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
Value Gov’t Promotion 0.01 −0.03 0.06 0.11∗ −0.02 −0.04 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Approached about a Job −0.15 −0.04 0.13† −0.09 −0.17 0.00 −0.05
(0.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.09 −1.29∗∗ −0.90 0.04 0.03 −0.44 −0.55
(0.79) (0.61) (0.56) (0.57) (0.62) (0.60) (0.45)
SES 0.15 −0.06 −0.10 0.08 0.26† 0.20† 0.09
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.19) (0.13)
Agency Tenure −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Frequency of Contact 0.13∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.11† 0.08† 0.04 0.12∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
τ1 & Con. (C35) −0.84∗ −1.02∗∗ −0.82∗∗ −0.36 −1.02∗∗∗ −0.83∗∗ −1.25∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.48) (0.40) (0.57) (0.40) (0.41) (0.32)
τ2 −0.04 0.17 0.02 1.09∗∗ 0.41 0.42
(0.48) (0.38) (0.41) (0.55) (0.38) (0.39)
τ3 0.61 1.20∗∗∗ 0.80∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.36) (0.42) (0.56) (0.41) (0.41)
τ4 1.43∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.36) (0.41) (0.57)
τ5 2.33∗∗∗ 2.92∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 3.59∗∗∗
(0.48) (0.38) (0.44) (0.60)
N 245 245 246 246 246 245 243
N Clusters 108 108 108 108 108 107 107
Pct. Correctly Predicted 27% 32% 26% 26% 58% 57%
Wald χ2 39.10 47.29 17.33 64.33 20.39 14.73
R2 0.17
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test
† significant at p < .15 in a one-sided test of HA: β < 0.
χ2 tests significant at p < .05, excluding models C31 (p < 0.07) and C35 (p < 0.15).
Models C29-C34 are ordered probit models. Model C35 is an OLS models.
147
Table C.19: Models of Investment Conditional on Position: Rulemakers
Model (C36) (C37) (C38) (C39) (C40) (C41)
Dependent Variable Read Outside SME Academic Training Conferences
Politicization −0.02 −0.08∗ 0.04 0.01 −0.08∗ 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Pol. × Rulemaker 0.06 −0.00 −0.12∗ 0.03 −0.00 −0.09†
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Rulemaker 0.09 0.29∗∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.03 0.16 0.33∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Preference Divergence 0.00 0.05 0.05 −0.00 −0.12∗∗ 0.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Value Policy Influence 0.12∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.06 0.01 0.05 −0.00 0.04 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.02 −0.00 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Approached about a Job 0.04 0.13 0.16∗∗ 0.12 0.07 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.02 −0.57∗ −0.04 −0.45† −0.03 0.05
(0.36) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.38)
SES 0.24∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.13 −0.03 0.13 0.14
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Frequency of Contact 0.01 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.02 −0.03 0.01
with Appointees (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
τ1 −1.42∗∗∗ −0.61∗∗∗ −0.27 −0.77∗∗∗ −1.00∗∗∗ −0.39∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
τ2 −0.55∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.22 0.34 0.86∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
τ3 −0.01 1.50∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20)
τ4 0.72∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22)
τ5 1.61∗∗∗ 3.26∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.19) (0.24) (0.22)
N 753 755 755 753 755 755
N Clusters 161 161 160 161 161 161
Pct. Correctly Predicted 22% 36% 28% 32% 53% 49%
Wald χ2 28.64 203.19 55.84 83.57 53.32 46.49
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test
† significant at p < .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β < 0.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01
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C.13.2 Agency Mission
The technical expertise required to perform a job certainly varies by agency. Diplomats
at the Department of State need different expertise than scientists at NASA. Economists at
the Federal Reserve need different expertise than lawyers at the Department of Justice. I
categorized agencies by mission to control for this variation in the usefulness of investment
tasks across agencies. Categorizing agencies by mission creates groups that require similar
skill sets across cabinet departments and independent agencies. For example, the Natural
Resources Conservation Service (USDA), the Forest Service (USDA), National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (Commerce), and the Environmental Protection Agency
all have a mission related to Natural Resources and Environment, despite being in different
executive departments or no executive department at all. Similarly, categorizing by mis-
sion groups agencies in the Department of State with independent agencies like the United
States Agency for International Development and the United States African Development
Foundation.
I identified agency mission using a report by the General Accountability Office that re-
ported spending by budget function at the agency-level.3 Per the report, budget functions
are designed to group spending by mission area or “national need.” The classification sys-
tem is used primarily by Budget Committee for the Congressional budget process.
I calculated the proportion of each agency’s budget in each of the 17 main functions. I
then coded each agency’s mission as the budget function with the largest proportion of the
agency’s budget. While agency’s budgets often fall into more than one function, only 8
cases have less than 80% of their spending in a single category. For agencies that were not
identified in the data, I coded their mission based on spending in the executive deparment
overall or the categorization of agencies with a similar mission. For example, the Depart-
ments of Defense, State, and Veterans Affairs categorize spending by program or purpose
3The report is titled “Federal Budget: Agency Obligations by Budget Function and Object Classification
for Fiscal Year 2003.” The report number is GAO-04-834. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-04-834.
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not agency. However, 92% of spending at DOD is in the National Defense function, 95%
of spending at DOS is in the International Affairs function, and 100% of spending at VA is
in the Veterans Benefits and Services. Therefore, I code all agencies in these departments
according to total spending. Offices of the Secretary or the Office of the Attorney General
were coded as having the mission most prevalent in the executive department. As another
exmaple, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is not identified in the
GAO report, so I code it the same as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal
Trade Commission, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency which are identifed
in the GAO report and have similar missions to the Federal Reserve.
As a final step, I recategorized certain agencies. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Social Security Administration, and the Social Security Advisory Board would
be the only agencies in their function (Medicare and Social Security, respectively). There-
fore, I recategorize CMS into Health and SSA and SSAB into Income Security. Finally,
the Internal Revenue Service is categorized in the Income Security function, presumably
due to tax credits and refunds. The Office of Personnel Management is also categorized
in the Income Security function due to its federal employee retirement spending. I recate-
gorize them to the General Government category that includes “provision of central fiscal,
personnel, and property activities,” which I think better captures these agencies’ missions.
Table C.20 contains agencies and, if applicable, the executive department they are in.
The GAO report used fiscal year 2003 data and I could not find a more recent data sources
that provides agency-level detail. Bold text denotes an agency that was explicitly identified
in the report or that could be clearly linked to a line item in the executive department’s
budget categorization. Otherwise, I coded the agency as described above. Not all agencies
are in the models in the main text due to restrictions on response rates by agency.
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Figure C.29 plots the mean level of frequency for each investment task by mission. Vari-
ation in investment frequency by mission has face validity. The frequency with which civil
servants attend training and seminars varies the least across missions. This makes sense
given the generality of the question. Attending training is a more general task than read-
ing or conducting academic research, for example. Similarly, medical professionals at the
Department of Veterans Affairs or civil servants working in General Science, Space, and
Technology are likely to read or conduct academic research. Similarly, civil servants work-
ing in International Affairs contact subject matter experts at international agencies quite
often.
Table C.21 shows that the models from Table 2 in the main text are robust to controlling
for mission.4 I also estimate the model of exit with mission fixed effects to provide an
additional control for the market value of skills sets associated with each mission. I use
non-clustered robust standard errors in the ordered probit models so that the Wald tests are
valid. Standard errors are clustered on mission in the OLS models.
Similar to the analysis of rulemakers above, tasks that are not useful for building exper-
tise should not be affected by politicization because frequency is low for all civil servants.
Therefore, I can exploit variation in frequency of investment by mission to isolate agencies
where each expertise investment type is useful. There are too few respondents per mission
to analyze them separately. Therefore, I subtract the mean investment frequency pooled
across missions from the mean frequency of investment by mission to create a measure of
whether civil servants working in agencies with a given mission invest more or less than
average. I then interact this difference with politicization to evaluate whether civil ser-
vants in agencies with a mission that makes an investment task more useful are affected by
4One concern about using fixed effects in a maximum likelihood model is that both the number of obser-
vations and the number of fixed effects must approach infinity for estimates to be consistent. See Greene,
William. 2004 “The behaviour of the maximum likelihood estimator of limited dependent variable models in
the presence of fixed effects”. Econometrics Journal 7: 98-119. Using Monte Carlo methods, Greene finds
that once the number of fixed effects is greater than 3 bias decreases rapidly. The models in Table C.21 have
15 fixed effects and, moreover, the coefficient estimates hardly differ form the estimates in Table 2. Overall,
there is little concern that the fixed effects are causing bias.
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politicization. The evidence is mixed. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative
and distinguishable from zero with a high degree of confidence for reading or conducting
academic research and attending industry or trade conferences. Otherwise, I do not find a
conditional effect.
Overall, this analysis coupled with the analysis of investment behavior among rulemak-
ers suggests that the types of tasks that build expertise vary across positions and missions.
Isolating cases where expertise should be more useful can reveal relationships between
politicization and investment behavior that are not evident in the pooled analysis. Scholars
should be mindful of this when designing future research on expertise investment by civil
servants.
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Figure C.29: Investment Frequency by Mission
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Read professional or trade journals
Frequency
International Affairs
Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services
Community and Regional Development
Income Security
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General Science, Space, and Technology
Transportation
Veterans Benefits and Services
Never Rarely
Few times
per year Monthly Weekly Daily
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Discuss policy with outside experts
Frequency
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Commerce and Housing Credit
Health
National Defense
Community and Regional Development
General Science, Space, and Technology
International Affairs
Transportation
Never Rarely
Few times
per year Monthly Weekly Daily
Note: Horizontal lines denote 95% confidence intervals.
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Frequency
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National Defense
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International Affairs
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Transportation
Income Security
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Health
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Few times
per year Monthly Weekly Daily
Note: Horizontal lines denote 95% confidence intervals.
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Frequency
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General Government
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International Affairs
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Never Rarely
Few times
per year Monthly
Note: Horizontal lines denote 95% confidence intervals.
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Table C.21: Models Controlling for Agency Mission
Model (C42) (C43) (C44) (C45) (C46) (C47)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.06∗ −0.08 −0.09∗∗ 0.01 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.04∗
(0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Preference Divergence −0.01 0.82∗∗ 0.04 0.04 −0.11∗ 0.01
(0.07) (0.35) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Value Policy Influence −0.06 0.27 0.33∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.30) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.17∗∗∗ 0.30 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03
(0.04) (0.30) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.01 −0.08 −0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.17) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.34∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 0.10 0.19∗∗ 0.01 0.10∗∗
(0.09) (0.80) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.25 −3.14∗ −0.53∗ −0.27 −0.11 −0.32
(0.38) (1.65) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30)
SES 0.14 2.56∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.03
(0.10) (0.85) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.004) (0.03) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Frequency of Contact 0.01 0.75∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.00 0.08∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.04) (0.23) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.83∗∗∗
(0.10)
Mission Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
τ1 & Con. (C43, C47) 0.35 43.16∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ 0.02 −1.00∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.99) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.13)
τ2 1.41∗∗∗ 0.29 0.97∗∗∗ 0.33
(0.26) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23)
τ3 1.96∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24)
τ4 1.98∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.23)
τ5 3.00∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.25)
N 710 753 765 765 765 763
R2 0.13 0.15
Pct. Correctly Predicted 45% 35% 28% 53%
Wald χ2 128.52 190.68 153.52 66.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on mission in models C43 and C47.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C42 and C44 - C46 are ordered probit models. Models C43 and C47 are OLS models.
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Table C.22: Models of Investment Conditional Mission
Model (C48) (C49) (C50) (C51) (C52) (C53)
Dependent Variable Read Outside SME Academic Training Conferences
Politicization −0.01 −0.09∗∗ 0.00 0.03 −0.09∗∗ 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Pol × Diff. from Mean Freq. 0.02 0.04 0.02 −0.35∗∗∗ −0.27 −0.84∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.08) (0.13) (0.40) (0.27)
Difference from Mean Frequency 0.77∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.57) (0.39)
Preference Divergence 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.00 −0.10∗ 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Value Policy Influence 0.13∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.06
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.01 −0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Approached about a Job 0.01 0.10 0.18∗∗ 0.06 0.02 −0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.13 −0.47 −0.13 −0.43 −0.05 0.14
(0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.38)
SES 0.18∗∗ 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.17∗ 0.17∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Frequency of Contact 0.03 0.17∗∗∗ 0.06 0.04 −0.01 0.04
with Appointees (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
τ1 −1.42∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.26 −0.72∗∗∗ −0.96∗∗∗ −0.34∗
(0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
τ2 −0.52∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.29 0.36∗ 0.92∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
τ3 0.03 1.49∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20)
τ4 0.77∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.10∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20)
τ5 1.69∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20)
N 763 765 765 763 765 765
N Clusters 161 161 160 161 161 161
Pct. Correctly Predicted 21% 35% 27% 31% 53% 49%
Wald χ2 50.33 205.82 124.64 141.16 54.26 54.57
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test
† significant at p < .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β > 0.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01
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C.14 Robustness of Models
C.14.1 Sensitivity of Models to Restrictions on Appointee Response Rate
The tables in this section contain models from the main text estimated without restricting
the sample to cases with a 15% response rate by appointees and with the sample limited
to cases with at least 5 appointees for calculating preference divergence. This analysis
demonstrates that subsetting the data set does not lead to substantive conclusions that differ
from the conclusions in the main text. Even when restricting the appointee response rate
to 15%, preference divergence in some agencies is based on a single appointee.5 Demon-
strating that results are robust to requiring at least 5 appointees for calculating preference
divergence limits concern about measurement error.
A notable difference is that the coefficient on preference divergence squared is smaller
on Model C55 than in Model 2 in the main text, resulting is less confidence that it is not
zero. This may be because preference divergence is measured with greater error.
5This is partially due to difficulty calculating the denominator in Offices of the Secretary and the Office of
the Attorney General because the commercial database used to construct the sample does not identify these
workplaces for non-respondents.
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Table C.23: Models of Politicization
Model (C54) (C55) (C56) (C57)
Dependent Variable Pol. Pol. Pol. Pol.
Subset No restriction At least 5 appointees
Preference Divergence 0.14∗∗∗ 0.03 0.15∗∗∗ −0.07
(Std. Err.) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.13)
Divergence2 0.05† 0.09†
(0.04) (0.06)
SES 0.10∗ 0.11∗ 0.06 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Frequency of Contact 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
τ1 −2.26∗∗∗ −2.30∗∗∗ −2.12∗∗∗ −2.21∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
τ2 −1.59∗∗∗ −1.63∗∗∗ −1.44∗∗∗ −1.52∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
τ3 −1.06∗∗∗ −1.10∗∗∗ −0.95∗∗∗ −1.03∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
τ4 −0.38∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
τ5 0.76∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
τ6 1.69∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
τ7 2.48∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 2.63∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
τ8 3.31∗∗∗ 3.27∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.22) (0.24)
N 1,894 1,894 1,082 1,082
N Clusters 187 187 90 90
Pct. Correctly Predicted 37% 37% 39% 40%
Wald χ2 87.05 86.90 70.73 69.36
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test
† significant at p≤ .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β > 0.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models are ordered probit models.
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Table C.24: Models of Intent to Exit, Effort, and Expertise Investment: No Restriction on
Appointee Response Rate
Model (C58) (C59) (C60) (C61) (C62) (C63)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.09∗∗ 0.00 −0.08∗∗ −0.04∗∗
(0.03) (0.21) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Preference Divergence 0.01 0.79 0.05 0.05 −0.11∗∗ 0.01
(0.06) (0.52) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)
Value Policy Influence −0.05 0.38 0.34∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.34) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.15∗∗∗ 0.43 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.26) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.00 −0.12 −0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.25) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.31∗∗∗ 3.35∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.12 0.09 0.11∗∗
(0.08) (0.64) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.25 −2.26 −0.36 0.01 −0.07 −0.17
(0.33) (1.99) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.20)
SES 0.12 3.10∗∗∗ 0.07 −0.14∗ 0.10 −0.01
(0.09) (0.61) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.004) (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact 0.01 0.71∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.03 0.08∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.04) (0.23) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.79∗∗∗
(0.09)
τ1 & Con. (C59, C63) 0.10 42.51∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗ −0.23 −1.07∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗
(0.23) (1.41) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.12)
τ2 1.15∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.26
(0.23) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
τ3 1.69∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.18) (0.20) (0.22)
τ4 2.37∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.21)
τ5 3.38∗∗∗ 2.90∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.22)
N 800 860 872 873 871 869
N Clusters 171 172 173 172 173 172
R2 0.13 0.16
Pct. Correctly Predicted 47% 35% 30% 51%
Wald χ2 120.98 222.17 57.82 45.44
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C58 and C60 - C62 are ordered probit models. Models C59 and C63 are OLS models.
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Table C.25: Models of Intent to Exit, Effort, and Expertise Investment: At Least 5 Ap-
pointees
Model (C64) (C65) (C66) (C67) (C68) (C69)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.10∗∗ 0.05 −0.08† −0.01 −0.08∗∗ −0.04†
(0.04) (0.27) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Preference Divergence 0.11 0.72 0.07 0.17∗ −0.05 0.07
(0.08) (0.59) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05)
Value Policy Influence −0.07 0.29 0.31∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.39) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.21∗∗∗ 0.42 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.03
(0.05) (0.39) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.04 −0.08 −0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02
(0.05) (0.31) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Approached about a Job 0.32∗∗∗ 2.86∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.06 0.02 0.09
(0.11) (0.77) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.06)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.14 −2.10 −0.07 0.03 0.08 −0.03
(0.46) (2.55) (0.47) (0.39) (0.45) (0.30)
SES 0.06 4.40∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.19∗ 0.12 −0.02
(0.11) (0.74) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07)
Agency Tenure −0.02∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.04) (0.004) (0.01) (0.005) (0.003)
Frequency of Contact 0.05 0.89∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.00 0.09∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.05) (0.25) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Eligible to Retire 0.87∗∗∗
(0.12)
τ1 & Con. (C65, C69) 0.17 42.36∗∗∗ −0.44∗ −0.28 −0.81∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.78) (0.25) (0.25) (0.30) (0.18)
τ2 1.21∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.61∗∗
(0.32) (0.25) (0.26) (0.30)
τ3 1.75∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.23) (0.26) (0.31)
τ4 2.21∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.27)
τ5 3.21∗∗∗ 2.78∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.28)
N 471 501 512 512 513 511
N Clusters 83 83 84 83 84 83
R2 0.19 0.14
Pct. Correctly Predicted 29% 35% 29% 51%
Wald χ2 119.32 124.52 41.89 43.88
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
† significant at p < .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β < 0; χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C64 and C66 - C68 are ordered probit models. Models C65 and C69 are OLS models.
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C.14.2 Models Controlling for Unobserved Agency Characteristics
One concern about the models in the main text is that unobserved agency characteristics
bias the coefficients. For these unobserved agency characteristics to bias the coefficients,
the characteristics must be correlated with the independent variable of interest and the
dependent variable. For example, some agencies are designed to be insulated from polit-
ical control. Some appointed positions have fixed terms with for-cause protections and,
therefore, serve across administrations. Other appointed positions have restrictions on par-
tisanship (i.e., party balancing requirements for some independent commissions) or exper-
tise requirements. (See Lewis 2003, Selin and Lewis 2012, and Selin 2015 for additional
discussion of agency structure.) By limiting the president’s choice of appointees, such
insulating agency characteristics may affect both preference divergence and politicization
raising concerns about omitted variable bias. Another concern related to statistical infer-
ence using these models is that presidents and appointees may concentrate policy influence
among appointees because of agency dysfunction, say inadequate training programs for
employees, that results in less expertise at the agency. Therefore, not controlling for this
dysfunction would bias the estimate of the effect of politicization on expertise investment
because agency dysfunction causes politicization and directly affects expertise investment.6
A similar concern applies to agency dysfunction causing exit and politicization.
In other cases, there may be unobserved agency characteristics that cause employees
to exit more or invest in expertise less, but that are uncorrelated with politicization. For
example, the controls for marketability of skills may not effectively capture variation in
skills at each agency, resulting in a correlation between agency and exit. Or, as discussed
above in Section 13, the usefulness of expertise may vary across agencies.
In this section, I estimate models with agency fixed effects to control for time-invariant
6This concern is limited by the negative effect of politicization on expertise. A common response to poor
performance due to agency dysfunction is to reduce politicization. For example, Director James Lee Witt
reduced the number of appointees at the Federal Emergency Management Agency by one-third in response
to poor performance by the agency (see Lewis 2008 Ch.6).
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unobserved agency characteristics and demonstrate robustness of the models presented in
the main text. Estimating models with agency fixed effects on this data set is problematic.
The agency fixed effects will absorb between agency variation in politicization and prefer-
ence divergence. Additionally, there are often few respondents per agency, and sometimes
as few as one, creating concerns about overfitting the model. In the ordered probit models
estimated on the random half sample, few respondents per agency results in observations
that are completely determined. I address this by limiting the sample to agencies with at
least five respondents when estimating these models with fixed effects.7 I use robust stan-
dard errors that are not clustered on agencies in the ordered probit models so that the Wald
tests are valid. Nonetheless, it is useful to demonstrate the robustness of the models in the
main text using models with agency fixed effects.
Tables C.26 and C.27 estimate the models from Tables 1 and 2 in the main text includ-
ing agency fixed effects. These models show that the relationships demonstrated in the
main text remain when controlling for any systematic time-invariant differences between
agencies, including differences in agency structure. This suggests there is important intra-
agency variation.
7For discussion of fixed effects and ordered probit models, see Greene, William. 2004 “The behaviour
of the maximum likelihood estimator of limited dependent variable models in the presence of fixed effects”.
Econometrics Journal 7: 98-119.
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Table C.26: Models of Politicization with Fixed Effects
Model (C64) (C65)
Dependent Variable Pol. Pol.
Preference Divergence 0.20∗∗∗ −0.10
(0.04) (0.13)
Divergence2 0.13∗∗
(0.05)
SES 0.11∗ 0.12∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.003)
Frequency of Contact 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.03) (0.03)
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes
τ1 −3.45∗∗∗ −3.54∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.36)
τ2 −2.61∗∗∗ −2.69∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.34)
τ3 −2.00∗∗∗ −2.08∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.33)
τ4 −1.24∗∗∗ −1.32∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.32)
τ5 0.04 −0.03
(0.33) (0.32)
τ6 1.07∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.32)
τ7 1.97∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.33)
τ8 3.00∗∗∗ 2.94∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.35)
N 1,630 1,630
N Agencies 173 173
Wald χ2 3450.14 3443.81
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01 in a two-sided test
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
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Table C.27: Models of Intent to Exit, Effort, and Expertise Investment: Controlling for
Unobserved Agency Characteristics
Model (C66) (C67) (C68) (C69) (C70) (C71)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.08† 0.15 −0.18∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.07† −0.06∗∗
(0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Preference Divergence 0.09 0.52 0.02 0.06 −0.19∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.08) (0.60) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
Value Policy Influence −0.08 0.07 0.29∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.40) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.23∗∗∗ 0.20 0.04 0.10∗ 0.08† 0.05∗
(0.06) (0.33) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 0.04 −0.04 0.00
(0.05) (0.32) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.37∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗ 0.06 0.07 −0.02 0.08†
(0.12) (0.75) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.06 −1.63 −0.29 −0.02 −0.03 −0.22
(0.55) (2.34) (0.41) (0.38) (0.47) (0.24)
SES 0.20† 3.20∗∗∗ 0.12 0.07 0.20† 0.03
(0.13) (0.83) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.04) (0.005) (0.005) (0.01) (0.00)
Frequency of Contact with Appointees 0.05 1.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.05 0.01 0.09∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.32) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.86∗∗∗
(0.12)
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
τ1 & Con. (C67, C71) 0.10 43.18∗∗∗ −1.05 −0.39 −0.49 −0.75∗∗∗
(0.61) (1.75) (0.67) (0.46) (0.37) (0.15)
τ2 1.24∗∗ 0.16 0.71 1.01∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.65) (0.45) (0.38)
τ3 1.76∗∗∗ 1.16∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 2.90∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.65) (0.45) (0.40)
τ4 1.99∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.46)
τ5 3.17∗∗∗ 3.37∗∗∗
(0.65) (0.47)
N 501 753 552 553 552 763
N Agencies 59 160 62 62 62 160
R2 0.11 0.15
Wald χ2 201.78 235.53 299.06 223.30
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on agencies in OLS models.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
† significant at p < .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β < 0 or β > 0; χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C66 and C68 - C70 are ordered probit models. Models C67 and C71 are OLS models.
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C.14.3 Replication of Models Using Alternative Measures of Preference Divergence
The models estimated thus far use the average of appointee ideal points to calculate
preference divergence. However, it may be that appointees are doing their best to faith-
fully implement the president’s agenda. In this case, the relevant policy preference does
not belong to appointees, but to President Obama. The tables below replicate models from
the main text using President Obama’s ideal point to calculate preference divergence. The
results are robust to using this alternative measure. The number of observations increases
in these models because I do not need to identify careerists and appointees in the same
agency to calculate preference divergence. Therefore, I can include respondents who se-
lected “Other” as their workplace.
I also use a survey question that asks respondents whose jobs deal with notice-and-
comment rulemaking and/or deciding enforcement priorities about their preferences over
the scope and stringency of regulation at their agency. This measure of preference diver-
gence directly captures preferences relevant to agency policymaking for this subset of re-
spondents. Moreover, controlling for preference divergence regarding scope and stringency
of regulation does not alter the relationship between politicization and exit or politicization
and expertise investment. Models estimated using the regulation-based measure of pref-
erence divergence replicate results from models in the main text, but with less precision
and less confidence due to case loss. The result in Model C85 is similar to the result in
Model C32 from Table C.28, which is expected given that the subset includes respondents
involved in rulemaking.
The question text is below. Online response options were selected from a continuous
scale from 1 to 7 with 1 labeled “Should be decreased significantly,” 4 labeled “About
right,” and 7 labeled “Should be increased significantly.” Respondents that chose the paper
survey could choose integers from 1 to 7.
“Some people think that the scope and stringency of regulation by federal agencies is too burden-
some and should be decreased. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other
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people think that the scope and stringency of regulation by federal agencies is too lax and should be
increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.
Thinking about regulations enforced by [your agency], where would you place yourself on this
scale?”
Table C.28: Models of Politicization using Alternative Measures of Preference Divergence
Model (C72) (C73) (C74) (C75)
Dependent Variable Pol. Pol. Pol. Pol.
Pref. Divergence from Pres. Obama 0.14∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.03) (0.09)
Pref. Divergence from Pres. Obama2 0.08∗∗
(0.03)
Pref. Divergence (Regs.) 0.13∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.05) (0.11)
Pref. Divergence2 (Regs.) 0.04†
(0.03)
SES 0.07 0.07 0.17∗∗ 0.16∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Frequency of Contact 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
τ1 −2.12∗∗∗ −2.20∗∗∗ −2.06∗∗∗ −2.12∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.26) (0.27)
τ2 −1.55∗∗∗ −1.62∗∗∗ −1.65∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.22) (0.23)
τ3 −1.05∗∗∗ −1.12∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗∗ −1.05∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.18)
τ4 −0.36∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.32∗ −0.39∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.18)
τ5 0.77∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18)
τ6 1.70∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.18)
τ7 2.47∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.19)
τ8 3.26∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 3.28∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.27) (0.28)
N 2,354 2,354 623 623
N Clusters 227 227 103 103
Pct. Correctly Predicted 38% 37% 42% 42%
Wald χ2 118.47 121.43 42.77 52.43
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test
† significant at p < .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β > 0.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models are ordered probit models.
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Table C.29: Models of Intent to Exit, Effort, and Expertise Investment: Preference Diver-
gence from President Obama
Model (C76) (C77) (C78) (C79) (C80) (C81)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.06∗∗ −0.02 −0.11∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.10∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Pref. Divergence from Pres. Obama 0.04 1.08∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07 −0.08∗ 0.02
(0.05) (0.33) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Value Policy Influence −0.03 0.49∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.29) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.01 −0.03 −0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.22) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.39∗∗∗ 3.11∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.10 0.13∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.55) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.22 −2.35 −0.15 0.02 0.00 −0.08
(0.30) (1.81) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27) (0.18)
SES 0.13∗ 2.88∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.15∗ 0.10 −0.03
(0.08) (0.54) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.004) (0.02) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact 0.00 0.93∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.03 0.09∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.03) (0.21) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.78∗∗∗
(0.08)
τ1 & Con. (C77, C81) 0.25 41.76∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗ −0.16 −1.03∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗
(0.22) (1.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.12)
τ2 1.30∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.24
(0.22) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21)
τ3 1.84∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.17) (0.19) (0.22)
τ4 2.40∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.20)
τ5 3.37∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.20)
N 973 1,047 1,061 1,061 1,060 1,057
N Clusters 203 204 205 204 205 204
R2 0.14 0.16
Pct. Correctly Predicted 51% 35% 31% 51%
Wald χ2 163.30 264.62 63.54 51.50
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test; χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C76 and C78 - C80 are ordered probit models. Models C77 and C81 are OLS models.
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Table C.30: Models of Intent to Exit, Effort, and Expertise Investment: Regulation Based
Measure of Preference Divergence
Model (C82) (C83) (C84) (C85) (C86) (C87)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.09† −0.28 −0.12∗ −0.11∗ −0.09† −0.08∗∗
(0.06) (0.31) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Pref. Divergence (Regs.) 0.14∗ 0.80† 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.08) (0.48) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05)
Value Policy Influence −0.18∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.01 0.17∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.08) (0.34) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.20∗∗∗ 0.69† 0.09† 0.16∗∗∗ 0.09 0.09∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.49) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03)
Value Gov’t Promotion 0.00 −0.58† −0.06 0.02 0.05 −0.01
(0.06) (0.41) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Approached about a Job 0.32∗∗ 3.27∗∗∗ 0.02 0.19∗ 0.04 0.07
(0.14) (0.98) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07)
Agency-Specific Expertise −0.76 3.62 −0.59 −0.40 0.27 −0.25
(0.61) (2.95) (0.48) (0.54) (0.59) (0.32)
SES 0.08 3.96∗∗∗ 0.13 −0.12 0.11 0.02
(0.15) (0.82) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.09)
Agency Tenure 0.00 0.10∗ −0.01∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003)
Frequency of Contact −0.02 1.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.09† 0.10∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
with Appointees (0.07) (0.30) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Eligible to Retire 0.82∗∗∗
(0.14)
τ1 & Con. (C83, C87) −0.13 38.01∗∗∗ −1.26∗∗∗ −1.08∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.74) (0.36) (0.39) (0.32) (0.21)
τ2 0.88∗∗∗ 0.12 −0.06 0.60∗∗
(0.32) (0.33) (0.39) (0.30)
τ3 1.51∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.73∗ 2.39∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.32) (0.41) (0.32)
τ4 1.92∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.42)
τ5 2.87∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.43)
N 261 287 291 291 292 290
N Clusters 83 84 84 83 84 83
R2 0.23 0.15
Pct. Correctly Predicted 17% 35% 31% 60%
Wald χ2 81.50 90.98 20.05 28.60
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
† significant at p < .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β > 0 or β > 0; χ2 tests significant at p < .03.
Models C82 and C84 - C86 are ordered probit models. Models C83 and C87 are OLS models.
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C.14.4 Replication of Models Using Alternative Measures of Politicization
A common measure of politicization in the literature is percentage of employees in an agency that
are appointees as developed by Lewis (2008). I prefer the measure of politicization from the survey
because individual perceptions better measure the relationship between appointees and careerists,
such as whether appointees and careerists are working together or whether careerists are excluded
from policymaking. Nonetheless, estimating the models of career decisions from the main text is a
useful robustness check.
I calculated the percentage of appointees two ways. First, I used the September 2014 FedScope
employment data from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which corresponds to the be-
ginning of the field period for the survey. The OPM data identifies Schedule C appointees and
Non-Career Members of the SES. I coded employees as presidential appointees requiring Senate
confirmation if they are on the Executive Schedule Pay Plan and have an Excepted Service Ex-
ecutive Appointment Type. Political appointees that do not require Senate confirmation are not
identified in the OPM data. This type of appointment is typically in the Executive Office of the
President. I then calculated the percentage of appointees in the total workforce for each agency I
can match to the OPM data.8 This measure is denoted “OPM.” Second, I calculated the percent-
age of appointees in each agency using the survey target population of 14,698 federal executives.
This measure, which captures the percentage of appointees in each agency’s senior management, is
denoted “FYB.”9
Tables C.31 and C.32 replicate the models of career decisions from the main text using the mea-
sures of percentage of total staff (OPM) and senior staff (FYB) that are appointees. The relationship
between politicization and exit is not replicated. Importantly, the relationship between expertise
investment and politicization is negative using these alternative measures of politicization and coef-
ficients are distinguishable from zero with a high degree of confidence. The replication of the results
from the main text is reassuring. Finally, there is suggestive evidence that increasing the proportion
8Two notable omissions are the Department of State and the Department of Energy. The Department
of State only reports employment data for the entire department. Similarly, the Department of Energy only
reports employment data for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the entire department.
9Respondents in the Offices of the Secretary and the Office of the Attorney are excluded because the
correct denominator cannot be determined from the commercial database.
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of appointees in senior management reduces the hours careerists typically work per week. It may
be that at agencies with a smaller proportion of appointees careerists must be assigned work so that
tasks are completed on time. Whereas a greater proportion of appointees allows delegation of more
work to appointees, which results in fewer tasks delegated to careerists and fewer hours worked per
week.
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Table C.31: Models Estimated with an Alternative Measure of Politicization - OPM
Model (C87) (C88) (C89) (C90) (C91) (C92)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization (OPM) 0.41 −3.40 −3.12† −4.66∗∗ −4.33† −3.23∗∗
(1.40) (17.18) (1.94) (1.88) (2.81) (1.39)
Preference Divergence 0.01 1.36∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.14 −0.09† 0.07
(0.06) (0.62) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04)
Value Policy Influence −0.06 0.20 0.32∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.40) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.17∗∗∗ 0.36 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.03
(0.05) (0.34) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.04 −0.00 −0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.33) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.19∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 0.12 0.20∗∗ −0.01 0.11∗
(0.09) (0.82) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
Agency-Specific Expertise −0.01 −3.85† −0.30 −0.27 0.00 −0.22
(0.40) (2.38) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.24)
SES 0.04 3.43∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.12 0.16∗ 0.00
(0.11) (0.67) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.005) (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact with Appointees 0.05 0.78∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.08∗ −0.03 0.07∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.26) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.81∗∗∗
(0.10)
τ1 & Con. (C88, C92) 0.03 42.44∗∗∗ −0.45∗ −0.35 −0.89∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗
(0.25) (1.66) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.15)
τ2 1.04∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.39
(0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
τ3 1.56∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25)
τ4 2.22∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.24)
τ5 3.16∗∗∗ 2.80∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.25)
N 606 649 659 659 660 658
N Clusters 132 133 134 134 134 134
R2 0.15 0.15
Pct. Correctly Predicted 48% 34% 30% 51%
Wald χ2 89.02 134.77 49.76 52.24
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
† significant at p < .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β < 0; χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C87 and C89 - C91 are ordered probit models. Models C88 and C92 are OLS models.
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Table C.32: Models Estimated with an Alternative Measure of Politicization - FYB
Model (C92) (C93) (C94) (C95) (C96) (C97)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization (FYB) −0.16 −4.52† −0.65∗ −0.91† −1.29∗∗∗ −0.69∗∗
(0.49) (3.00) (0.37) (0.57) (0.40) (0.27)
Preference Divergence −0.01 1.06∗ 0.05 0.07 −0.12∗∗ 0.02
(0.06) (0.58) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04)
Value Policy Influence −0.05 0.22 0.30∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.36) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.15∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.04
(0.04) (0.29) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.01 −0.20 −0.04 0.02 0.01 −0.00
(0.04) (0.29) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.28∗∗∗ 3.49∗∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.11 0.02 0.10∗
(0.09) (0.75) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.22 −3.44∗ −0.46† −0.17 −0.04 −0.25
(0.36) (2.04) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.22)
SES 0.12 3.12∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.15∗ 0.17∗∗ −0.01
(0.10) (0.70) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.005) (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact with Appointees 0.02 0.91∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00 0.10∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.28) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.84∗∗∗
(0.10)
τ1 & Con. (C93, C97) 0.05 42.57∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.39∗ −1.04∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗
(0.23) (1.50) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.14)
τ2 1.09∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.29
(0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
τ3 1.63∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23)
τ4 2.09∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.22)
τ5 3.11∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.24)
N 678 721 730 730 730 728
N Clusters 150 150 151 151 151 151
R2 0.15 0.16
Pct. Correctly Predicted 41% 34% 31% 53%
Wald χ2 104.86 144.06 53.72 63.25
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
† significant at p < .10 in a one-sided test of HA: β < 0; χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C92 and C94 - C96 are ordered probit models. Models C93 and C97 are OLS models.
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C.14.5 The Parallel Regression Assumption
Ordered probit models assume the coefficients on the independent variables do not vary across
response categories. As discussed by Woolridge,10 this arises from the underlying latent variable
formulation. Essentially, the intercept shift between cut points inside the nonlinear cumulative
distribution function determines the differences in predicted probabilities across categories if the
independent variables are held constant.
I use generalized ordered probit models as implemeted by the gologit2 package to evaluate the
validity of the parallel regressions assumption. As explained by Williams (2006),11 the autofit
option in gologit2 goes through an iterative process of fitting a series of binary probit regres-
sions that group categories in sequence of their order and then executes a series of Wald tests on
each variable to determine whether its coefficients vary across these binary models. If at least one
coefficent has an insignificant Wald test, then the coefficent with the largest p-value is constrained
to be the same across response categories and the process is repeated until all coefficients that have
an insignificant test are constrained.
Table C.33 gives the coefficients on the key independent variable for each ordered probit model
from the main text estimated using a generalized ordered probit model that relaxes the parallel
regression assumption for variables that may violate it using a 95% level of confidence. The co-
efficients on the independent variables of interest do not violate the parallel regression assumption
as demonstrated by the p-values for the tests of each coefficient. (The null hypothesis is that the
coefficients are equal across models.) Importantly, there is little difference in predicted probabilities
shown in Figure 1 and predicted probabilities estimated using the generalized ordered probit mod-
els. Specifically, the differences in predicted probabilities are less than 1.3 percentage points, and
often less than 1 percentage point. Marginal effects remain distinguishable from zero with a high
degree of confidence.
10See pages 658-659 of “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Second Edition” by
Woolridge for additional discussion.
11See Williams, Richard. 2006. “Generalized ordered logit/partial proportional odds models for ordi-
nal dependent variables”. The Stata Journal 6 (1): 58-82. For discussion of the probit link function, see:
http://www3.nd.edu/ rwilliam/gologit2/gologit2.pdf.
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Table C.33: Models of Intent to Exit and Expertise Investment: Evaluating the Parallel
Regression Assumption
Model (C98) (C99) (C100) (C101) (C102) (C103)
Dependent Variable Pol Pol Exit Outside SME Training
Divergence 0.14∗∗∗−0.02
(Std. Err.) (0.04) (0.10)
Divergence2 0.07∗
(0.04)
Politicization 0.07∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.00 −0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wald Test P-value (Coefficient) 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.37 0.34
Wald Test P-value (Divergence2) 0.07
Coefficients are estimated using a generalized ordered probit model that relaxes the parallel regression as-
sumption for variables that may violate it. For each model, the variables with coefficients that are not con-
strained across models are: Models C98 and C99: SES and Frequency of Contact with Appointees; Model
C100: Retirement Eligibility; Model C101: Agency-Specific Expertise; Model C102: Preference Divergence;
Model C103: Approached about a Job and Agency Tenure. ∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a
two-sided test. Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses, except in Model POL1. Cluster-
ing the standard errors results in one observation that has a negative predicted probability with one outcome,
which is a problem with these generalized models. Therefore, I use robust standard errors without clustering
for this model. Clustering the standard errors also rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient on pref-
erence divergence meets the parallel regressions assumption (p=0.047). Importantly, using robust standard
errors without clustering generates the same coefficient and standard error shown in the main text.
C.15 Testing for Conditional Effects of Preference Divergence and Value of Policy Influence
Theory suggests two conditional hypotheses about the effect of politicization on exit intention
and investment frequency. First, as the policy influence of political appointees increases relative
to the influence of senior career civil servants, the more agency policymaking will be determined
by political appointees. If appointees mostly determine policy, then careerists will suffer greater
utility loss from agency policymaking as preference divergence between appointees and careerists
increases. This yields the following hypotheses:
H2a: The positive association between the likelihood that civil servants’ express intent to exit the
agency and politicization should increase as the preference divergence between civil servants
and appointees increases.
H3a: The negative association between civil servants’ frequency of investment in policy expertise
and politicization should decrease as the preference divergence between civil servants and
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appointees increases.
Second, the measure of politicization captures actions by appointees that limit career civil ser-
vant’s policy influence (i.e., policy discretion). Therefore, politicization reduces utility only for
civil servants who care about policy, and the losses should be greater the more the civil servants
care about policy. This yields the following hypotheses:
H2b: The positive association between the likelihood that civil servants’ express intent to exit the
agency and politicization should increase as the value civil servants place on policy influence
increases.
H3b: The negative association between civil servants’ frequency of investment in policy exper-
tise and politicization should decrease as the value civil servants place on policy influence
increases.
Tables C.34 and C.35 contain models testing these conditional hypotheses. There is little support
for any of the hypotheses. The coefficients on the interaction of politicization and preference di-
vergence are not distinguishable from zero with a high degree of confidence in any model and they
are sometimes incorrectly signed. The coefficients on the interaction of politicization and the value
civil servants place on policy influence are generally not distinguishable from zero with a high de-
gree of confidence. The exceptions are the model of expertise investment by attending training and
seminars and the model of latent expertise investment (as measured by a factor score). While this
is suggestive evidence supporting H3b, at least for some investment tasks, a stronger claim requires
evidence that exhibits greater consistency across models.
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Table C.34: Effect of Politicization Conditional on Preference Divergence
Model (C104) (C105) (C106) (C107) (C108) (C109)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.07 0.46 −0.04 0.03 −0.14∗∗ −0.03
(0.05) (0.40) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Preference Divergence −0.02 1.15∗ 0.10∗ 0.07 −0.14∗∗ 0.03
(0.07) (0.59) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04)
Pol. × Pref. Div. 0.00 −0.46 −0.05 −0.04 0.05 −0.02
(0.05) (0.34) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Value Policy Influence −0.06 0.31 0.32∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.36) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.16∗∗∗ 0.42 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.30) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.01 −0.08 −0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.28) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.31∗∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 0.12 0.13∗ 0.05 0.10∗
(0.09) (0.72) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.23 −3.15 −0.47 0.00 −0.03 −0.20
(0.36) (2.16) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.22)
SES 0.14 2.86∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.12 0.14 −0.01
(0.10) (0.66) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.005) (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact with Appointees 0.01 0.74∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.02 0.09∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.25) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.81∗∗∗
(0.09)
τ1 & Con. (C105, C109) 0.05 42.45∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗ −0.25 −0.99∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗
(0.24) (1.51) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.13)
τ2 1.09∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.32
(0.24) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
τ3 1.63∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22)
τ4 2.26∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.22)
τ5 3.27∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.23)
N 710 753 765 765 765 763
N Clusters 159 160 161 160 161 160
R2 0.13 0.15
Pct. Correctly Predicted 45% 35% 30% 52%
Wald χ2 110.91 195.82 49.89 47.27
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C104 and C106 - C108 are ordered probit models. Models C105 and C109 are OLS models.
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Table C.35: Effect of Politicization Conditional on Value of Policy Influence
Model (C110) (C111) (C112) (C113) (C114) (C115)
Dependent Variable Exit Effort Outside SME Training Factor
Politicization 0.11 0.47 0.00 0.06 0.15∗ 0.04
(0.08) (0.74) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06)
Pol × Policy Infl. −0.02 −0.15 −0.03 −0.02 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.03∗
(0.03) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Preference Divergence −0.02 0.86 0.06 0.05 −0.11∗∗ 0.02
(0.06) (0.58) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)
Value Policy Influence −0.05 0.37 0.34∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.38) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Value Pvt. Sector Job 0.16∗∗∗ 0.42 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03
(0.04) (0.30) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Value Gov’t Promotion −0.01 −0.07 −0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.28) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Approached about a Job 0.31∗∗∗ 3.46∗∗∗ 0.12 0.13∗ 0.05 0.10∗
(0.09) (0.72) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Agency-Specific Expertise 0.23 −3.34 −0.50 −0.01 −0.03 −0.22
(0.36) (2.15) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.22)
SES 0.14 2.86∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.12 0.15∗ −0.01
(0.10) (0.67) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Agency Tenure −0.01∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.005) (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Frequency of Contact with Appointees 0.01 0.74∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.02 0.09∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.25) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Eligible to Retire 0.81∗∗∗
(0.10)
τ1 & Con. (C111, C115) 0.07 42.48∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗ −0.24 −0.86∗∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗
(0.24) (1.50) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.14)
τ2 1.11∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(0.24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
τ3 1.65∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22)
τ4 2.28∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.23)
τ5 3.28∗∗∗ 2.84∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.24)
N 710 753 765 765 765 763
N Clusters 159 160 161 160 161 160
R2 0.13 0.16
Pct. Correctly Predicted 45% 35% 29% 52%
Wald χ2 111.93 192.38 50.75 57.19
Robust standard errors clustered on agencies in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01 in a two-sided test.
χ2 tests significant at p < .01.
Models C110 and C112 - C114 are ordered probit models. Models C111 and C115 are OLS models.
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